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Abstract 
This thesis examines the content and process of change associated with deregulation of 
the electricity industries in New Zealand and The Gambia by studying the scope of 
change, the process of implementation, the obstacles to change and the outcomes of 
change. The study employs a case study methodology using semi-structured interviews 
for primary data collection. A total of fifty-one respondents comprising senior managers, 
consultants and administrators were interviewed in both countries. Both manual and 
computer-aided analyses was carried out. Apart from providing a better understanding of 
the change process, the study makes three contributions to the literature on organisational 
change. First, it shows that internally initiated, controlled and implemented change 
processes are more likely to achieve their desired outcomes compared to change 
processes initiated, controlled and implemented from outside the organisation. Second, it 
demonstrates the crucial role of trust in facilitating effective change. Third, it illustrates 
the importance of the selection process in establishing and nurturing trust in 
organisations. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
The oil shocks of the early and late seventies resulted in a general decline in most 
world economies. Most of these economies were government controlled and 
government commercial activities made a significant contribution to the gross 
domestic product (GDP) in these countries (Bollard and Buckle, 1987). Government 
controlled companies undertaking commercial activities were, in most cases, found to 
be performing less well than similar companies in the private sector (Kent, 1987; 
Babai, 1988; Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley, 1992; Mathieu, 1996). With the worsening of 
economic conditions in the eighties, most governments, therefore, decided to carry out 
reforms to make their economies more vibrant and better able to withstand future 
shocks. Most governments embarked on economic liberalisation programmes. 
Included in these liberalisation programmes was the reform of state trading activities 
(Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Reforms in most countries were motivated by a concern 
to establish structures and procedures that would contribute to, rather than impede, 
organisational efficiency and effectiveness (Boston et. aI, 1991). Most countries 
embarked upon organisational change in the state-trading sector that involved the 
introduction of some form of privatisation into the sector. 
This study examines the changes that have taken place in the electricity industries in 
New Zealand and The Gambia. New Zealand started its economic reform process in 
1984 and since then it has been at the forefront of change in the OEeD (Bollard and 
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Mayes, 1991; Duncan and Bollard, 1992; Massey, 1995) in both government 
commercial activities and the core public sector. The reforms adopted in New 
Zealand have become models which have won acclaim from institutions such as the 
World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Some of the reforms 
introduced in New Zealand have been adopted as international models and formed the 
basis for reform in other OEeD countries (Boston et. al., 1996; Spicer et. al., 1996). 
Being a third world country devoid of any natural resources, The Gambia is 
dependent on aid from Western countries and Western lending agencies to assist it in 
its economic development. A substantial part of the state budget in The Gambia 
comes from the external aid received from donor countries and bilateral partners. As 
a result of this dependence on external sources for aid, external agencies made future 
aid to The Gambia contingent on the country undertaking economic liberalisation 
programmes. Several reform programmes have been initiated but these have mainly 
been confined to fiscal reform and reform in state trading activities. 
Economic efficiency in the electricity industry in any country is important as 
electricity is an engme of economic growth. The efficiencies obtained in the 
electricity industry could translate to other sectors of the economy as electricity is 
utilised in almost all sectors of an economy. In both New Zealand and The Gambia 
changes were carried out to establish structures and procedures that would enhance 
the efficiency and effectiveness of their respective electricity industries. In order to 
remove the tight government controls of the. seventies in both industries, there was a 
revitalisation of managerial structures and the extrication of managerial authority 
from the constraints of centrally prescribed rules and procedures. 
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Internationally, privatisation has been widely adopted to bring about economic reform 
in public enterprises (Mascarenhas, 1991). In New Zealand, change in state trading 
activities in the electricity industry came in the form of corporatisation followed by 
deregulation, whereby the industry was opened up to competition. Further 
privatisation in the form of the reallocation of property rights was carried out in a few 
sectors of the industry (particularly on the demand side - distribution and retailing), 
although the bulk of the industry (the supply side - generation and transmission) still 
remains under government control. 
In The Gambia, change in the electricity industry came through the parastatal route (in 
most developing countries, especially in Africa, state owned enterprises are known as 
parastatals), where the industry was expected to operate commercially. This change 
was similar to the corporatisation programme in New Zealand. Change in the 
industry in The Gambia also occurred through a management lease where the 
operational aspect of electricity provision and distribution was contracted out to a 
private sector company. The government in recent years has become more open to 
more private sector participation in the electricity industry by encouraging the 
introduction of Independent Power Producers (IPP) in the industry. Further 
privatisation is an option that is under serious consideration, but at present all 
electricity assets in The Gambia are vested in the State. 
1.2 Research Design 
This study was guided by a set of research questions that could best be answered 
using a qualitative methodology. Qualitative techniques are appropriate in the 
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investigation of dynamic processes such as a change process (Merriam, 1988; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). Qualitative techniques are able to capture, describe, decode 
and interpret the precise meanings of phenomena occurring in their normal and social 
contexts (Fryer, 1991). A case study method of inquiry was chosen for the study, as it 
was considered suitable to gain an in-depth understanding (Merriam, 1988) of the 
change process. A multi-case design was used for the investigation because with 
multi-case designs it is possible to understand how the cases forming the study are 
affected by local conditions (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This understanding, 
according to Miles and Huberman (1994), assists in the development of sophisticated 
descriptions and powerful explanations of the phenomenon under study. A multi-case 
design also allowed me to evaluate and contrast the consequences of the rather 
different trajectories of transformation that occurred in the two countries. An 
inductive approach was used in the investigation. There were no a priori theoretical 
propositions, as the aim of the study was to better understand the process of 
organisational change and to examine the context in which change occurred. 
1.3 Significance of the Study 
The research described in this thesis is important for a number of theoretical and 
practical reasons. First, the majority of studies on organisational change have been 
carried out in single country settings focusing mainly on Western experiences. There 
is a dearth of organisational change studies in less developed countries (Hanke, 1987). 
This study, which is comparative in nature, has the potential of furthering our 
understanding of the process of change by comparing the experiences of a developed 
country with the experiences of a developing one. It also has the potential of 
contributing to the scholarly literature on the organisational change process. 
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Comparative studies are always of interest to scholars as very useful lessons can be 
learnt from such studies (Castles et. aI, 1996). Such a study can provide a more 
systematic knowledge to the field and a more explanatory account of the change 
process, as it has evolved in the two countries. It also has the potential of filling the 
existing gaps in our understanding of the process of change, especially in LDCs. 
Second, the global economic landscape is undergoing unprecedented change and that 
is clearly evident in the adoption of privatisation as a strategy on a worldwide basis 
(Newman, 2000). There are many benefits that could be achieved through global 
integration and privatisation (Rutland, 1997). One such industry that could benefit 
from global integration and privatisation is the electricity industry. Many electricity 
companies are in the process of forming global alliances and it is an industry where 
significant change has been experienced and continues to be experienced worldwide. 
This makes the industry suitable for the study of the process of organisational change. 
New Zealand has been at the forefront of electricity reform, and this study, which 
details the changes in New Zealand and their consequences together with the changes 
in The Gambia, will have potential application worldwide. Such a study will be of 
interest to those countries contemplating undertaking electricity reforms of their own. 
It will also be of interest to those countries that are contemplating going into 
partnership arrangements with other countries. 
Third, this study looks at organisational and institutional changes that have been 
internally generated and organisational and institutional changes that have been 
prescribed from outside. The study has the potential of contributing to a better 
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understanding of internally versus externally generated change programmes and their 
consequences. 
1.4 The Gambia and New Zealand Electricity Industries 
The New Zealand electricity industry is made up of generation, transmission, 
distribution and retailing sectors. The generating system consists of two AC sub-
systems, based in the North and South Islands respectively. Most of the electricity 
generated is produced in the South Island whereas consumption is greater in the North 
Island. Due to this disparity in supply and consumption concentrations, the two sub-
systems are connected by a 1040/1 086MW submarine HVDC cable across Cook 
Strait. Seventy-five percent of New Zealand's electricity requirements are met from 
hydro plants, seven percent from geothermal and the remainder from a variety of 
thermal plants mainly using gas as the source of fuel (Read, 1997). The total 
generating capacity in the New Zealand electricity industry is around 8700MW 
(Contact Energy, 1998). The entire New Zealand electricity system is interconnected 
through a National Grid system. Nation-wide transmission is achieved through 
12,000 kilometres of high voltage AC lines and 600 kilometres of high voltage DC 
lines (Transpower Website). The transmission lines connect power stations to the 
distribution lines of local power companies. Large industrial users are directly 
connected to the grid. 
The supply and demand sides of the industry in New Zealand are separated, making 
the industry a complex one. The industry requires a significant amount of co-
ordination between the various sectors to ensure that a reasonable amount of security 
is maintained at all times to prevent power outages. The distributors, on the demand 
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side, who were historically responsible for distribution and retailing are responsible 
for the supply of electricity from the transmission grid to the customer premises. 
More than ninety-nine percent of New Zealand homes receive their electricity through 
distributors. The distributors in New Zealand together service a total of around 1.3 
million electricity consumers (Read, 1997). The retail companies who are responsible 
for selling electricity to the consumer are now responsible for the installation of 
electricity meters and revenue collection. This was historically the responsibility of 
distributors, but with the reforms in 1998 this sector was split off from distributors. 
The Gambian electricity industry is dependent on thermal means for generation. 
There is one main power station that provides power for the capital Banjul and its 
environs. The rated generating capacity of this station is 28MW but, due to the fact 
that some of the generators are old, the station has been de-rated to 23MW (Nawec 
Website). There are six stations in the main provincial centres in the country serving 
the areas surrounding the centre (Cham, 1997). The capacity of these stations varies 
however; the capacity of the largest provincial generating station is less than 1MW 
(Cham, 1997). The network covering the Greater Banjul area is the largest with about 
fifty kilometres of high voltage transmission lines. There is no interconnection 
between the stations and hence no national grid system due to the distances involved 
and due to the fact that most of the people living in some of the villages in between 
provincial centres and the Greater Banjul area do not have the means to pay for 
electricity supply. 
The Electricity Company in The Gambia is responsible for both the demand and 
supply sides of the industry making it a vertically integrated company. There is a 
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significant gap between the demand for services and the existing capacity of the 
system (Nawec, 1999), with demand far outstripping supply. The company is also 
responsible for revenue collection. However, the full amount of revenue due from 
customers for their consumption is not realised because of illegal tampering of meters 
at customers' premises, and metering and billing errors (Nawec, 1999). Nawec 
estimates that about 40% of its generation is not accounted for as a result of illegal 
tampering and losses on the old and poorly maintained transmission and distribution 
lines (Nawec Website). The company has a total registered customer base of 44, 000 
consumers. The company also has responsibility for water production and 
distribution as well as sewerage disposal. 
1.5 Overview of the Thesis 
The thesis contains seven chapters. This chapter introduced the study and outlines the 
research design, the significance of the study and a brief overview of the electricity 
industries in New Zealand and The Gambia. 
Chapter two discusses the research methodology used in the study. It describes the 
research design and justifies the use of the qualitative paradigm and case study 
methodology as the methodology of choice. The chapter looks at multi-case studies 
and the reason why this study employed a multi-case design. The chapter details the 
researcher's biases and also outlines the data collection strategies used in the research. 
The methods of analysis used in the thesis are detailed and issues of internal validity, 
reliability and generalis ability are discussed. ' 
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Chapter three exammes the theories and concepts that constitute the analytical 
framework used to describe and explain the changes that have been undertaken in the 
electricity industries both in New Zealand and The Gambia. The most appropriate 
strand guiding the thesis is the literature on privatisation and deregulation. However, 
the chapter also discusses an array of competing theories drawn from many 
disciplines and perspectives. 
Chapter four outlines and discusses the various changes that have taken place in the 
electricity industry in New Zealand. The manner of implementation and the problems 
encountered during implementation are also discussed. The chapter concludes by 
discussing the outcomes of the change programme in New Zealand. 
Chapter five outlines and discusses the various changes undertaken in the electricity 
industry in The Gambia. The manner of implementation, the problems encountered 
and the outcomes of the changes in the various eras of change are also discussed. 
Chapter six carries out a cross-case comparison of the changes in New Zealand and 
The Gambia. It looks at the factors influencing the transformation process in both 
countries and the level of government participation in the change process. The 
patterns of organisational change adopted by both countries are compared and 
contrasted. 
The conclusions drawn from the two cases in chapters four and five and the cross-case 
analysis in chapter six are discussed in chapter seven. A model incorporating the 
prominent role of trust in the organisational change process has been developed and is 
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explained in the chapter. The chapter concludes by outlining the implications of the 
research for policy, managerial practice and future research. 
Appendix One reviews the various pieces of legislation that have guided the reform 
process in both New Zealand and The Gambia. Appendix Two outlines the "aide-
memoire" that guided the interviewing process. 
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Chapter 2 
Research Methodology 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the methodology used in this research. It starts out by 
discussing the factors governing the research design. The chapter also gives an 
overview of the qualitative research paradigm and the case study methodology and 
explains why they were chosen for the purposes of developing a better understanding 
of the change process. The data collection strategies and the analysis techniques used 
during the research process are also discussed and the chapter concludes by discussing 
validity and reliability issues concerning the study. 
2.2 Research Design 
In social science research it is recommended that research be guided by a set of 
research questions (Creswell, 1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994) in order 
to focus the researcher on the issues to be researched. Initially I found it difficult to 
narrow my research interest and express them in the form of a question(s) due to the 
fact that I was also interested in undertaking a study that would make some 
meaningful contribution to the development of The Gambia. However, after much 
contemplation, I decided to settle on researching the organisational change process as 
The Gambia had undertaken many change programmes in the past and most change 
programmes had not achieved the desired change objectives. More changes were 
being planned to make the economy more efficient and the planned changes included 
more private sector participation in the economy. It was therefore imperative to 
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ascertain why change programmes in The Gambia had not achieved the change 
objectives before embarking on further changes. 
I decided to undertake a comparative study of change in New Zealand and The 
Gambia. New Zealand offered a unique opportunity to study change as it was at the 
forefront of change both within the SOE sector as well as the public sector in the 
OEeD (Boston et. aI, 1996). New Zealand had undergone changes in its economy to 
make it more robust and efficient and to be better able to withstand future economic 
shocks. Kelsey (1993), an ideological opponent of the changes in New Zealand, 
acknowledges that most of the changes, especially those in the SOE sector, have been 
successful and are now being used as models of change by the World Bank and IMP. 
The electricity industry was chosen as the industry to undertake a study of the process 
of organisational change in both countries, as both industries had undergone changes 
in the last fifteen years and were still undergoing further change. The electricity 
industry in New Zealand had undergone significant change, which had seen it 
transformed from a loss making government department to profit making SOEs 
(Spicer et. aI, 1991, 1996). The Gambia had also undertaken reform in various sectors 
of the Gambian economy including its electricity sector which had been transformed 
from a government department to an SOE, albeit a loss making one. There existed, 
therefore, a unique opportunity to study the organisational change process brought 
about through privatisation in the electricity industry in two different settings - a 
developed and a developing country. Such a.study, it was felt, would result in a better 
understanding of the organisational change process. 
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Change in the electricity industry was not only confined to New Zealand and The 
Gambia, but utilities worldwide had also undergone many changes involving the 
utilisation of privatisation concepts over the last decade. Change in the electricity 
industry was largely due to the important role electricity plays in economic 
development. Most of the changes in the electricity industry in New Zealand and 
other OECD countries were well documented allowing me the opportunity to access 
secondary data as well as the wider literature on privatisation and deregulation of 
utilities. 
I developed two initial research questions to guide the research process. The initial 
research questions were stated thus: 
• What was the nature of the restructuring process in the electricity industry 
in New Zealand? 
• How was it similar or different to the restructuring process in the 
electricity industry in The Gambia? 
The research questions were meant to serve as a guide in the research process, as well 
as the selection of a suitable research paradigm and an inquiry strategy (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1990). Eisenhardt (1989) and Miles and Huberman (1994) suggest that in 
inductive research it is best if the researcher starts with a general research question 
that could be narrowed down as the research progresses. 
Two other research questions (sub-questions) were developed later from the initial 
research questions (Creswell, 1994) and these were used to guide the research 
process, especially during the data collection phase. The sub-questions were: 
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• What forces have prompted reform in The Gambia and in New 
Zealand? 
• What approaches to reform have been undertaken and why? 
2.3 Research Paradigm 
The fundamental objective the thesis set out to address, through the research 
questions, was to develop a better understanding of the change process. It was felt 
that the outcome of such a study would be rich due to the diverse nature of the sites 
being investigated. Pettigrew (1988) notes that "there is a dearth of studies which can 
make statements about the how and why of change, about the processual dynamics of 
change ... which go beyond the analysis of change and begin to theorise about 
changing" (p.15). The dearth of studies (Wilson, 1992; Cuervo and Villanlonga, 
2000), on the 'how' and 'why' of change is due to the difficulty and complexity 
involved in studying the change process especially where change has already taken 
place or is taking place (as was experienced in both New Zealand and The Gambia). 
Social science research lends itself to either a qualitative or a quantitative method, or 
a mixed method including both qualitative and quantitative techniques of 
investigation. These methods are simply denotations of different ways of conducting 
social investigations and the suitability of any method depends on the research 
questions and the nature of the investigation (Bryman, 1988). There has been an 
ongoing debate as to the relative merits and disadvantages of these two styles of 
conducting research. Filstead (1970), Cronbach, (1975), Cook and Reichardt, (1979), 
Lincoln and Guba, (1985), Patton (1986, 1988c), and Fetterman (1989) provide in-
depth reviews of the qualitative and quantitative paradigms debate. 
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2.3.1 Qualitative Research 
The research questions as stated above lend themselves to the use of a qualitative 
methodology. Qualitative techniques are appropriate in the investigation of dynamic 
processes, such as a change process, as they are able to capture, describe, decode and 
interpret the precise meanings of phenomena occurring in their normal and social 
contexts (Fryer, 1991). 
Qualitative techniques of inquiry emerge from the phenomenological and interpretive 
paradigms, which emphasise a constructivist approach. It is based on the constructs 
that people use in order to render the world meaningful and intelligible to them 
(Bryman, 1988; Patton, 1990; Cassell and Symon, 1994; Merriam and Simpson, 1995; 
Merriam, 1998). Two defining characteristics of the qualitative research method 
include the focus on interpretation rather than quantification and concern with the 
context (Cassell and Symon, 1994), both of which are important in the study of the 
change process. Qualitative techniques make use of a holistic approach, which allows 
for the assembling of a comprehensive and complete picture of the process under 
investigation (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984; Patton, 1987, 1990; Miles and Huberman, 
1994). 
Qualitative research takes place in natural settings and has been described as 
naturalistic, because the researcher does not manipulate the programme or participants 
for the purpose of the research (Reichardt and Cook, 1979; Guba and Lincoln, 1981; 
Bogdan and Biklen, 1982; Patton, 1987; Denzin and Lincoln, 1994; Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). An open research strategy is normally adopted and this makes 
qualitative research particularly oriented toward exploration and discovery using 
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inductive techniques (Patton, 1987; Bryman, 1988). Research focused on discovery 
and insight from a respondent's perspective offers, according to Merriam (1988), the 
greatest promise of making significant contributions to any knowledge base. 
Although qualitative research can be deductive, most qualitative researchers adopt an 
inductive approach, because through inductive means the possibility exists of building 
abstractions, concepts, hypothesis and theories. In qualitative research it is possible 
for categories to emerge from informants, rather than being identified a priori by the 
researcher. As a result of its focus on process, meaning and understanding, the 
product of a qualitative study is richly descriptive (Taylor and Bogdan, 1984; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994; Merriam, 1998) as most qualitative researchers use verbatim 
quotations from respondents in order to illustrate their findings (Bryman, 1988). 
Most studies of organisational change have focused on the content of change. 
However, Johnson (1987), in his case study of a retail menswear chain in Britain, 
recommends the study of the process of change in order to gain a better understanding 
of the dynamics of change. Qualitative methods do allow for both the content and 
process of change to be studied, as demonstrated by Addison (1997), who undertook a 
study of the introduction of new technology into the meat processing industry in New 
Zealand. Qualitative methods of research not only allow for the discovery of what 
has happened but also allow for the verification of such discovery (Patton, 1990). 
The selection of two sites for the research study on organisational change through 
qualitative means allows unique diversities and contrasts between sites to be captured. 
These diversities and contrasts could bring out "differences in content, in process, in 
goals, in implementation, in politics, in context, in outcomes, and in programme 
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quality" (Patton 1987, p.28). According to Bogdan and Biklen (1982) and Merriam 
(1988), qualitative research is more concerned with process rather than outcomes and 
the diversity in the processes across sites could lead towards the development of rich 
theory. 
Qualitative methods usually require the researcher to get close to the respondents in 
order to collect data. Gaining access to respondents involves a combination of 
strategic planning, hard work and luck (Van Maanen and Kolb, 1985). Miles (1979b) 
notes that the most serious and central difficulty in the use of qualitative methods is 
the frequent data overload. Data are usually collected over several months or years 
and, due to the close involvement with the subject, the data/notes could easily run into 
hundreds or thousands of pages. Arriving at a realistic conclusion from such 
voluminous data could prove daunting and overwhelming for any researcher. 
Pettigrew (1988) notes that in qualitative research, there is an ever-present danger of 
death by data asphyxiation! 
Various inquiry strategies could be utilised in a qualitative study. Denzin and Lincoln 
(1994) define a strategy of inquiry as "a bundle of skills, assumptions and practices 
that researchers employ as they move from their paradigm to the empirical world" 
(p.14). The most commonly used inquiry strategies in the qualitative paradigm 
include grounded theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), ethnographies and case studies. 
A case study methodology was chosen as the inquiry strategy for this study. 
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2.4 Case Studies 
---n 
A case study consists of a detailed investigation of a bounded phenomenon such as a 
process, an organisation or an individual (Merriam, 1988) with a view to providing an 
analysis of the context and processes involved in the phenomenon (Hartley, 1994). A 
case study method of inquiry was chosen for this study as it was considered suitable 
to gain an in-depth understanding (Merriam, 1988) of the change process, which is a 
contemporary phenomenon within a real-life context (Yin, 1994). The general 
research question is ar\-hOW'~estion which, according to Yin (1994), lends itself 
well to the use of a case study methodology. "How" questions tend to be explanatory 
and deal with events over a period of time. The sub-questions in the study are(~hatJ 
questions which are exploratory in nature and also lend themselves well to the use of 
a case study methodology (Yin, 1994). 
-'Y 
By using the case study approach, the reasons behind decisions, their implementation 
and their outcomes could be identified. This would contribute to the body of 
knowledge on organisational change through the systematic piecing together of 
detailed evidence leading to the development of a better understanding of the change 
process. A case study methodology is suitable when understanding is sought in order 
to improve practice (Merriam, 1988) as cases are more contextual because the 
experiences of the respondents are rooted in context (Stake, 1981). The use of a case 
study methodology also allows management processes and causal relationships to be 
studied (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994), which could be incorporated into 
any theory that may emerge. As well as generating theory, case studies could also be 
used to test theory. Eisenhardt (1989) provides examples of cases that have been used 
to generate as well as test theory. 
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In this research an instrumental case study approach has been adopted. In 
instrumental case studies, cases are examined to provide insight into an issue such as 
developing a better understanding of the change process. In instrumental cases, the 
cases are often looked at in depth, their contexts scrutinised and their ordinary 
activities detailed, in order to develop or refine theory (Stake, 1994). The two cases 
that form part of this study are not cases about the electricity industry, but should 
rather be considered as cases to illustrate the process of change through the adoption 
;( 
of privatisation practices.~ The cases playa supportive and facilitative role, which 
allows insight to be gained into the change process leading to a better understanding. 
2.4.1 Multiple Case Design 
Case studies can involve single or multiple cases and numerous levels of analysis 
(Yin, 1994). Miles and Huberman (1994) note that with multi-case designs it is 
possible to understand how the cases forming the study are affected by local 
conditions. This, they argue, assists in the development of sophisticated descriptions 
and powerful explanations of the phenomenon under study. Patton (1987) notes that a 
multiple case design offers a deeper understanding of processes and outcomes of 
cases as they capture individual differences or unique variations between sites. This 
study makes use of a multi-case/embedded design as two sites were selected for the 
study (New Zealand and The Gambia). An embedded design, according to Yin 
(1994), is a multi-level analysis within a single case. This study utilises an embedded 
design because the changes have been examined at two levels, the macro level, which 
corresponds to the national level, and the micro level corresponding to the 
organisational level. The use of an embedded design was necessitated by the need to 
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fully understand the change process as it has evolved in the two sites chosen for the 
study. The changes in New Zealand and The Gambia involved the introduction and 
adoption of privatisation concepts. According to Ramamurti (2000), the causes of 
privatisation, the manner in which it is implemented and its consequences can be 
more fully understood by examining it at more than one level. 
The use of a multi-case study also contributes to increasing the generalis ability of 
case studies (qualitative research generally suffers from a problem of generalising), as 
the evidence is often more compelling, resulting in a more robust study (Herriott and 
Firestone, 1983). An adequately sampled and analysed multi-case study will provide 
not only a sense of uniqueness of the cases, but also a study of more general relevance 
and interest (Bryman, 1989; Hartley, 1994). 
A lot of confusion has arisen about the generalising of results in social science 
research. This has arisen due to the widespread use of quantitative techniques. In 
quantitative research, generalising of results refers to generalising from a sample to a 
population. However, in qualitative research, generalising of results is about 
generalising to theoretical propositions and not to the popUlation under study (Hartley, 
1994; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Yin, 1994). The word sampling, as used by 
qualitative researchers, does not refer to sampling in a statistical sense, but rather the 
techniques used in the selection of respondents. 
A theoretical replication logic (Yin, 1994) has been used in case selection to identify 
the subtle similarities and differences between cases. Yin (1994) argues that the use 
of replication logic in the selection of cases can help in the development of a rich 
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theoretical framework. The case sites have been chosen because the local conditions 
are quite different. According to Pettigrew (1988) it makes sense to choose extreme 
situations because this will make the process of interest (change) transparently 
observable. Patton (1987) notes that case studies of unusual successes or failures may 
generate particularly useful information. Eisenhardt (1989) has identified several 
studies in which researchers have purposefully selected diverse organisations in order 
to build a model applicable across organisations. 
There was some concern, raised by a New Zealand respondent, that the selection of 
cases in this study was inappropriate due to the fact that the New Zealand electricity 
industry was far bigger than the Gambian electricity industry. The Gambian industry 
was, in the opinion of the New Zealand respondent, comparable to Auckland 
International Airport's electricity requirements. The use of a replication logic in case 
selection, and the fact that the study made use of an instrumental case study design 
(Stake, 1994) meant that the study was concerned with the phenomenon of change 
through the adoption of privatisation practices and policies rather than the study of the 
electricity industry. This being the case, the relative sizes of the industries were 
irrelevant and the selection of cases was justified. Patton (1987) notes that more can 
be learnt from intensively studying extreme cases. 
2.5 Data Collection Strategies 
Data for this study was collected over a period of eight months in New Zealand and 
The Gambia. In New Zealand I made use of both primary and secondary data as the 
New Zealand changes have been well documented. In The Gambia the data was 
mostly primary data that I had to collect as the changes have not been documented. 
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2.5.1 Access to the sites 
It was necessary for the purposes of this research to obtain access to the multiple sites 
chosen for data collection. The Management Department of the University of 
Canterbury has had a long association with the electricity industry in New Zealand in 
the field of research, and it was felt that I could call on this good relationship to gain 
access to the industry for data collection. The Managing Director of the electricity 
industry in The Gambia and the government minister responsible for the industry, at 
the time of conceptualising the research project, were both personally known to me 
and I felt that access to the industry in The Gambia would also be forthcoming. 
Crompton and Jones (1988) recommend seeking access from the top hierarchy in 
organisations when undertaking social science research. Letters were, therefore, 
written to the minister and managing director in The Gambia requesting permission to 
study the industry. Letters were also written to organisations in the New Zealand 
industry requesting permission to talk to senior managers about the reforms in the 
electricity sector. Letters were written to private consultants in the industry 
requesting interviews to talk about reforms in the electricity sector in New Zealand. 
All letters in New Zealand were followed up with phone-calls about a week after the 
letters were sent out. A total of seven organisations were contacted together with five 
independent consultants and the Ministry of Commerce, which was the government 
ministry charged with overseeing the electricity changes in New Zealand. Six 
organisations responded granting permission to undertake research in their 
organisations. Of the five private consultants contacted, two responded favourably. I 
also received responses from three senior government officials who were willing to be 
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interviewed on the changes in the electricity sector. The only response from The 
Gambia came from the government minister and he was enthusiastic about the 
proposed study involving the electricity industry in The Gambia. However, I put the 
lack of response from the managing director down to the changes taking place in The 
Gambia. Soon after my letters were sent out, there were a number of changes in 
senior positions including both the minister responsible for electricity and the 
managing director of the Electricity Company. (I was told on arrival in the Gambia 
however, that the non-response from the managing director was due to the fact that 
the administrative assistant had sent a response to the wrong fax number, even though 
the letters I sent out were on departmental letterheads !) 
On arrival in The Gambia, I visited both the new minister and the new managing 
director to acquaint them of my intention to study the process of change in the 
electricity sector. Gambian cultural tradition demands that the senior person in any 
organisation be acquainted with whatever is going on in his/her organisation. I thus 
required the "blessing" of both the minister and the managing director in order to start 
interviewing potential respondents. I subsequently contacted the human resources 
manager and together we drew up a list of people within the organisation who could 
provide me with the information I required. She promised to write to the selected 
respondents to ensure that they allocated some time to talk to me. The letter from the 
human resources manager was also important because of the political situation in The 
Gambia. Although it was politically stable, people were still scared of the 
repercussions of getting on the adverse side of government with their comments, 
especially with a civilian government that had military connections and made 
extensive use of an intimidating intelligence organisation. Officials are usually tight-
24 
lipped about issues such as change and privatisation especially in an industry as 
sensitive as the electricity industry. This was evident in some of the interviews I 
conducted with some senior government officials. They were tight-lipped and some 
of the responses they gave did not make any sense to me and in some cases I knew 
that some of what they said was untrue or that they were just not willing to divulge 
information because it was too sensitive. The letter from the human resource manager 
proved very helpful as it opened a lot of doors and ensured that respondents knew 
about the project and its purpose even before I contacted them. 
Table 1 below gives a breakdown of the respondents used in this study. Due to the 
need to maintain confidentiality and anonymity, names have not been included. 
Table 1 Breakdown of Respondents 
New Zealand The Gambia 
CEOs 4 1 
Senior Managers 11 9 
Past Senior Managers 3 7 
Consultants 2 3 
Government Officials 3 8 
Total 23 28 
2.5.2 Selection of Respondents 
The main technique used to select respondents in the study, as outlined in Table 1 
above, _was purposive (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982; Patton, 1987, 1990; Merriam and 
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Simpson, 1995). Respondents were chosen because of their capacity to contribute 
meaningfully to the objectives of the study. Miles and Huberman (1994) note that in 
qualitative research, sampling is driven by the conceptual question and not by 
representativeness as in quantitative research. (The word sampling as used by 
qualitative researchers does not refer to sampling in a statistical sense but rather the 
techniques used in the selection of respondents.) According to Merriam (1988) 
purposive sampling is undertaken when one wants to discover, understand and gain 
insight into a process, and the need, therefore, arises to select a sample from which 
one can learn the most. Creswell (1994) suggests that respondents be chosen who 
could best answer the research questions of the study. In order to develop a better 
understanding of the change process, it was felt that people involved in the change 
process, both past and present, should be contacted. It was also felt that information 
obtained from people who had been involved at a senior level, both from the industry 
and government, would be more appropriate in helping to develop a better 
understanding of change, as most of the changes under study had been driven or 
implemented by senior management. 
The snowball sampling technique (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982; Patton, 1987) was also 
used in respondent selection. This technique involves asking a respondent who had 
already been interviewed to recommend others. They were specifically asked to 
recommend people who, in their opinion, could provide me with the information I 
was after. This proved to be effective in two ways. I was able to gather a lot of useful 
information from people who I had not earlier considered as part of my list of 
respondents and, it also enabled me to gain access to them as I could use the name of 
the person recommending them. 
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Some amount of theoretical sampling (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) was also employed 
in the study. Theoretical sampling is a procedure whereby researchers consciously 
select additional cases or respondents to be studied, or interviewed, according to the 
potential for developing new insights, or expanding and refining those already gained 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Some preliminary analysis was carried out on the data 
collected and through this analysis, identification of missing links in the data was 
made. New data sources were found that were not part of the original list based on 
the process of theoretical sampling. Most of these new data sources were not part of 
the organisation, but had either worked in government or had worked for the 
organisation in the past. 
2.5.3 Researcher Bias 
In qualitative research, the researcher (in this case myself) is the main instrument for 
data collection and analysis (Bogdan and Biklen, 1982; Merriam, 1988; Patton, 1990). 
Research of an inductive nature does not require theoretical propositions to be 
prepared before the start of data collection (Merriam, 1988, Patton, 1990). However, 
it is impossible to achieve a clean theoretical slate and to enter the research field with 
no preconceived notions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Wolcott 
(1982) suggests that it is foolish for a researcher not to make such theoretical 
orientations known. Merriam (1988) posits that the researcher must be aware of any 
researcher biases and how they may influence the investigation. Guba and Lincoln 
(1981) and Lofland and Lofland (1984) suggest that the methodology section in a 
qualitative research study should make explicit such theoretical orientations as well as 
private feelings. This section aims to bring these to light. 
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I had been involved with a state-owned enterprise in The Gambia for eight years, the 
last two years of which was at a middle management level. I was, therefore, quite 
familiar with the operations of SOEs in the Gambia. I was dissatisfied with the 
inefficiencies displayed by SOEs, although they were supposed to be adopting private 
sector practices, and I was of the opinion that much could be done to improve their 
performance. My being enrolled in a PhD was a result of the frustrations encountered 
at work and I felt the need to undertake a study that would help to correct the 
performance anomalies in The Gambia. I was, therefore, somewhat biased in thinking 
that the system, as it was in The Gambia, needed a drastic overhaul and it was with 
such a bias that I entered the field for data collection. 
Although this research was to be inductive in nature, I went into the process believing 
that government involvement in the electricity industry, especially in The Gambia, 
was bad. There had been several changes in the top management team in the past and 
in the three months before data collection commenced there was a complete 
management change in the electricity sector in The Gambia. The changes had all 
been government directed with the board playing very little or no part at all in the 
decision making process. 
I went into the research process initially with the opinion that the outcome of the 
research process would be "how to change". I felt that this "how to change" recipe 
for The Gambia would more or less be a mirror copy of what had happened in New 
Zealand, with a few modifications to suit the local conditions in The Gambia. This 
was because over the past thirty years, since the attainment of independence, there 
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was the feeling that we (Gambians) were incapable of running our own affairs and it 
would have been better if we were not independent or if we copied Western practices. 
I was, however, relieved when my research findings were different, and glad that I 
was able to discover something that would be of interest to governments and change 
practitioners irrespective of whether they are from a developed or a developing 
country. 
I was also nervous of undertaking research due to the fact that I had an engineering 
background and was not familiar with social science research. I also felt that I was at 
a disadvantage in New Zealand because I spoke with an accent and was of a different 
skin colour to most of the executives and, as a result, would find it difficult to be at 
ease with them. I thought that it would be much easier to carry out interviews in The 
Gambia due to my familiarity with the surroundings and having the same accent and 
the same skin colour as potential respondents. 
To help combat the fears I had of going into the field to collect data, I had a series of 
interviews at the University to acquaint myself with interviewing techniques. I 
interviewed one of my supervisors whilst the other observed the process. Useful 
comments were obtained from that process on how to go about interviewing 
executives. One of my supervisors then proceeded to interview the other whilst I 
observed. These preliminary interviews provided me with the confidence to enter the 
field of research for data collection. 
On entering the field I discovered that most of my fears were unfounded. Everything 
went relatively smoothly, with the exception of one interview in New Zealand, in 
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which the interviewee felt that he knew what was good for me and sought to convince 
higher authorities, including my sponsors, to have my project and focus changed. 
2.5.4 Data Collection Methods 
It is necessary in a qualitative research study that the study is bounded (Guba and 
Lincoln, 1981; Patton 1990; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Stake, 1994) and the rules 
for inclusion or exclusion be made known. The aim of the research process was to 
develop a better understanding of the change process. It was therefore felt that to 
achieve this, it was best that the data collection be bounded within the senior 
management level (purposeful sampling) in both countries. 
Qualitative researchers have, at their disposal, a variety of methods for data collection 
(Taylor and Bogdan, 1984; Merriam, 1988; Bryman, 1989). The methods mostly 
used, which are not mutually exclusive, include participant observation, interviewing 
and document analysis (Patton, 1987). I decided that my main source of data 
collection would be through interviews, for three reasons. The first was that I was 
interested in historical as well as current data in order to understand the changes that 
had taken place, and were still taking place, in the industry. It was therefore 
necessary to talk to people who had been, or are, participants in order to gain that 
understanding. The second reason was that the changes in The Gambia had not been 
well documented, and I needed to talk to those involved in order to piece together the 
story of change. Interviews allow more flexibility than observation and document 
analysis (Creswell, 1994). Third, I was constrained by time. My scholarship was to 
run for an initial period of thirty months and, after spending six months defining the 
study, it would have been impossible to acquire the data required for the study from 
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document review or participant observation alone in the time frame I had. Taylor and 
Bogdan (1984), note that interviewing is selected when one wants to study "a 
relatively large number of people in a relatively short period of time" in order to 
obtain "a broad picture of a range of settings, situations or people" (p.79). 
The three methods of data collection, interviewing, participant observation and the 
analysis of documents were all used at one stage or the other to collect data for this 
study. There has been extensive documentation of the changes in New Zealand and I 
was able to review most of the studies on change in the electricity sector in New 
Zealand. I was also able to review board papers in The Gambia for the last five years, 
although other documentation was not forthcoming from the authorities despite 
repeated attempts and requests for them. Participant observation took place before 
interviews, during interviews and after interviews, and I was able to note what was 
going on in the surroundings, as well as the body language and facial expressions of 
respondents. I sometimes had to wait for up to three hours in either the reception or a 
waiting room in The Gambia (in one case I had to wait a working day and a half, and 
in another, the interview had to be stopped halfway through and continued the next 
day) before an interview, even though I had a confirmed appointment. During these 
periods I made sure I took notes and observed what was going on around me. I also 
observed and made notes during an interview of the number of time the respondent 
and I were interrupted. I was able to listen to the conversations between the 
interviewee and staff members when a staff member corning into the office 
interrupted the interviews. I was also able to listen to phone conversations, although 
only one side of the conversation was being heard. From these observations I was 
able to piece together a picture of what went on in the organisation. These 
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observations helped me to reach a conclusion that there was a general trend of 
disorderliness in the electricity sector in The Gambia, and this I felt contributed to the 
poor performance of the sector. 
The use of multiple methods of data collection is called triangulation (Patton, 1987; 
Miles and Huberman, 1994). Triangulation is a way of getting to the finding by 
seeing or hearing multiple instances from different sources, by using different 
methods (Miles and Huberman, 1994) or by clarifying meaning and verifying the 
repeatability of an observation or interpretation (Stake, 1994). Triangulation helps to 
build checks and balances into the data and enhances validity (Patton, 1987). It also 
adds rigour, breadth and depth to the research process (Flick, 1992). Yin (1994) notes 
that multiple sources of evidence (triangulation) allow for the addressing of a broader 
range of historical, attitudinal and behavioural issues. It also, according to Yin 
(1994), leads to the development of converging lines of inquiry rendering any 
conclusion more convincing and accurate. 
2.5.5 Interviews 
--c Semi-structured interviews werellsed in the study, as an exploratory stance was 
adopted. This style of interview is suitable in cases where the researcher knows a 
little about the phenomenon to be explored (Merriam, 1988). The interv,iew schedule 
11"--··c ',) 
ill ,--,' -,-;,' 
(Appendix Two) was guided by a set of questions that served as an "aide-memoire" to 
remind me of the topics I wanted to cover (Bryman, 1989; King, 1994). The 
questions dealt with specifics rather than abstractions and generalisations (Kvale, 
1983). The goal of the interviews was to see the research topic from the perspective 
of the respondents. Respondents were asked about the facts of the matter, as well as 
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their opinion (Yin, 1994), and they were allowed to speak in depth on the issues. I 
interrupted from time to time to further probe into the matter, or to offer 
encouragement as the respondents spoke (Spradley, 1979). 
At the start of each interview, the purpose of the interview was again made known to 
the respondent. In The Gambia, I sometimes had to meet respondents a few days 
before to explain to them the purpose of my research and arrange a time for an 
interview. I made use of the snowball sampling technique to talk to those who were 
not in the employ of the electricity industry. I also used my connections of family and 
friends to help make contact with such people and gain access to interview them. All 
respondents were assured of confidentiality (Spradley, 1979; Bogdan and Biklen, 
1982) and I have tried to disguise this in the case studies, especially in The Gambia 
where everybody claims to know everybody. Some of the quotes used have been 
changed to the third person rather than the first person to maintain anonymity. 
A total of fifty-one interviews were conducted. Most of the interviews lasted for an 
hour. Twenty-three interviews were on the electricity industry in New Zealand and 
twenty-eight were related to the industry in The Gambia as shown in Table 1 on page 
25. Some of the data collection for the Gambian study took place in Britain because 
some prominent participants in the reform process in The Gambia had sought exile in 
Britain after the military coup of 1994. One of the interviews in New Zealand was a 
group interview (Fontana and Frey, 1994) in which three people were interviewed 
together. This was the most problematic of. all the interviews I conducted as it was 
sometimes difficult to control because some of respondents wanted to speak at the 
same time as the others. As well as this, the interview sometimes went off track, as 
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respondents' answers might take off from another respondent's answer and this was 
sometimes unrelated to the issue being discussed. The group format also made it 
difficult to research sensitive topics (Fontana and Frey, 1994), such as those dealing 
with particular members of the group and how the others felt about them. 
The interviews were conducted in English, although three interviews in The Gambia 
were conducted in the local language. Boas (1943) notes that the purpose of an 
interview is to understand the thoughts of the respondents, and the whole analysis of 
experience must be based upon their concepts and not that of the researcher's. It was 
thus essential that the interviewees were put at ease and I therefore conducted the 
interview in the language of their choice. Spradley (1979) notes that language is a 
means of communication and a tool for constructing reality. This encouraged me to 
continue the interview in the local language even though I knew that some of the 
respondents were much more fluent in English than 1. 
Most of the interviewees were only contacted once. However, in The Gambia I was 
able to do some follow-up interviews as I interacted with some of the respondents 
socially. I used such social gatherings to pursue data collection by asking some 
respondents casually about certain aspects of reform and whatever was mentioned 
was considered as data for the study. Some of the data collected was through social 
group discussion and these discussions were valuable sources of rich data. There was 
no note taking during these discussions and I relied on my memory to be able to 
recollect what transpired at the gatherings. I made sure that as soon as I got home I 
wrote down most of what I could recollect from the discussions and appended them to 
my journal. 
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Each interviewee (in the formal interviews) was asked whether he would be 
comfortable with the interview being tape-recorded (Spradley, 1979; Bogdan and 
Biklen, 1982; King 1994). Only three respondents, all of them in The Gambia, 
refused tape recordings. I therefore took memory-jogging notes (King, 1994) during 
the interviews and these were later expanded upon. Two respondents who allowed 
tape recordings were concerned that the contents of the discussion were only for my 
ears and should not be made available to the media. During all of the interviews, I 
took notes and these, together with the observations I made whilst waiting for the 
interviews and during the interviews, were recorded in a journal and formed part of 
the data that was analysed (Spradley, 1979). 
The data from New Zealand was gathered in three rounds of data collection. Some 
preliminary analysis was carried out in between data collection rounds after 
transcribing the interviews. This preliminary analysis was important as it guided me 
in selecting respondents for the next round of interviews (theoretical sampling). In 
The Gambia, I did not have the lUxury of time to enable me to carry out preliminary 
analysis and had to make do with one round of data collection. 
The number of interviews conducted (fifty-one) was arrived at when I felt that 
theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) had been achieved. Theoretical 
saturation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) is the point at which incremental learning is 
minimal with additional interviews, and when phenomena that are being observed and 
accounts of interviewees had been seen or recorded before. Theoretical saturation 
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was reached before the fifty-first interview, however a few more interviews were 
conducted after this point to ensure that I had actually reached the point of saturation. 
2.6 Data Management 
In qualitative research, it is best for data collection to go hand in hand with data 
management and data analysis (Merriam, 1988; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Data 
management involves the systematic and coherent process of data collection, storage 
and retrieval (Miles and Huberman, 1994). Some data analysis took place during the 
collection stage, although the major analytical work was undertaken later. In New 
Zealand, there was sufficient time between data rounds to do analysis, and the 
principle of theoretical sampling guided the next round of data collection, which 
assisted in filling the gaps in the data. In The Gambia, due to time constraints, no 
formal analysis took place. However, I tried to remember things from past interviews 
and jotted a few notes down on things I needed to follow up in subsequent interviews. 
Most of the research data was tape-recorded, and the tapes were later transcribed 
using a word processor. Copies of the transcribed data were made and stored in 
several different places including my computer hard drive, floppy disks, filing cabinet 
and two different departmental servers. No one, other than me, had access to the data. 
Most of the interviews were an hour long and, on average, an hour's interview was 
equivalent to about fifteen pages of words of one and a half line spacing. Verbatim 
transcriptions were made for all but two of the interviews, where the interviewees 
went off the topic and I saw no need to continue with verbatim transcriptions. All of 
the tapes used for the interviews were kept in the filing cabinet in my office and were 
never reused. My journal that detailed the observations I made during fieldwork was 
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written up separately. However, those that dealt with particular interviews were 
added as addenda to the particular interview transcript they were linked to. Field 
notes, according to Eisenhardt (1989), serve as a running commentary to the 
researcher, and become a means of accomplishing the overlap of analysis and data 
collection. Van Maanen (1988) describes field notes as an ongoing stream of 
consciousness commentary involving both observation and analysis. 
2.7 Data Analysis 
Data analysis progressed simultaneously with data collection and management, 
although the major portion of analysis took place at the end of data collection. 
Eisenhardt (1989) notes that analysis is at the heart of theory building, but "it is both 
the most difficult and the least codified part of the process" (p.539). Yin (1994) and 
Miles and Huberman (1994) both acknowledged the difficulty entailed in analysing 
qualitative studies. The difficulty, according to Miles (1979b), is due to the fact that 
methods of analysis are not very well formulated. I consulted several texts on 
analysing qualitative data, but none seem to give a clear-cut and easily understandable 
procedure. I opted in the end to use various methods of analysis as suggested by 
Bryman and Burgess (1994) and Yin (1994). These authors suggest that analysis is a 
dynamic process that links together problems, theories and methods. 
I started out by doing the analysis manually by looking for themes (Taylor and 
Bogdan, 1984; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Rubin and Rubin, 1995) that described 
what was actually going on, from what respondents had narrated. According to Rubin 
and Rubin (1995), related themes help to build towards a theory. Recurring patterns 
and themes were noted on the margin of the transcribed interviews and field notes. I 
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used this system of identifying patterns and themes in analysing data for the first two 
interviews. It took about eight hours to go through an hour's interview, and the 
process was tedious and nerve-racking. I was, however, not satisfied with this method 
because everything had to be done by hand and written on the limited space available. 
This system also resulted in my having an increased amount of paper work, with 
paper strewn all over my desk. I therefore decided to try using computer techniques 
to aid in data analysis. 
I used NUD*IST (Non-numerical Unstructured Data Indexing, Searching and 
Theorising) computer software programme to assist in data analysis. This programme 
was chosen for several reasons. Primarily, it is widely regarded as the best package 
(Weitzman and Miles, 1995). Secondly, one of my supervisors was very familiar with 
it and I knew that if I encountered problems with the programme, I could count on his 
assistance. Thirdly, it was the only computer programme available in the department 
for qualitative data analysis and there was a lack of research funds to purchase other 
qualitative analysis packages. The transcribed interviews were put into text unit form 
and imported into Nudist. A text unit is delimited by a hard carriage return, and it 
could be a word, a line, a phrase or a paragraph. The data reduction (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994) which took place in putting the data into text unit form involved 
analysis, because the data was reduced to themes ready for importation into Nudist. 
2.7.1 Coding 
Nudist was used as a store-and-retrieve package, and it helped me to think more 
deeply about the meaning of the data and apply codes to meaningful chunks of data. 
Codes are tags or labels for assigning units of meaning to the data (Miles and 
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Huberman, 1994). Codes bring together similar ideas, concepts or themes. The use 
of Nudist helped to reduce analysis time and made procedures more systematic and 
explicit (Tesch, 1989). I started out using free nodes (in Nudist the codes are referred 
to as nodes, and the word node and code are interchangeable) in which all codes were 
stand-alone codes. I quickly moved to an indexing system as I thought this to be 
more efficient than the stand-alone nodes. In an indexing system the codes were 
nested within one another in a hierarchically organised index system (Richards and 
Richards, 1994; Weitzman and Miles, 1995). This hierarchically organised index 
system forced me to think about the relationships among the codes. No 
predetermined scheme of coding was developed prior to the start of coding, although 
when putting the data into text units, I did realise some important themes. The coding 
was allowed to evolve as I went through the text units in Nudist. After coding a few 
interviews, I went back and compared what was already coded with the data as well as 
comparing the codes with some of the theory that was already being formed in my 
head. This was similar to the constant comparative method of Glaser and Strauss 
(1967) and I tried to combine some of the codes into higher conceptual levels of 
coding. This method was used throughout the entire coding process and Ire-coded 
the data after about every ten interviews (cumulatively). I was thus moving 
backwards and forwards between concrete pieces of data and codes and between 
description and interpretation (Merriam, 1998). By so doing I was able to rationalise 
the nodes and reduce them to a more manageable number (at one point during coding 
I had almost 400 nodes, but at the end of the process I was left with 279 nodes). The 
last interviews coded were the easiest as almost all incidents had been classified and it 
was just a matter of coding data to existing categories. 
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The Gambian and New Zealand data were coded separately. During the research 
design phase, the decision was taken to approach the study of change from two levels 
of analysis, the industry and the organisational levels. Patton (1990) believes that the 
issue that determines the unit of analysis for a study, depends on "what it is you want 
to be able to say something about at the end of the study" (p.100). I decided that I 
wanted to say something about the change process from a holistic perspective, hence 
the need for the two levels of analysis. In New Zealand there were two branches 
corresponding to the two levels of analysis, the industry level and the organisational 
level, since these two were different. In The Gambia, there was only one branch (one 
level of coding) because the industry and organisation are one and the same. Fig 1 
overleaf shows a screen from Nudist outlining the indexing system and tree structure 
of the coding carried out in Nudist. Appendix Three contains the data that was coded 
under the theme selection for the Gambian case. All issues that dealt with selection 
were put under this category. 
In qualitative studies, there is some confusion about the use of computers in data 
analysis. Computers, according to Weitzman and Miles (1995), do not analyse data 
but it is rather the people behind the computers who analyse the data. Most of the 
analysis in this study was carried out manually by using themes and developing 
categories. The computer programme Nudist, however, enabled me to do this with 
ease, and helped me to manage the data (Richards and Richards, 1994). Without 
Nudist, I could have easily miscoded, mislabelled, mislinked and mislaid the data 
(Wolfe, 1992). 
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2.7.2 Memos 
A memo is a theorising write-up of ideas about codes and their relationships as they 
strike the analyst during coding (Glaser, 1978). I used the memo capability built into 
Nudist to write memos as coding progressed. This proved very useful, as I was able 
to put down my initial thoughts as coding progressed. These memos later enabled me 
to move from the empirical data to a conceptual level (Bryman and Burgess, 1994; 
Miles and Huberman, 1994). Each memo was dated and attached to the node it 
referred to. When nodes were moved or merged with others, during the process of 
rationalisation, Nudist automatically created a memo at the new node or merged the 
old memo with the existing memo at the new node. I was thus able to keep track of 
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node mergers and movements, and the dates at which they took place during analysis. 
This all helped to trace the data and my findings as they emerged. 
Each case was analysed and written up separately and these appear in Chapters four 
and five of the thesis. These write-ups were pure descriptions of the changes and how 
they were carried out in the two sites. These write-ups build up an explanation about 
the cases (Yin, 1994). Yin notes that tracing changes over time is a major strength of 
case studies. Eisenhardt (1989) notes that "the overall idea is to become intimately 
familiar with each case as a stand-alone entity" (p.540). These individual cases were 
central to the generation of insight and the discovery of patterns (Gersick, 1988; 
Pettigrew, 1988) which were expanded upon in the cross case comparison to deepen 
understanding and explanation (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Chapter six contains the 
cross case analysis, where data sources and patterns in one case were corroborated by 
the evidence and patterns in the other case. According to Eisenhardt (1989) such 
cross case comparisons lead to strong theory. It was through the "intimate 
familiarity" with the individual cases that the core concept of this thesis, trust, was 
arrived at. It involved theorising at a level higher than what was done previously 
using Nudist. It also involved comparing the cases and moving back and forth 
between the data and the emerging theory. The late emergence of the core category, 
according to Chenitz and Swanson (1986), is quite normal as in inductive research the 
central core category (trust) forms the pivot or main theme around which all other 
categories revolve. Some of the extant literature reviewed in chapter three was used 
to tie together the evidence from the cases. Eisenhardt (1989) believes that tying the 
literature with the evidence leads to a theory with strong internal validity, wider 
generalis ability and a high conceptual level. 
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2.8 Evaluating the study 
Lincoln and Guba (1985) note that every research process, no matter what paradigm is 
used, must be able to answer questions regarding its truthfulness, reliability and 
generalisability. Qualitative research involves trying to piece together reality from the 
perspective of respondents. A general criticism of this paradigm, especially from 
quantitative researchers, is that qualitative methods are lacking in rigour and 
reliability, and they do not address the issues of generalis ability which can be so 
effectively tackled by quantitative methods (Hartley, 1994). 
2.8.1 Internal Validity 
The degree to which the findings correctly map the phenomenon under study 
represents the internal validity of the study (Denzin and Lincoln, 1994). The 
triangulation of data collection methods helps to enhance the validity of a study as 
multiple instances are recorded through different sources by different methods (Guba 
and Lincoln, 1981; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Triangulation serves to clarify 
meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is being seen (Flick, 1992). 
Denzin (1989a, 1989b), however, posits that triangulation is not a tool or strategy of 
validation, but an alternative to validation. This study employed triangulation 
techniques in data collection. 
One way of establishing a study's internal validity is through the data collection 
mechanism. . The large number of respondents from diverse backgrounds and 
organisations helped to establish the study's internal validity. Most of the questions 
were asked to several respondents and there was a high degree of corroboration in the 
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data in answer to those questions. A method that could be used for enhancing internal 
validity in a study is to test the credibility of the data (Guba and Lincoln, 1981). One 
method adopted in this study to test the credibility of the data was to send the full 
transcripts of the interviews to respondents in New Zealand (Merriam, 1988; Miles 
and Huberman, 1994). In this way they could verify whether the data as recorded was 
a true account of the interview. Most of the respondents replied that the transcripts 
were indeed a true reflection of the interview. Some respondents went further to 
enlarge on certain issues, and clarify others, and made suggestions on some relevant 
literature. This process was not carried out in The Gambia, mainly because of the 
difficulties experienced in getting the people to sit down and have an interview. It 
was my opinion that there was a significant time management problem and executives 
would not have had the time to read the transcript and provide me with feedback. I 
had also made extensive use of technology through email facilities to. get feedback 
and test the credibility of the data in New Zealand. Although the technology was 
readily available in The Gambia, most of the people I interviewed did not have access 
to email facilities and sending the transcripts by ordinary mail would have been too 
expensive as well as taken too long. This would ultimately have delayed the progress 
of the research. 
Another method used to check the internal validity of the study was through peer 
examination (Merriam, 1988). I share an office with another PhD student who is also 
researching the area of organisational change in the electricity industry. Findings, as 
they emerged, were discussed with him for ,comments on validity. Merriam (1988) 
also notes that clarifying researcher biases at the outset of the study enhances the 
internal validity of the study. Yin (1994), however, believes that internal validity is a 
44 
concern only for causal (explanatory) case studies and the making of inferences when 
every event cannot be directly observed. 
2.8.2 Reliability 
The issue of reliability, especially when dealing with social science research, could be 
problematic since human behaviour is never static (Merriam and Simpson, 1995). 
The reliability of a qualitative study refers to the extent in which the findings of the 
study could be replicated (Merriam, 1988). This study involved a diverse selection of 
respondents who were within and without the organisations studied, giving it breadth 
and depth. This, according to Miles and Huberman (1994), plays an important part in 
establishing a study's reliability. The interview questions were quite clear and 
wherever possible further clarification was made to the respondents during the 
interviews. All the information used and collected (questions, notes, tapes, and 
database) has been kept, ensuring that there is a chain of evidence (Guba and Lincoln, 
1981; Yin, 1994), which enhances the reliability of the study. 
Reliability and validity, according to Guba and Lincoln (1981), are inextricably linked 
in the conduct of social science research. Guba and Lincoln (1981) make a case for 
side-stepping reliability in favour of internal validity, "since it is impossible to have 
internal validity without reliability, a demonstration of internal validity amounts to a 
simultaneous demonstration of reliability" (p.120). Lincoln and Guba (1985) suggest 
that dependability and consistency could be substituted for reliability, because rather 
than replication, one wishes outsiders to concur that given the data collected the 
results make sense, i.e. they are consistent and dependable. 
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2.8.3 Generalisability 
Thick descriptions of the cases, the findings and conclusions are necessary in order to 
allow readers to determine for themselves whether the results of this study are 
applicable to them (Guba and Lincoln, 1981; Merriam, 1988; Merriam and Simpson 
1995). This is because the readers are the best judges of applicability. Chapters four, 
five, six and seven contain thick descriptions to enable readers to make a decision on 
applicability. The use of multi-case studies, as already discussed, increases 
generalis ability (or external validity). Multiple cases allow the researcher to look at 
multiple actors in multiple settings thus enhancing generalisability. I have had several 
discussions with postgraduate students from developed and developing countries 
about the findings of my research. These discussions suggest that the findings of this 
study are applicable to other settings other than those that formed part of this study. 
2.9 Conclusion 
In this chapter the research questions guiding the research design were outlined. It 
was identified that the best way to answer the research questions was to employ a 
qualitative methodology, as qualitative methods are appropriate in the investigation of 
dynamic processes such as a change process. A multi-case study was employed as 
multiple cases increase the generalis ability of a study. Data was collected mainly 
through interviews, and analysis was carried out with the help of Nudist, which is a 
software programme for qualitative data analysis. 
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Chapter 3 
Literature Review 
3.1 Introduction 
Both the New Zealand and Gambian electricity industries have undergone 
transformational change in the last fifteen years. The electricity industries in both 
countries prior to the changes were being run as government departments within the 
Ministry of Works. The changes in both countries have been carried out in distinct 
stages, with each stage involving complex change steps and processes. 
The changes in the electricity industry in New Zealand and The Gambia are part of a 
world-wide trend towards privatisation and deregulation of the industry. In New 
Zealand the first step in the change process was corporatisation, which saw the 
electricity department transformed from a government department to a corporate 
entity utilising private sector concepts of operation. Corporatisation was the route 
used to introduce commercial concepts into the industry. Corporatisation was initially 
confined to the supply side of the industry but was later adopted in the demand side of 
the industry as well. The next major change in the New Zealand electricity industry 
was the introduction of competition into the industry. The changes carried out had a 
large economic component to them and the introduction of competition and the 
deregulation of the industry was part of achieving overall economic efficiency in the 
economy in general and the industry in particular. The generation sector was split 
into competing generators. The distribution sector was also split into the lines sector 
and retailing sectors to increase competition. The final step in the change process in 
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the New Zealand electricity industry was the transfer of property rights from the state 
to private hands. Electricity industry assets previous to the change were vested in 
national and local government. However, it was perceived that greater efficiencies 
could be obtained by reallocating the property rights to the private sector. A state 
generator has so far been sold and some of the lines businesses and retail businesses 
have also been sold to private companies. 
In The Gambia, electricity is generated through thermal means with the industry 
mainly confined to the capital and surrounding towns. The electricity industry in The 
Gambia is a vertically integrated industry with one company responsible for 
generation, transmission, distribution and retailing of electricity. The initial change in 
the industry was through corporatisation where the industry was expected to operate 
commercially. The next major change involved contracting out some of the 
operations of the industry to private operators who were responsible for providing the 
managerial input whilst the assets were still vested in the State. The third change 
carried out in The Gambia involved a private operator and the government entering 
into a joint venture and setting up a company to generate electricity to sell to the main 
electricity provider in the country. Further changes are planned for the electricity 
industry in The Gambia. The main changes planned are the further introduction of 
private sector participation in the electricity industry and the possible reallocation of 
property rights to the private sector. 
This chapter seeks to embed the changes described above in the appropriate strands of 
literature informing change. It examines the theories and concepts which constitute 
the analytical framework used to describe and explain the changes that have been 
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undertaken in the electricity industries in New Zealand and The Gambia. In most 
countries across the world, the electricity generation and distribution industry is 
undergoing rapid change. These range from policy changes relating to regulation and 
reorganisation, to privatisation and competition. There is a thriving literature that 
provides often contrasting perspectives on the issues relating to organisational, 
ownership and regulatory structures in the electricity industry (Joskow and 
Schmalensee, 1983; Einhorn, 1994; Culy, Read and Wright, 1996; Gilbert and Kahn, 
1996; Mez and Midttun, 1997; Mez, Midttun and Thomas, 1997; Read, 1997; 
Czamanski, 1999; Patterson, 1999). This literature has mainly examined the issues 
from the perspectives of public policy and economics. The changes that have taken 
place in both New Zealand and The Gambia consisted of changes involving public 
policy and economics and resulted in the state playing an increasingly diminishing 
role in the commercial activities of government. However, the literature on 
deregulation and privatisation is insufficient in scope to explain the changes that have 
taken place in both countries, hence the need to also look at other theories and 
concepts that are relevant for each stage of the change process. Understanding the 
process of organisational change in the electricity industry thus requires the 
appreciation of an array of competing theories drawn from many disciplines and 
perspectives. 
Change can be studied at various levels such as the institutional, the organisational, 
the group or the individual levels. The changes that were carried out in New Zealand 
and The Gambia have been examined at two levels - the national and the 
organisational levels. At the national level the changes were of an institutional nature 
and reflect the process of privatisation, where the state either partially or totally 
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relinquished control of its assets and of management. However, these changes at the 
institutional level needed to be translated to the level of operation, which is the 
organisational level. It is at this level (the organisational level) that the majority of 
the changes were implemented with the objective of achieving the desired 
performance outcomes. The changes at the two levels in a privatisation programme 
must therefore be in tandem with each other because the changes at the national level 
sets the scene, or makes the environment conducive, for change to take place at the 
organisational level. The changes carried out at the organisational level in both 
countries were radical and discontinuous because they involved unpredictable 
departures from past practices (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995) which had, hitherto, 
been quite predictable and were in conformity with normal civil service type 
operations. These changes brought about the introduction of commercial concepts 
into what was previously a government department established for the public good. 
3.2 Privatisation 
In present day society, privatisation has become synonymous with the sale of state 
assets and the transfer of ownership to the private sector (Starr, 1990; Alkhafaji, 
1993). Johnson, Smith and Codling (2000) view privatisation as a process of 
institutional change. Ferguson (1992), however, notes that there is no universally 
accepted definition of privatisation and the only thing one can say with certainty is 
that it involves the reduction of state influence in the operations of firms, and transfers 
some or all of the ownership and/or control to the private sector (Zahra et. aI., 2000). 
Ramamurti (2000) notes that privatisation is a complex phenomenon because it covers 
a variety of organisational transformations that range from economic liberalisation, 
deregulation to outright sale of assets. 
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The literature on privatisation (Hanke, 1987; Vernon, 1988; Vickers and Yarrow, 
1988; Starr, 1990; Alkhafaji, 1993; Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994; Ramamurti, 
1999, 2000) reveals that the concept of privatisation is derived from the theory of 
property rights, which has its origins in neo-classical economics (Demsetz, 1967; 
Furubotn and Pejovic, 1972). Property rights define who has claims on the profits of 
firms (Fligstein, 1996). Depending on the manner in which the rights associated with 
any asset have been specified, these rights can improve incentives and enable more 
effective use and allocation of scarce resources (Demsetz, 1967; Furubotn and 
Pejovic, 1972; De Alessi, 1980; Jones, 1983; Barney and Ouchi, 1986). Privatisation 
is thus the establishment of a private system of enterprise control that provides an 
appropriate structure of incentives for the economic actors functioning within that 
particular institutional setting (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994). 
Privatisation, in most cases, is considered as a purely economic activity due to the fact 
that the research on privatisation has, to a large extent, been dominated by economists 
(Vernon, 1988; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994). 
However, in order to fully understand the process of organisational change, especially 
the changes that have taken place in both New Zealand and The Gambia, privatisation 
must not only be considered as an economic activity, it must also be considered as a 
political process (Ramanadham, 1993; Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994; FIigstein, 
1996; Kogut, 1996; Ramamurti, 2000), as an institutional myth (Rottenburg, 1996) 
and as a determinant of organisational change (Ramanadham, 1993). This chapter 
will review privatisation in terms of these perspectives. 
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3.2.1 Privatisation as an Economic Activity 
Privatisation as an economic activity could be brought about, according to 
Ramanadham (1993), by any of three options - ownership changes, organisational 
changes and operational changes as shown in Figure 2 below. The different options 
used in privatisation programmes according to Filatotchev et. al (1999a, 1999b) 
reflect variations in political ideology, stage of development, national cultures and 
long-term development plans. 
Privatisation Options 
I 
Operational Organisational Ownership 
Changes Changes Changes 
I 
I I I I I I I 
Rationalisation Creation of Total Joint 
of government Restructuring Competition Corporatisation Denationalisation Ventures 
Liquidation 
controls 
Figure 2 Privatisation Options 
In Western countries privatisation has consisted mainly of ownership changes and 
involved the selling of state assets in a market environment dominated by private 
property (Pirie, 1988; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Privatisation that involves 
ownership changes is usually carried out to provide revenues for the state budget and 
to retire debt (Bollard and Buckle, 1987; Deane, 1989; Ramanadham, 1993). There 
exists a wide range of options and methods that vary in complexity and sophistication 
that could be used to bring about privatisation (Pirie, 1988; World Bank, 1988; Cook 
and Kirkpatrick, 1995; Filatotchev et. aI, 1999a, 1999b). The options used to bring 
about ownership changes in the New Zealand and the Gambian privatisation 
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programmes involved some amount of direct sales, public share offerings, joint 
ventures and the free distribution of shares. The methods chosen in any particular 
case are usually dependent on the prevailing economic conditions and the economic 
outcomes desired of the privatisation programme. 
The direct sales option involves selling either the entire assets or part of the assets to a 
cornerstone shareholder. Private sale of shares offer easier disposal if a buyer could 
be found (Clarke, 1994). In New Zealand, most of the demand side companies, as a 
consequence of the Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998, were sold using this option 
of privatisation. The only state generator sold thus far in New Zealand involved some 
amount of direct sales as forty percent of the assets were sold off to a cornerstone 
shareholder. 
In most developing economies, direct sales normally involve foreign buyers because 
of the lack of sufficient domestic capital to make the sale of government assets a 
realistic possibility (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994). State-owned firms in most 
LDCs, particularly in Africa and Eastern Europe, badly need new infusions of capital 
and expertise. Foreign direct investment contributes to the generation of new 
knowledge partly through the infusion of new capital and new technology and partly 
through the introduction of new methods of operations (Kogut, 1996). 
Foreign investment may create some concern, especially in countries that are 
nationalistic. In such countries opposition. builds up from politicians and interest 
groups who believe that their sovereignty is being eroded through foreign dominance 
of what was previously state-owned enterprises (Dinavo, 1995; Rutland, 1997). The 
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experiences with MSG in The Gambia was a case in point and because of this there is 
some apprehension towards future privatisation programmes that involve foreign 
investment. In New Zealand, political parties such as the Alliance and New Zealand 
First are opposed to the sale of strategic assets to foreigners. In the past these parties 
have campaigned using the no-sale policy of strategic assets as an election strategy. 
Privatisation through public share offerings is a method that, like direct sales, is also 
more predominant in Western economies where there already exist capital markets for 
the trading of shares. The public offering of shares may take place where the 
enterprise is a going concern and also where the enterprise is an attractive investment 
for interested parties. Public share offerings could involve either putting up the whole 
equity of the enterprise or a proportion of the equity for sale. This was the method 
adopted for the sale of Contact Energy in New Zealand where sixty percent of the 
assets were sold through a public share offering and forty percent to a cornerstone 
shareholder. Public share offerings, according to Vickers and Yarrow (1988), are the 
ideal way to achieve a wide spread of ownership. According to an OECD (1997) 
report, public share offerings are more transparent and more politically acceptable 
than the other methods of privatisation that involve the sale of assets. Widespread 
share ownership builds up public interest in the privatised entities activities, and if the 
shares rise in value after privatisation, public support for privatisation is maintained 
(Pirie, 1988). The evidence from the privatisation programmes undertaken in Britain 
and Eastern Europe shows that whenever shares are publicly offered the controlling 
shares end up in the hands of the rich. This has been attributed mainly to the fact that 
the majority of the population who are eligible to buy shares do not possess the means 
to buy enough shares to allow them to have a say as to how the company is run 
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(Clarke, 1994). Public share offerings help to create an economic class of elites, 
which in some cases defeats the whole purpose of the offering of shares (Rutland, 
1997). No public offering of shares has taken place in the electricity industry in The 
Gambia. The only public share offering undertaken in the Gambian economy ended 
in failure as the company that was privatised went bankrupt after a few years and 
shareholders lost their investments. 
Privatisation through share offerings are normally plagued with valuation problems, 
as the value of the company must be expressed in monetary terms (Frydman & 
Rapaczynski, 1994). In SOEs different individuals and organisations have different 
subjective assessments of the company's value, and this subjective element cannot be 
separated from the valuation process. In New Zealand the sale of other government 
assets in the economy encountered a lot of valuation problems and in most cases this 
led to the delay of the privatisation programme announced by the government (Spicer, 
et. al. 1991, 1996; Duncan and Bollard, 1992). Vickers and Yarrow (1988) and Pirie 
(1988) detail the problems encountered with valuation in the British privatisation 
programme in the eighties. In most cases the price of shares rose steeply above the 
initial asking price indicating that the companies were sold too cheaply. 
Another option that involves ownership changes through privatisation is through the 
use of joint ventures. A joint venture occurs when two or more legal entities 
collaborate in an enterprise and share the risks and benefits of the collaboration 
(World Bank, 1995). The joint venture defines the rights and priority of acquisition 
among the parties. A joint venture with foreign partners ensures that control of the 
organisation is not ceded to foreigners (Mcdermott, 1997) and minimises the fears 
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associated with foreign dominance of local economies, as a local component is 
guaranteed through the agreement establishing the venture. A joint venture serves to 
legitimise the foreigners' role in the privatisation programme (Frydman and 
Rapaczynski, 1994). It serves as a vehicle to transfer knowledge as well as to secure 
international linkages. The literature on privatisation suggests that joint ventures are 
especially useful in countries that are new in establishing market reforms such as the 
countries in Eastern Europe. It encourages managerial learning through the transfer 
of skills and technology (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994; Grabher and Stark 1997). 
Privatisation that involves ownership changes could also be brought about through the 
free distribution of shares. This is a method that has been more widely used in the 
Eastern European privatisation programmes (Clarke, 1994; Frydman and 
Rapaczynski, 1994; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995) than elsewhere. In this system the 
government reallocates the assets to the citizens or the local community. This system 
of privatisation was used in the New Zealand electricity distribution sector where the 
shares of local electricity companies, after privatisation, were held for the local 
community in a trust. This method of privatisation offers the promise of an equitable 
distribution among the beneficiaries (unlike the public offerings of shares) and is a 
means of attracting political support to the privatisation process (Clarke, 1994). The 
free offering of shares reduces the problems associated with valuation of the assets 
and it also elirrlinates the problems related to the shortage of domestic capital and the 
reluctance of foreign investors to make a foreign direct investment (Frydman and 
Rapaczynski, 1994; Megyery and Sader, 1996). Although the free distribution of 
shares results in an equitable distribution of shares, in the absence of rules it is 
possible for beneficiaries to sell their shares to other parties interested in the 
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privatised organisation, which may ultimately lead to the creation of a class of elitist 
shareholders. 
Privatisation involving ownership changes could be contentious due to its political 
ramifications. It is possible for privatisation to be achieved through organisational 
changes that do not involve a change of ownership (Ramanadham, 1993). Non-
ownership changes are usually carried out when there is a need for improvement in 
economic efficiency without resorting to ownership sales. Frydman and Rapaczynski 
(1994) note that in non-ownership changes the reasons for carrying out privatisation is 
to revive the economies by depoliticising most economic decisions through the 
separation of the dominant enterprise sector from the state. One of the evils of 
politicisation of the economy is inefficiency resulting from the rent-seeking behaviour 
of politicians. Niskanen (1971) and Buchanan (1972) note that politicians impose 
objectives that help them to win elections but these might conflict with the efficiency 
objectives of firms. Privatisation through non-divestiture mechanisms is carried out 
to create new institutional structures that would facilitate the rapid revitalisation of 
these economies (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994) and to extricate these 
organisations from political interference. In both the New Zealand and the Gambian 
electricity industries, corporatisation was used to bring about privatisation without 
divesting the state of its assets. 
Corporatisation is a non-divestiture technique of privatisation that consists of the 
transformation of state enterprises to a separate entity with corporate personality 
(Daintith, 1994). The assets and shares of the corporatised entity still remain with the 
state (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994). The aim of corporatisation is to secure legal 
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and organisational independence for the organisation and to promote accountability 
and efficiency through the avoidance of constraints associated with public authority 
status (Daintith, 1994). This is normally achieved by the adoption of private sector 
practices in the state sector (Duncan and Bollard, 1992). The transformations of the 
New Zealand Electricity Department to ECNZ in 1987 and the Electricity Department 
in The Gambia to GUC in 1972 were carried out using the corporatisation option of 
privatisation. The transformation from a state department to corporatisation, 
according to Daintith (1994), is usually difficult because it represents a discontinuity 
in the legal existence of the organisation and a departure from past practices which, 
over time, have become entrenched in the organisation. 
A management contract is another form of non-divestiture technique of privatisation 
that could be utilised to bring about improvements in economic performance. This 
type of privatisation transfers operating rights to the private operator, but it does not 
involve the transfer of any financial risk should the enterprise fail to make a profit 
(World Bank, 1988; 1995). The objective of the privatisation of management is to 
enhance efficiency of the organisation by improving the management through the 
introduction of private sector disciplines and management techniques. Management 
contracts also permit the importation of foreign expertise without the political and 
other risks associated with outright sales (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994). The 
advantage of management contracts is that ownership is retained, a defined degree of 
control is maintained and a high level of management and other skills is injected into 
the enterprise enhancing its overall efficiency and profitability (Vuylsteke, 1988). In 
The Gambia a management contract was the mode of privatisation used at one stage 
in the privatisation programme and was designed to bring about improvements in the 
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performance of the utility sector. The contract was between the utility company and a 
foreign company. 
As there is no transfer of ownership in a management contract, the contractor has no 
incentive to maintain or improve the value of the assets beyond the level necessary for 
earning a satisfactory return during the period of the contract. Kent (1987) believes 
that management contractors charge excessive fees for minimal improvements III 
performance. Conflict between the contractor and government could result in 
negative consequences for the organisation (Dinavo, 1995). The management 
contract method of privatisation has mostly been used in developing countries, 
especially in Africa, where it is believed that there exists a shortage of management 
skills (Hanke, 1987; Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995). 
Although non-divestiture techniques result in increases in efficiency and the effective 
use of state assets, the literature on privatisation (Jennings and Cameron, 1987; 
Vuylsteke, 1988; Wortzel, 1988; Deane, 1989) however, argues that this technique 
should only be used as a temporary measure to return a state-owned enterprise to an 
acceptable level of operation and profitability. The gains of non-divestiture 
techniques of privatisation, they argue, would be eroded if other measures of 
privatisation that involved ownership changes were not advanced. Pirie (1988) 
believes that a reversion to past practices is imminent as the novelty of non-divestiture 
techniques die out and the orthodox practices of the public sector reassert their 
influence. The only way that the private sector practices could be sustained is by 
making sure that they are institutionalised and the literature argues that this could only 
be achieved through ownership changes. Deane (1989) argues that corporatisation 
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and other non-divestiture techniques do not clarify property rights to the extent that it 
will yield the right incentives to make restructuring transformation performance 
enhancing. Stark (1997) posits that accountability, effectiveness and efficiency could 
only be achieved and sustained with the clarification of property rights by the 
reassignment of such rights from the state to private hands. The literature on 
privatisation suggests that ownership changes are the only way forward in 
privatisation programmes. It, however, does not consider the institutional 
environment in which the privatisation programme is taking place and whether the 
same economic outcomes desired from a privatisation programme could be obtained 
from reforms other than ownership changes. 
In the literature on privatisation, the weight of opinion among economists (Jennings 
and Cameron, 1987; Vernon, 1988; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Deane, 1989; Nellis, 
1991; Ramanadham, 1993; Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994; Dinavo, 1995) has 
emphasised the important role competition plays in improving performance. The 
competitive process and the structure of industry are central to economic life 
(Auerbach, 1988). Competition, according to Vickers and Yarrow (1988), is 
important to stimulate efficiency because it acts as a disciplinary mechanism for 
management and it promotes sound economic performance by making explicit the 
costs of inefficiency. In most economics publications, the view is widely held that 
competition is the dominant regulatory force of the capitalist market economy 
(Auerbach, 1988). Advocates of competition believe that it places each productive 
resource in the precise position where it can make the greatest possible addition to the 
total social dividend (Burke et. aI, 1988) by preventing the exploitation of consumers. 
Competition is therefore not a goal but a means of organising economic activity to 
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achieve a goal (Stigler, 1968). The economic role of competition is therefore to 
discipline the various participants (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) in economic life to 
provide their goods and services skilfully and cheaply (Stigler, 1968). As a result of 
this, most of the reforms that have been carried out both in the developed and 
developing world have included some aspects of reform to introduce competition 
where it was absent, and to enhance it and make it more efficient wherever it was 
present. The experience and outcomes of the privatisation programme undertaken in 
the UK bears out the theoretical argument that privatisation is most effective if a 
change of ownership is combined with measures to strengthen competition (Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1988). The latter reforms in the New Zealand electricity industry were 
driven by the need to introduce more competition into the industry. 
More emphasis has however been placed in the literature (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; 
Deane, 1989; Nellis, 1991; Ramanadham, 1993; Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994) of 
ensuring that competition accompanies privatisation. However, the introduction of 
competition is dependent on the stage of reform and the surrounding institutional 
environment. If the institutional environment is not conducive to introducing 
competition, its introduction would lead to undesirable outcomes. Many critics of 
competition claim that it leads to a shoddy, acquisitive and unfair society (Burke et aI, 
1988). What these critics failed to consider is the institutional environment in which 
competition was being introduced. Without rules of competition there will be conflict 
and anarchy within the competitive environment with the ultimate losers being the 
consumers. There is therefore the need, for rules or regulation to govern the 
competitive environment. Hayek (1980) places responsibility for an ordered 
competitive environment upon the legal enforcement of such rules and the need for 
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the rules to be non-discriminatory. Governments normally undertake the prescription 
of rules of competition. Privatisation therefore cannot be considered as an entirely 
economic activity and other factors must therefore be taken into consideration in the 
decision to privatise, the drafting of rules of competition, as well as the 
implementation of the privatisation programme. 
3.2.1.1 Corporate Governance and Control 
In order that the outcomes of a privatisation programme are realised, it is essential 
that those who are responsible for the operational activities of the privatised 
enterprises serve the interests of the shareholders. Arrangements should be put in 
place to ensure that managers comply with the interests of the shareholders, as there 
might be a divergence between the interest of the manager and that of the shareholder. 
If this divergence is not controlled, the outcomes expected of a privatisation 
programme may not be achieved. This could have the potential of adversely affecting 
the performance of the organisation. The divergence may be due to the fact that the 
shareholder cannot sort out legitimate cases of tacit knowledge from cases of 
misrepresentation due to bounded rationality (Simon, 1957, 1961) on the part of the 
shareholder, and opportunism on the part of the manager (Williamson, 1975, 1985). 
Problems of divergence between the interests of the manager and shareholder are 
called agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). A number of theories have 
been developed to mitigate its effect (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 
1983a, 1983b). 
The shareholder (principal) in the privatised entity must monitor and provide 
incentives to entice the manager (agent) to behave in ways that would result in the 
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principal:s utility maximisation and avoid the adverse consequences of goal 
divergence. Kogut (1996) argues that incentives are not only monitoring devices but 
they also serve as signals of what is important inside an organisation. Contracts are 
written between the agent and the principal to specify the rights of the agent as well as 
establishing the rewards and/or sanctions to be faced by the agent (Fama and Jensen, 
1983a). Most senior employees in the New Zealand electricity industry are on 
individual contracts that spell out the expectations of both management and the 
shareholders as well as the rewards employees will receive if the expected levels of 
performance are achieved. In the absence of contracts or agreements, managers have 
a tendency to act opportunistically to the detriment of the principal by shirking 
(A1chian and Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1975, 1985). Agents could also 
appropriate a sufficient portion of the benefits they produce. Monitoring mechanisms 
need to be put in place to prevent shirking. Incentive devices to co-align the agent's 
behaviour with the desires of the principal include the payment of performance 
bonuses and, in cases where the property rights are privately held, giving managers an 
equity stake in the organisation (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen and Murphy, 
1991). Sanctions usually involve the non-payment of performance bonuses or the 
termination of the agent's services if performance falls below the desired level 
(Morck, Schleifer and Vishny, 1988; Jensen and Murphy, 1991). 
Agency theorists (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b; 
Jensen and Murphy, 1991) have come out in support of ownership changes as the 
ideal form of privatisation. They suggest that the ideal structural form should involve 
some ownership stake for managers in the enterprise. Jensen and Murphy (1991) 
found that direct ownership of shares is by far the most effective incentive device for 
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manager motivation. Ownership of shares by managers ensures that risk is optimally 
shared between the principal and the agent (McGuire, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989). Other 
economists (Jennings and Cameron, 1987; Vuylsteke, 1988; Wortzel, 1988; and 
Deane, 1989) suggest that non-divestiture methods of privatisation should be followed 
by asset sales so that the possibility exists for managers to become residual claimants 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983b), thereby constraining any rent-seeking behaviour they may 
be harbouring. 
In order to mitigate against the problem of agency, Fama and Jensen (l983a, 1983b) 
have suggested the separation of ownership from control in order to monitor and 
control agent behaviour. They suggest that the ratification and monitoring of 
decisions in an organisation should be separated from the initiation and 
implementation of decisions. Ratification and monitoring, they posit, should be 
vested in a board of directors and the initiation and implementation of decisions 
should be vested in management. The agency rationale for privatisation is that it 
induces changes in corporate governance and managerial incentives which in turn 
lead to improved performance (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Cuervo and Villanloga, 
2000). From the literature it would be expected that the separation of ownership from 
control would lead to better outcomes in a privatisation programme that involves 
ownership changes than one that involves non-divestiture techniques. 
Agency theory is an organisational change theory that is both explanatory and 
prescriptive (Pratt and Zeckhauser, 1985), unlike most of the traditional management 
theory literature which is strongly prescriptive in flavour (Barney, 1990). It is a 
theory of interest, of motivation, and of compliance, and is useful in institutional 
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design and analysis, especially in the selection of agents and the design of 
remuneration and performance management systems. The changes in both New 
Zealand and The Gambia have, at different stages of the change process, incorporated 
changes based along agency theory by providing incentives to managers and by 
separating ownership from control. 
Agency theory, however, overlooks altruism (Perrow, 1981, 1986; Jones, 1983) and 
integrity on the part of the agent. It ignores the importance of facilitative effort, in 
particular teamwork (Nilakant and Rao, 1994). The theory has also been largely one-
sided in nature, focusing on the actions of agents and overlooking opportunism on the 
part of principals (Perrow, 1986). Table 2 overleaf gives an overview of the theory. 
3.2.1.2 Governance Structure 
Privatisation of the ownership and non-divestiture methods is normally accompanied 
by operational changes to bring about the economic efficiencies desired. The 
organisations normally undergo radical restructuring to achieve the optimal 
governance structures that would result in increases in economic efficiency. 
Organisational restructuring normally involves looking at the cost structures in place 
as well as the cost structures of alternative governance structures and adopting 
whichever structure best suits the organisation. 
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Table 2 Agency Theory Overview 
Agency Theory Overview 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient 
organisation of information and risk-bearing costs 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent 
Human assumptions Self-interest 
Bounded rationality 
Risk aversion 
Organisational Partial goal conflict among participants 
assumptions Efficiency as the effectiveness criterion 
Information asymmetry between principal and agent 
Information Information as a purchasable commodity 
assumption 
Contracting problems Agency (moral hazard and adverse selection) 
Risk sharing 
Problem domain Relationships in which the principal and the agent have 
partly differing goals and risk preferences (e.g., 
compensation, regulation, leadership, 
. . 
ImpreSSIOn 
management, whistle-blowing, vertical integration, transfer 
pricing) 
Source Eisenhardt (1989) 
Most privati sed organisations move to have the goods and services needed for their 
operations either internally or externally produced depending on the transaction costs 
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associated with either mode of production (Williamson, 1975, 1985). In the New 
Zealand electricity industry most companies opted to outsource some of their 
operations. Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994) however, doubt whether transaction 
cost theory could ever hope to be able to decide that one or another set of institutional 
market arrangements is the 'best', in the sense of best solving the co-ordination, 
supervision and other contractual problems facing agents in an economic market. 
Pure economic considerations could not be used to determine the governance 
structure because political considerations as well as the institutional environment 
surrounding the organisation need to be factored into the decision to decide on an 
appropriate governance structure. 
3.2.2 Privatisation as a Political Process 
Although privatisation is widely regarded as an economic activity, it must also be 
considered as a political activity (Ramamurti, 2000). Economic policy formulation 
does not occur in a political vacuum. A climate for investment and growth, which 
usually forms part of the reason for undergoing a privatisation programme, requires 
steady and predictable government policy. Effective deregulation and the 
introduction of competition is also predicated upon a stable state. Privatisation 
involves redefining the role of the state with the state normally ceding some of its 
control or assets to the private sector (Ramanadham, 1993), which in itself is a 
political process. 
The successful initiation of reform according to Haggard and Kaufman (1995) 
depends on rulers who have personal control over economic decision-making, the 
ability to recruit and back a cohesive reform team and the political authority to 
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override bureaucratic and political opposition to policy change. Before privatisation 
can take place, leaders must first of all perceive it as politically desirable and 
politically feasible. Political desirability means that the reforms would be of benefit 
to the leadership and its constituents and political feasibility means the ability for 
politicians to enact reforms and overcome opposition (World Bank, 1995). There is 
therefore a need for political leadership and the necessary drive and commitment to 
see privatisation through (Deane, 1995). In other words privatisation programmes are 
heavily dependent on the ruler's understanding, political savvy, strength and 
commitment (Callaghy and Wilson III, 1988). 
The design of privatisation schemes varies by political conditions across countries, the 
persistence of the state and its administration of cultural values, social and political 
institutions influences the set of feasible evolutions (Hanke, 1987; Dinavo, 1995; 
Kogut, 1996; Ramamurti, 2000). Privatisation of the ownership variety, as well as 
economic purposes, can be carried out for ideological purposes especially by parties 
favouring more free market economic policies (Fregusson, 1992; McGowan, 1994). 
Economic crises in particular macroeconomic crises will normally bring about 
political demands for a change in the rules governing economic activity (Ramamurti, 
1992; Bruno, 1996; Fligstein, 1996). The changes in New Zealand could be regarded 
as being triggered by economic crises and the move towards privatisation was both a 
political and an economic strategy to redress the situation. New Zealand is also 
characterised by a stable state despite the changes in government. The initial changes 
in The Gambia were politically driven, as it,was the desire of the government to see 
the expansion of the electricity sector and to provide services to other areas of the 
country to demonstrate to the citizenry that every part of the country was important. 
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Chastened by financial crises and external pressure many governments in developing 
countries have shown a willingness to make fundamental reforms including 
privatisation. The latter changes in The Gambia fall under this category. 
Politics and the environment both play important roles in the privatisation process 
(Ferguson, 1992; Ramanadham, 1993; Clarke, 1994; Frydman and Rapaczynski, 
1994; Fligstein, 1996; Kogut, 1996). The constitution of property rights is usually a 
contestable political process with organised groups such as business, labour 
organisations and political parties trying to affect the constitution and reassignment of 
such rights to their benefit (Fligstein, 1996). The transfer or reassignment of property 
rights is not usually made to the highest bidder as would be expected if privatisation 
was a purely economic process, rather it is made to the bidder that best serves the 
political interest of the state (Fligstein, 1996). The stability and legitimacy of the state 
is important and measures to guarantee this are taken into consideration when major 
reform is being initiated. Politics is, therefore, at the centre stage of privatisation and 
must be recognised as a key factor affecting not only the adoption, but also the design 
of privatisation programmes and options. 
Property rights, governance structures and rules of exchange are arenas in which 
governments establish rules for economic actors (Fligstein, 1996). Fligstein (1996) 
notes that governance structures refer to the general rules in a society that define 
relations of competition, co-operation and market specific definitions of how firms 
should be organised. These rules are normally prescribed through legislation and 
politics inevitably plays a part in the establishment of such rules (Rutland, 1997) and 
sometimes trade-offs are made to suit the political actors. Historically, regulation has 
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been justified on a variety of non-economic grounds related to the public interest, 
such as the need to maintain a particular industry or service for reasons such as the 
public good or national security (OEeD, 1992). Politicisation of the process could 
lead to a potential conflict between the economic and political incentives of the main 
players in the process and this sometimes leads towards the bureaucratisation of the 
process which may result in its stagnation (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994). The 
introduction of industry specific regulation into the demand side of the New Zealand 
electricity industry is one area where politicisation has affected the process. Is there 
an optimum level of politicisation required in the privatisation process to bring about 
the desired economic efficiencies? Some states have greater capacities for 
intervention than others and the likelihood of intervention, according to Evans et. aI., 
(1985), depends on the nature of the situation and the institutional history of the state. 
Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994) argue that one of the evils that flows from 
increased politicisation of the economy is inefficiency resulting from the rent-seeking 
behaviour of politicians. Most economists believe that privatisation leads to the 
depoliticising of the economy, however, Rutland (1997) argues that far from 
depoliticising economic decision making, privatisation necessitates the exercise of 
political discretion and creates massive opportunities for political manoeuvring. 
In a country without a significant private sector, one cannot expect a far-reaching 
improvement in the functioning of any newly created privatised enterprise 
(Ramanadham, 1993; Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994). Similarly, privatisation is 
seriously constrained in any country whose physical infrastructure (transport, 
electricity, telephone, water) is weak (Ramanadham, 1993). The physical 
infrastructure in any country is an area that is under the purview of government, 
70 
although the current trend in most countries is for these to be progressively handed 
over to the private sector for further development after initial development has been 
undertaken by government. Bearing these in mind, can western privatisation models 
developed in countries that have developed infrastructures serve as benchmarks in 
other places that have different political, economic and physical infrastructures? 
In less developed countries privatisation through the sale of assets, to raise money for 
the state budget, has become synonymous with foreign investment. The clearer 
government policy is with regards to privatisation the better for investors, as 
government policy has an impact on potential investors. Foreign direct investment is 
dependent on the political and economic stability of the country of investment and 
requires adequate infrastructure, ready supply of trained labour, industrial peace and 
wage stability. The price paid for assets, the returns expected from the assets and the 
price charged for products and services obtained from the assets are all dependent on 
the political stability of the country (Coffee, 1996). In an unstable country the price 
paid for the assets would be low and the returns expected high to justify the risks 
associated with such an investment (Haggard and Kaufman, 1995). 
Privatisation could lead to job creation as well as job losses. Effective privatisation 
without creating significant unemployment and related disruptions is difficult to 
achieve (Melloan, 2000). When jobs are created everyone is happy. However, job 
losses in any economy are a serious concern for governments as it could cost them 
their support base. Governments are therefore more interested in job creation because 
this lessens the burden on the taxpayer because in countries where unemployment 
benefits are paid, such payments become unnecessary. Job creation in any economy 
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will likely return the government and politicians making economic and political 
decisions in a democracy to power after elections. The impacts of privatisation on 
employment are undoubtedly the most widely recognised concern in almost all 
countries (Ramanadham, 1993). In certain countries (United Nations, 1995) steps 
have been taken by governments to limit the amount of redundancies allowed in the 
first few years of privatisation. Fergusson (1992) notes that managers in developing 
countries are more aware of social needs and wider social responsibilities and are 
accustomed to sometimes giving broader social and collective interest precedence to 
economic ones. It is uncertain whether such social considerations would lead to 
flawed privatisation programmes. 
It must be constantly kept in mind that privatisation is not an end in itself and it is 
intended to produce certain results, which may be encapsulated in the term 
'efficiency'. Ramanadham (1993) posits that an economy should not just aim for 
profitability but should rather aim at making a contribution to the well being of the 
community. Privatisation therefore conjures up political undertones and the 
organisational change literature could benefit from the identification of the impacts of 
privatisation as the process of organisational change proceeds. Despite its widespread 
adoption in recent years and the growth in the literature, the body of knowledge on the 
impact of privatisation is rather limited (United Nations, 1995) and the causes and 
consequences of this important policy shift are still not very well understood 
(Ramamurti, 2000). An identification of the likely impacts may provide policy 
makers and managers implementing those policies with ideas on what should 
influence privatisation programmes and how to shape such programmes to ensure 
favourable impacts. 
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3.2.3 Privatisation as an Institutional Myth 
Privatisation, as has already been argued, is both an economic as well as a political 
process. However, privatisation can also be regarded as an institutional myth that has 
gained legitimacy through its widespread adoption. Privatisation in particular, and 
supply-side economics in general, as we now know it started in the United States and 
the UK in the early eighties, and within ten years the concept has spread and become 
institutionalised the world over. Privatisation has now become the dominant theme of 
public policy (Heald, 1985). Tolbert and Zucker (1983) define institutionalisation as 
"the process through which components of formal structure become widely accepted 
as both appropriate and necessary and serve to legitimate organisations" (p.25). 
Privatisation is being widely adopted not because of the economic benefits it actually 
brings but because everyone is doing it. Countries that fail to go down the 
privatisation road are not taken as seriously as those that have and, according to 
Hanke (1987), they are perceived to have made no commitment towards privatisation. 
Legitimacy of an organisation in the eyes of society provides support from other 
organisations thereby increasing the likelihood of its survival (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
1978). 
Being a political process, the impetus for privatisation normally comes from 
governments. When governments are faced with economic crises (Ramamurti, 1992; 
Bruno, 1996), they usually resort to privatisation as a means to alleviate the crises and 
bring about a turn around in economic performance. Sometimes this drive by 
governments to bring about change are self generating such as the changes in New 
Zealand. However, external political pressure could sometimes be brought to bear on 
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governments forcing them to undergo change through the adoption of privatisation 
policies and techniques. Such pressure is normally brought to bear on governments 
which are desperately in need of external help. These powerful organised interests 
outside the state playa great part in shaping these organisations and drives them to 
incorporate practices to gain legitimacy and increase their survival prospects (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1977; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983). The aid which normally comes either 
through foreign governments (usually Western) and international funding agencies is 
usually contingent on reforms based on the concept of privatisation (Bierstecker, 
1990). A number of economists and political scientists have looked at the spread of 
privatisation and have provided an overview of the extent to which governments have 
been under external pressures to conform to the concept of privatisation (Bierstecker, 
1990; Ikenberry, 1990; McGowan, 1994). What is uncertain however, is whether 
these powerful organised interests are right in making aid contingent on reforms that 
involve privatisation and whether the outcomes of a privatisation programme that is 
voluntary and one that is forced upon governments would be any different? Would 
the reforms that are brought about through inducement have a strong and lasting 
effect on organisational performance? 
Privatisation has become institutionalised through the process of imitation. Ideologies 
spread and the successes, failures and experiences of one country are examined by 
another. Organisations show their conformity by incorporating environmentally 
embedded (Granovetter, 1985) and institutionally rationalised rules into their 
structures (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) to maximise their legitimacy, stability and 
chances of survival (Zucker, 1987; Bloodgood and Morrow, 2000). Organisations 
are always on the lookout for the number of organisations similar or dissimilar to 
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them that may be changing, the direction of change and how clear it is as to whether 
the change strategies have achieved the change objectives (Bloodgood and Morrow, 
2000). International bodies such as the EEe, the OEeD, the World Bank and the IMF 
have served as information sources, transferring information on best practice on a 
wide range of economic activities (Bayne, 1987; Henderson, 1988) through their 
regular publications. Organisations therefore, from the information gained and from 
observing other organisations, undergo similar changes. Such types of change, 
through imitation, are a conscious effort by organisations to gain legitimacy. Roberts 
and Greenwood (1997) have used the term post-conscious institutionalisation to 
describe such changes. 
The outcomes of the privatisation programme in the UK were largely regarded as 
successful as economic efficiency was enhanced and ownership was widely 
distributed among the population (Pirie, 1988; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988). Other 
countries quickly copied the British experience and undertook similar reforms. 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) argue that when organisations are faced with ambiguity 
or uncertainty, they model themselves on more successful organisations in an attempt 
to gain legitimacy and demonstrate their resolve for improvement. This was quite 
noticeable in the New Zealand electricity industry especially in the distribution sector 
where the smaller companies mimicked the practices that had been adopted in larger 
electricity companies. Does gaining legitimacy through mimicry lead to better 
organisational performance? Is legitimacy sufficient to bring about improved 
economic efficiency? It is unclear from, the literature on privatisation whether 
adopting privatisation programmes because others are doing it would make a major 
difference in an organisation or an industry. Purposeful and reflexive imitation is 
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quite a common phenomenon. However, Rottenburg (1996) asks the question on 
whether the present world-wide craze of privatisation is based on a verifiable 
superiority of the model? 
The institutionalisation of privatisation has also been brought about through 
professionalisation. Universities, professional training institutions and professional 
and trade associations have served as important centres for the development of 
organisational norms (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Expertise played a great part in 
bringing about the institutionalisation of privatisation especially in developing 
countries with the presence of key policy makers as students in Western universities 
and Western advisers as key policy advisers in developing countries. In The Gambia 
many government officials had been on attachment programmes with the World Bank 
and the IMF in Washington. These institutions have been championing privatisation 
programmes in many developing countries and it was therefore no surprise when 
these officials on their return also took up the cause of privatisation as being the only 
solutions to the economic problems being experienced in The Gambia. In the 
developed world, there is a relative incestuousness amongst the policy community 
which relies on the same journals, the same conferences and belong to the same 
professional organisations (McGowan, 1994). Over the past fifteen years 
privatisation has been discussed among members of professional organisations and, 
after a while, members adopt such practices and introduce it into their own 
organisations. New Zealand is a member of the OECD and many government 
officials participated in OECD forums in which privatisation and its role in enhancing 
economic efficiency were discussed. The thinking of officials, as a result of training 
and through their association with professional bodies, after a while becomes 
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homogenous across an organisational field (DiMaggio and Powell, 1991). There also 
existed in New Zealand the filtering of staff in the electricity industry, as many 
companies in the distribution industry hired people in other electricity companies 
(mostly from the larger electricity companies) to help them initiate change. Managers 
and key staff drawn from the same institutions will tend to view problems in a similar 
fashion and approach decisions in much the same way (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
This filtering of professionals helped the privatisation programmes to become 
institutionalised within the electricity industry in New Zealand. 
Most countries are driven to incorporate the practices and procedures that 
privatisation entails because it has become rationalised through its widespread use in 
economies which are perceived as successful (Western economies). By incorporating 
privatisation legitimacy is increased irrespective of the immediate efficacy of the 
acquired practices and procedures. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that because the 
building blocks of organisations are considered proper, adequate, rational and 
necessary, organisations must incorporate them to avoid illegitimacy. They go on to 
argue that modern societies are filled with institutional rules which function as myths 
depicting various formal structures as rational means to the attainment of desirable 
ends. Privatisation can be regarded as an institutional myth as it is now being 
regarded in most countries, such as The Gambia, as the only way to bring about 
economic wellbeing. The W orId Bank and the IMF are two international bodies that 
have served to legitimise the practise of privatisation. Privatisation programmes all 
over have incorporated elements that has resulted in isomorphism with environmental 
institutions such as incorporating elements that are legitimated externally rather than 
in terms of efficiency (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tolbert 
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and Zucker, 1983). The incorporation of institutionalised elements protects 
organisations from having their conduct questioned by creating myths of formal 
structure that shape the organisation. Meyer and Rowan (1977) note that such 
organisations become more legitimate, successful and are more likely to survive than 
organisations which have failed to incorporate the institutionalised form. Over time 
the procedures adopted are taken for granted by others as the right way to do things, 
as the myths built into institutional elements create the necessity, the opportunity and 
the impulse to organise rationally (Meyer and Scott, 1983). Meyer and Scott (1983) 
argue that such myths depend for their efficacy and their reality on the fact that they 
are widely shared, or are promulgated by individuals or groups that have been granted 
the rights to determine such matter. The World Bank and IMF are widely considered 
as competent to determine whether a developing country should move down the path 
of privatisation and their judgements are rarely questioned. 
3.2.4 Privatisation as a Determinant of Organisational Change 
According to Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994) privatisation must be understood as a 
comprehensive reform programme intended to liberate the productive forces of a 
society in which the elements of design must work in tandem with unpredictable, 
spontaneous evolution of economic institutions. However, changes at the institutional 
level must be accompanied by changes at the organisational level to bring about the 
desired results (spontaneous evolution of economic institutions). Focusing on one 
level can cause one to overlook important drivers of privatisation and some of its 
consequences (Ramamurti, 2000). Privatisation will normally result in enterprises 
having to find new ways of organising to generate and nurture new types of 
capabilities that are more relevant to the environment that privatisation is trying to 
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create. During a privatisation programme, the institutional environment is changed 
and the organisations therein are forced to respond to the changes in the environment. 
The response in most cases is expected to be immediate. Privatisation is synonymous 
with the movement away from the production of goods and services for the public 
good to the production of goods and services for profit. Organisations must therefore 
undergo a radical re-conceptualisation of mission, leadership, strategy and culture. 
The changes required of privatisation include changes in strategy and structure as well 
as adjusting and encouraging individual employee behaviour and motivation (Dean et 
aI, 1999). It is also essential that the employees' mindset be changed from that 
associated with the provision of a public good to operating strictly on commercial 
lines. The changes involved in a privatisation programme at the organisational level 
therefore cannot be brought about by a mere continuation of the status quo but there 
must be a radical transformation of the entire organisations. 
Nadler and Tushman (1989) have identified two types of changes - changes that focus 
on individual components are called incremental changes and changes that address the 
whole organisation including strategy are called strategic change. Incremental 
changes, they argue, do not address fundamental changes in the definition of the 
business, shifts of power and alterations of the organisational culture. Incremental 
changes, according to Tushman et. al. (1986), Nadler and Tushman (1990), and 
Newman (2000), are compatible with the existing structure of the company, builds on 
the past and generally takes place within the general framework already in place. 
Privatisation clearly is not compatible with the existing structure of organisations and 
does not take place within the framework present. It in fact discards most of the past 
practices of organisations. It therefore must fall under the second category of changes 
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identified by Nadler and Tushman (1989). Table 3 below outlines Nadler and 
Tushman's (1989) categorisation of organisational change. 
Table 3 Types of Organisational Change 
Anticipatory 
Reactive 
Incremental 
Tuning 
Adaptation 
(Source Nadler and Tushman, 1989) 
Strategic 
Reorientation 
Recreation 
The transformation to privatisation therefore involves major discontinuities with past 
practices of state-owned organisations run by the government (Daintith, 1994). 
Discontinuous changes involve simultaneous and sharp shifts in strategy, power, 
structure, and control (Tushman et. aI, 1986). Discontinuous change is a 
metamorphosis of the organisation (Meyer et. aI, 1993; Newman, 2000). It is abrupt, 
painful to participants and often resisted by the old guard (Tushman et. aI, 1986). 
Such types of changes occur in response to, or in anticipation of, environmental 
changes. Most of the changes in the New Zealand and the Gambian electricity 
industries were revolutionary changes and were in response to environmental changes 
that were brought about by the declining economic situation. However, some of the 
changes in the distribution sector in New Zealand were in anticipation of changes to 
the environment especially before the split of line and energy businesses in 1998. 
Reorganisations of a discontinuous nature such as privatisation are usually fraught 
with difficulty, uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity. Political, social and enterprise 
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managerial attitudes have an important bearing on the pace of privatisation and its 
outcomes. It is the contention of this thesis that the manner in which the above 
processes are handled has a bearing on the outcome of the change process. In 
managing the organisational change process, those responsible for establishing the 
policy and for implementing the process must ensure that transparency is maintained 
at all levels so that all parties could be assured of the fairness of transactions 
(Ramanadham, 1993). Trust therefore seems to be an important element in the 
process of bringing about organisational change that involves privatisation. 
The introduction of private sector practices into the public sector or the transfer of 
property rights involves a major paradigm shift and new strategies are required for the 
'new' organisations, as the old must be discarded. Invariably, when organisations 
need a new strategy, they often have to hire new people to help lead the process of 
organisational change and develop the new strategies needed to bring about the 
desired paradigm shift (Tichy and Ulrich, 1984). Organisations typically hire people 
who have participated in similar change programmes and can therefore bring in a new 
perspective to the organisation (Kanter, 1983; Tichy and Ulrich, 1984; Tushman et. aI, 
1986; Nadler and Tushman, 1990; Pettigrew, 1991; Kotter, 1995; Bloodgood and 
Morrow, 2000). Strong leadership is therefore important in any change process, 
especially in a privatisation programme, as it becomes the foundation on which 
change is built (Nilakant and Ramnarayan, 1998). The leadership must be able to 
attend to the environmental shifts that affect privatisation and take action to create 
conditions that motivate the desired behaviour in the organisation. The literature on 
managing discontinuous change emphasises the need to bring in outsiders to manage 
change (Tichy and Ulrich, 1984; Tushman et. aI, 1986; Nadler and Tushman, 1990). 
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However, what is actually required in a change programme that involves privatisation 
is a leader who understands the concepts of privatisation and a leader who is able to 
make complete breaks with the past, in other words bring about the required paradigm 
shift. 
Due to the political nature and the economic ramifications of privatisation, the process 
is most likely to be opposed by special interest groups affected by the changes 
(Ramanadham, 1993; Clarke, 1994; Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994; Rutland, 1997). 
Managing this opposition and resistance is an integral part of managing the change to 
privatisation. The efforts towards change must overcome efforts within the 
organisation and outside the organisation to maintain the status quo (Starbuck, 1965). 
Is resistance to change due to the lack of trust in the change programme or in the 
change implementors? What role do communication, teamwork and participation play 
in the change process? The literature on the management of change suggests that 
communication, teamwork and participation could play important roles in stemming 
resistance to change (Kotter and Schlesinger, 1979; Moris and Raben, 1995; Rutland, 
1997). 
The literature on the management of change suggests that in a discontinuous change, 
such as those carried out in New Zealand and The Gambia, the speed of change would 
have a bearing on the outcome of the change process. The literature posits that if 
change is implemented slowly, it prolongs the process and gives special interest 
groups time to organise and form a coalition. that could undermine the changes. This 
strengthens institutional and organisational inertia and may result in the status quo 
being maintained (Tushman et. aI, 1986; Strebel, 1994; Kotter, 1995; Nadler et. aI, 
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1995; Rutland, 1997). This was evident in New Zealand were the changes have taken 
around fifteen years although at the start everyone involved in the process knew what 
was required and what to do. However, due to the long period it has taken a lot of 
resistance was encountered along the path of change. 
3.3 Conclusion 
Although privatisation is largely regarded as an economic activity, it must also be 
regarded as a political activity, an institutional myth and a determinant of 
organisational change. Many organisational interventions require both macro 
(national) and micro (organisational) level changes and the failure to carry out the 
desired changes at these two levels may result in the anticipated change outcomes not 
being achieved. Privatisation is one such concept (multi-dimensional in nature) that 
can affect different facets of organisational transformation in multiple ways (Zahra et. 
aI, 2000). Several options could be used to bring about the privatisation of state 
owned enterprises. However, whatever method is used, the environmental context 
must be taken into account when the privatisation programme is being designed and 
implemented. The environmental context is usually determined by the political, 
economic and social circumstances present in the society. 
Privatisation must be accompanied by proper governance mechanisms to curb 
opportunism. Agency theory offers some solutions aimed at mitigating the problems 
associated with opportunism by providing incentives and separating ownership from 
control to ensure that management complies with the wishes of the shareholders. 
Privatisation has become institutionalised in modern society due to its widespread use 
in many countries. It has thus been accorded legitimacy and increases the survival 
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prospects of organisations that have been privatised irrespective of the efficacy of the 
acquired practices. 
The implementation of private sector practices must take place at the organisational 
level. Organisational changes include making changes to the strategy and structure of 
the organisation and these usually involve a significant departure from past practices 
as the 'new' organisations must generate and nurture new types of capabilities. 
Ramanadham (1993) asserts that whatever the option used in privatisation, unless 
there is an attitudinal change from all the major actors - the bureaucrats, the owners, 
the managers and the workers - the process is likely to have limited success. 
Performance measures in any organisation cannot be considered in isolation from the 
culture, structure, environment and objectives of the organisation (Jackson and 
Palmer, 1989). Privatisation is not a panacea or a formula, it is an approach that can 
generate and focus creative policy ideas. The focus of privatisation as an elixir to the 
renovation and revitalisation of industry has been based on the belief that firm 
restructuring is most effective when private. However, very few empirical studies 
have been conducted to confirm or refute the efficiency argument along the 
public/private sector dichotomy in both developed and developing countries 
(Millward, 1988; Musa, 1994; Cuervo and Villanlonga, 2000). However, economists 
and political scientists are in agreement that a good privatisation programme should 
facilitate the establishment of a firm system of managerial accountability and control. 
This thesis provides a more nuanced view of privati sat ion as organisational change by 
examining it at both the macro (national) and micro (organisational) levels. 
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Chapter 4 
The Story of Change in the New Zealand Electricity Industry 
4.1 Introduction 
Change over the last fifteen years has been an ongoing process in the New Zealand 
economy. The changes in the New Zealand economy were initiated in response to a 
deteriorating economic situation sparked off by the oil shocks of the seventies. The 
economic situation was made worse when the United Kingdom joined the European 
Union because, up to then, the UK had absorbed most of New Zealand's exports. 
Electricity played an important role in the socio-economic development of New 
Zealand. Prior to the economIC reforms, the electricity sector was the biggest 
government owned department and provided employment in the economy for around 
fifteen thousand people. In a bid to make the economy more efficient, there was a 
need for reform in the government's biggest department. The electricity department 
became one of the first of the government departments that were to be reformed. 
This chapter describes the changes in the electricity industry in New Zealand. The 
chapter traces the changes in the industry from its development in the late nineteenth 
century to the most recent changes. The ideology governing the changes has been 
described under three categories: corporatisation, deregulation and ownership 
changes. The manner of implementation and the strategies adopted by the various 
participants in the industry are also discussed in the chapter. The problems 
encountered along the path of reform are discussed and the chapter concludes by 
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looking at the outcomes of the change programme. A timeline of the changes in New 
Zealand is shown in Table 4. 
Table 4 Timeline of Change in the New Zealand Electricity Industry 
Year Event 
1986 SOE Act 1986 passed. 
1987 Corporatisation of NZED into ECNZ. 
ECNZ responsible for Generation and Transmission. 
Energy Companies Act 1992 passed. 
1992 Corporatisation of Local Authorities into Electric Power Companies. 
Removal of Exclusive Franchise Areas. 
1994 Separation of the National Grid from ECNZ. 
Transpower formed to own National Grid. 
Split of ECNZ into two SOEs. 
1996 Contact Energy formed. 
Fully Competitive Wholesale market established. 
1998 Electricity Industry Reform Act passed. 
ECNZ Split into 3 SOEs. 
Meridian Energy, Genesis and Mighty River Power formed. 
1999 EPCs required to separate line businesses from retail businesses. 
Generators allowed to retail electricity. 
Mergers of lines businesses and retail businesses. 
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In the write-up of the case all quotes have been italicised. Some of the shorter quotes 
have been included in sentences and these have been shown in between inverted 
commas. Longer quotes have been put in separate paragraphs. 
4.2 Development 
Electricity generation was started in New Zealand in 1888 and pioneered by the 
private sector who were using it in the gold mining industry. Keen interest in 
electricity quickly developed, and soon after local governments became interested in 
electricity because of the potential of using it for street lighting. The steady growth in 
the demand for electricity, and the geographic spread of settlement in New Zealand, 
led to the involvement of the central government. The central government took over 
the development of generation and transmission infrastructure because it (the 
government) felt that it was the only organisation capable of providing the substantial 
infrastructural investment required. Local government authorities were established to 
take up the responsibility of distributing and retailing electricity. Two types of local 
authorities emerged; one was owned by municipal councils and known as Municipal 
Electricity Departments (MEDs) and the other was set up by statute, had elected 
officials to run its affairs, and was known as Electric Power Boards (EPBs). Each 
local authority had a very well defined and tightly protected franchise area across 
which other authorities were not allowed to enter to distribute or retail electricity. 
The demand for electricity continued unabated for almost sixty years and during this 
time the government embarked on several dam construction projects in order to meet 
the country's insatiable demand for electricity. A national transmission grid was built 
and by the early sixties New Zealand had developed a fully interconnected electricity 
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grid with the commissioning of the Cook Strait cable to link the North and South 
Islands. During this period of growth several local bodies were formed and by 1959 
there were eighty-four local bodies responsible for the distribution and retailing of 
electricity to over ninety-eight percent of the country's population. 
4.3 Economic Crisis 
Electricity was partly responsible for the rapid growth of the economy and by the 
early fifties New Zealand was among the top five countries in the world in terms of 
GDP per capita. The late sixties and early seventies saw a gradual but steady decline 
in economies worldwide. The New Zealand economy, which was mainly based on 
agriculture, also declined as a result of the oil shocks, the agricultural subsidies that 
were put in place by the European Union and the United States, and Britain joining 
the EEC. This decline resulted in a general unhappiness with the whole economic 
development of New Zealand, and signs were emerging that the government sector 
was far less efficient than the private sector whose assets were performing better than 
government assets. This decline in government performance in the words of a senior 
government official, "gave rise to a substantial intellectual drive by quite a large 
group of people to say that there's got to be a better way of organising ourselves". 
Several articles on how to remodel the economy to make it more efficient were 
published by government officials and private sector lobby groups. The private sector 
lobby groups through their publications were putting pressure on the government for 
radical change in the economy to make it more effective and efficient. 
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4.4 The Ideology and Changes in the Electricity Industry 
This section outlines the changes that have been carried out in the New Zealand 
electricity industry. The changes have been categorised and discussed under the 
headings corporatisation, deregulation and ownership changes. 
4.4.1 Corporatisation 
In 1984, there was a change of government in New Zealand. The change was shortly 
thereafter followed by an economic crisis precipitated by declining foreign exchange 
reserves. This crisis added to the already existing woes in the economy and 
demanded immediate attention. In a bid to salvage the economy, the government 
embarked on a widespread reform programme that affected every sector of the 
economy. A series of radical measures was undertaken by the government to open up 
the economy and remove all the barriers, such as import and export control, currency 
exchange rates, and restrictions on investment, which had contributed in making the 
New Zealand economy one of the most regulated economies in the OEeD. 
According to one of the managers in the electricity distribution sector: 
There was a drive for efficiency and I think that has come from 
government where we had to become more efficient which meant 
getting smarter or getting rid of the fat in the organisation. 
The government reform programme was aimed at reducing "fat" in the economy, 
especially in the sectors where the state participated in commercial activities. One of 
the industries affected was the electricity industry. This was an important industry as 
it provided service to many other industries, and its improvement would benefit the 
whole economy. 
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The electricity industry was characterised by a lack of efficiency and excessive capital 
investment, as most investments "were determined by Labour policy, rather than the 
most efficient way of realising the lowest price of electricity". The industry was also 
characterised by the "cross subsidisation of domestic consumers by industrial and 
commercial consumers, which impose greater costs on the productive sectors of the 
economy". The price of electricity was determined and tightly regulated by the 
government. The price setting mechanism in place did not take into consideration the 
true costs associated with the production and transmission of electricity. These 
characteristics of the industry were what the government reform programme set out to 
change. 
One of the components of the ideology governing the reform programme was to have 
limited government intervention and involvement in the electricity industry (and other 
industries). It was believed that the "private sector model of business is superior to 
the government model of business" and this was made evident by the fact that the 
government assets were performing less well than similar assets in the private sector. 
According to a senior government official, 
The notion of private sector being better than the government sector 
has been substantially an ideology but I feel that government is capable 
of running its businesses better than it has or can do. 
The government felt that the best way to revive the deteriorating economy and to run 
its businesses better was to "get the best of the private sector and put it into the public 
sector". A senior official reiterated the fact that in order to achieve the necessary 
efficiencies in the electricity industry, 
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it was necessary to shift the bulk of the electricity industry from 
government department status into a government company status and 
so instead of public service as one type of objectives, you have 
commercial objectives. 
Efficient prices in the industry could only be achieved by ensuring that investments in 
the industry were efficient. Investments in the past were never considered in 
economic terms, as an expert explained. 
We have a history in the generation side of planning and construction 
cycles that is totally out of phase with the actual demand realities. We 
have had massive shortages of generation; the last one was in the mid-
seventies and we had brown outs and rotating blackouts. It was 
actually Wellington's turn not to have two hours of power on a bloody 
cold winter's night! At other times massive building of generation 
which would not be required for another ten to fifteen years, which 
actually led to the current oversupply of capacity which is not expected 
to disappear for the next five to eight years depending on who you talk 
to. 
An example of inefficiency in the industry was the building of the Clyde dam. It was 
a known fact in the planning stage that there were risks involved with building one 
high dam on the river rather than a series of low dams. The government, however, 
went ahead and ordered a single high dam to be built. This project was fraught with 
problems due to it being located on an earthquake fault and having problems with 
land stabilisation. One senior manager in the industry had this to say about the 
government's decision to press ahead with the investment made on the Clyde dam. 
I don't think a private investor would have been stupid enough to take 
that sort of a risk on it and it is the tax payer who had to foot the bill. 
The cost of producing electricity from the Clyde dam is far higher than 
what the electricity obtained from it is actually sold for. 
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The corporatisation process, which entailed the embodiment of private sector 
practices into the public sector, was introduced to improve the efficiency of the 
electricity industry. Corporatisation was an economy wide reform programme that 
was also applied to the other industries facing economic decline. In April 1987, the 
assets of the New Zealand Electricity Department (NZED) were transferred to a new 
corporate entity called the Electricity Corporation of New Zealand (ECNZ). ECNZ 
was to be a government owned enterprise with government being the sole shareholder 
albeit with private sector model practices employed. This transfer of assets 
(generation and transmission) was carried out under a blanket piece of legislation, the 
State Owned Enterprises Act 1986 (see Appendix One for a review of the SOE Act), 
which affected all state trading activities (electricity, coal, and telecommunications). 
The SOE Act 1986 was meant to provide an environment that would lead to the 
adoption of commercial concepts into the operation of the state's trading activities. 
ECNZ was to be run in a commercial manner, in the hope that the pressures of 
commercialisation would get the desired efficiencies in place. 
I think the SOE structure is quite good as it actually divorces the 
company because the crown appoint the board of directors and the 
board of directors runs the company on commercial lines. The board 
of directors is selected basically from directors with commercial 
experience as well, so they know what's what. 
The corporatisation process was meant to bring in very strong capital market 
disciplines, where investment decisions would be made very carefully on the basis of 
good analysis of the market. The pricing mechanism in the industry was inefficient 
and needed to be reformed so that the price of electricity would truly reflect the cost 
of production. To attain a modicum of efficiency in ECNZ, it was necessary that 
prices of electricity tend towards Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) of electricity (the 
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cost of producing electricity from the next new power station to be built). This 
ideological shift from a public to a private sector model by ECNZ heralded the start of 
a new era in the electricity industry of "cutting out increased costs" and "making 
things more efficient". 
The corporatised ECNZ was allowed to improve its performance by employing 
private sector concepts. ECNZ was obligated to enter into an agreement with the 
government on a set of objectives and performance targets. These objectives and 
targets were embodied in a Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI). According to 
published figures in the annual reports of the corporation, the concept of limiting the 
role of government in state commercial activities paid substantial dividends. 
Following the corporatisation of ECNZ there were marked improvements in the 
performance of the corporatised entity compared to its performance under government 
departmental status. 
The changes in the electricity industry were initially concentrated on the supply side 
of the industry (generation and transmission). In order to fully realise industry-wide 
efficiency gains, it was necessary that corresponding reforms be made on the demand 
side of the industry (lines and energy). The demand side of the industry was being 
run as vertically integrated entities (similar to the supply side) but under local 
government control. The MEDs were owned by local councils and operated in cities 
and towns, and the EPBs were run by locally elected boards with the sole purpose of 
distributing power to both urban and rural consumers. The EPBs were creations of 
statute and had jurisdictions large enough to provide the necessary tax base to raise 
capital for infrastructure development. Political influence from local politicians was 
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rife in the distribution sector. The pricing mechanism was distorted in this sector of 
the industry as a price discrimination strategy, by means of cross-subsidisation, was 
employed where domestic consumers were subsidised by commercial and industrial 
consumers. 
The government felt that the principles of corporatisation should be applied to the 
demand side to make it more efficient, to introduce commercial objectives and to limit 
the role and influence of local government. Corporatisation of the demand side, it 
was felt, would lead to overall industry efficiencies. Corporatisation of the demand 
side was achieved through the Energy Companies Act 1992 (a review is given in 
Appendix One), which required the local bodies to acquire corporate forms, and to 
have commercial objectives. Demand side companies were transformed into 
corporate taxable entities. 
The concept of limiting the role of government resulted in some successes however, 
the desired levels of economic efficiency in the industry were not achieved. The 
industry was still notably a monopoly industry, where the government owned entity 
ECNZ produced 96% of generation and controlled the national grid. There was no 
competition on the supply side and ECNZ dictated the terms and conditions of supply 
to demand side companies. Although corporatisation had succeeded in making the 
industry more commercial, it was felt that the efficiencies could be further increased 
with competition. On the demand side, local authorities had been transformed to 
corporate entities, but were still supplying consumers in tightly controlled franchise 
areas. The industry was thus characterised by a government owned monopoly on one 
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side and local government owned monopsonies on the other side. A senior 
government official summed up the situation thus: 
I think probably a couple of years ago people sat down and had a look 
and asked whether corporatisation had achieved the o~jectives that 
were set for it. Enough people decided no and then moved fairly 
quickly to try and achieve the objectives we then had; in particular, to 
introduce more competition into the electricity sector. 
4.4.2 Deregulation 
In the mid-nineties, the ideological drive shifted from limiting the involvement of 
government to introducing competition in the industry. The facilitation of 
competition in the electricity industry could only be made possible by the removal of 
some of the regulations that govern~d the industry. The regulations had previously 
ensured that electricity generation and transmission was guaranteed monopoly status. 
Competition in both the supply and demand sides of the industry was deemed 
necessary to increase the overall efficiency of the industry. The generation sector had 
earlier been deregulated in 1988, a year after corporatisation, however, there were no 
new entrants to this sector due to the high capital investment requirements of this 
sector. Competition in the supply side of the industry was also inhibited by the fact 
that ECNZ had inherited an oversupply of generating capacity from the NZED as a 
result of bad investment decisions made by government. 
On the demand side, the tightly controlled franchise areas meant that there was no 
competition among distribution companies, and consumers within a particular 
franchise area were captured by the local distributor in that area. Competition on the 
demand side could only be facilitated by the removal of the tightly controlled 
franchise areas. In April 1994, the exclusive franchise areas, granted through statute, 
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were removed as part of the deregulation of this sector to facilitate competition. The 
inefficiencies on the demand side were not only caused by the franchise areas, but 
also by the large number of distribution companies in place to serve a consumer base 
of around 1.3 million (there were up to eighty-four companies at one stage). The 
proliferation of distribution companies reduced the economies of scale within the 
demand side of the industry, as some of these companies were known to have fewer 
than ten thousand customers. 
With the removal of the franchise areas and the introduction of competition, real 
competitive pressure was put on many distribution companies, especially the smaller 
ones dotted around the country. Competition on the demand side led to mergers and 
acquisitions as distributors tried to consolidate and introduce cost efficiency in their 
operations. The number of distributors dropped after the deregulation of the 
electricity industry and by 1997 there were only thirty-seven distributors in New 
Zealand. The reduction in distributors resulted in an increase in the overall efficiency 
of the demand side of the industry. 
Ideologists argued that an efficient industry could only be achieved if there was 
sufficient competition in both sectors of the electricity industry (demand and supply). 
Analysts at the Treasury argued for the separation of the competitive parts of the 
industry from the non-competitive parts. To attain this it was necessary for the 
industry, which was characterised by vertical integration comprising a competitive 
sector (generation and retailing) and a non-competitive (natural monopolies of 
transmission and distribution) sector, to be split. 
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So competition is first and foremost the key way to those benefits. But 
of course in an industry like electricity they've also got strong natural 
monopoly characteristics and therefore a key part of the reforms was to 
separate out structurally the natural monopoly parts of the business 
from the contestable parts of the business, so that competition could 
flourish where competition is possible. But also the natural monopoly 
parts were separated out, ring fenced and with special regulatory 
requirements applying to them, like information disclosure and that 
type of thing. 
ECNZ was responsible for both generation and high voltage transmission. Their 
ownership of the transmission grid could adversely affect other generators wanting to 
connect to the grid and stifle competition. In 1994, the government carried out a 
separation of the transmission grid and set it up as a separate SOE, called Transpower 
New Zealand Limited (Transpower), under the SOE Act 1986. The split was carried 
out to facilitate the entry of new generators into the generation market in order to 
enhance competition. 
To facilitate more competition in the supply side of the industry, the government 
decided to reduce ECNZ's dominance of the generation market. In 1996 the 
government sold off some of ECNZ's assets to a newly created SOE called Contact 
Energy to encourage competition in the generation sector. ECNZ's market share 
dropped from 96% to around 70%. 
To get competition in the wholesale generation of electricity you 
actually need a pool, so you have to have a fair amount of electricity 
traded through that pool, which means you need active buying and 
selling on the spot market. 
After splitting ECNZ and the formation of Contact Energy, the New Zealand 
Electricity Market (NZEM) was established in October 1996 as a pool for the 
wholesale selling and buying of electricity and electricity contracts. The NZEM 
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provided an environment that not only allowed competition, but also served as a 
means for discovering prices to reflect supply and demand in the market. The 
discovered prices in a market of only two participants, with disproportionate market 
shares, was not necessarily the most effective because ECNZ still had dominance 
(70% share to Contact's 30%) and could extract monopoly rents. To further enhance 
the competitive environment in the supply side of the industry the government, in 
1998, through the Electricity Industry Reform (EIR) Act 1998 (a review is in 
Appendix One), decided to break up ECNZ into three smaller SOEs to make the 
sector more competitive. The three new companies created in April 1999 were 
Mighty River Power, Meridian Energy and Genesis. 
Industry participants wanted more reform on the demand side of the industry, as the 
removal of exclusive franchise areas proved insufficient to achieve the desired levels 
of competition. The distributors and retailers Who were vertically integrated, it was 
argued, were capturing the gains of the wholesale electricity market (lower prices). 
When you have an integrated company it owns both the lines and is 
performing the retail function. It has got very strong incentives to try 
and keep out any other competing retailer, any new entrant retailer. 
In 1998 the government, in a bid to make the demand side more competitive, took the 
unprecedented step (not taken anywhere else in the world) to require the total 
separation of lines and energy businesses (through the Electricity Industry Reform 
Act 1998). This separation was to ensure that the efficiency gains from competition, 
in the supply side, would be passed on to the final consumers. It would also 
minimise, or remove altogether, cross-subsidisation in the industry. Barriers that had 
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been put by distributors in the past, barring other distributors from gaining access to 
what was once their traditional franchise area, would also be removed by separation. 
Because it is a stand-alone business, it then has no incentive to try and 
get others out and offers itself as a common carrier. So you've dealt 
with the incentive problem and therefore you don't need all sorts of 
regulations and rules to try and ensure that they give open access. 
Separation and competition on the demand side of the industry were expected to lead 
to further rationalisation of the demand side, due to the strong likelihood that under-
performing power companies would be taken over by better performing companies, 
and would result in improving the efficiency on the demand side. There have been 
significant changes in the demand side since the introduction of the EIR Act 1998. 
I guess what has happened over the last year, with the consolidation of 
the network and retailing side, there has been the splitting of the two 
out, and there has been lots of buying and selling and consolidating to 
a smaller number of larger organisations. Probably it is going to 
enhance efficiency quite significantly. 
The latest round of reforms, where the government has directed that 
distribution lines and energy split, will at least see that benefit being 
passed on to customers, as opposed to currently being captured by 
those power companies that have lines and energy. 
4.4.3 Ownership Changes 
The introduction of private sector practices, through the process of corporatisation, in 
the supply and demand sides of the industry, and competition resulted in the industry 
becoming more efficient than it was. However, ownership issues in the industry had 
to be clarified, as ideologically it was felt that greater efficiencies could be obtained 
from further privatisation programmes that involved ownership changes, as there were 
problems inherent in the corporatisation model. Ownership issues had created 
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problems on the demand side of the industry as EPBs, being products of statute, did 
not have any owners, and it was necessary that appropriate owners be found for them. 
Most industry participants felt that the continued government ownership, central or 
local, of a greater part of the industry was not conducive to obtaining the desired 
efficiency levels in the industry. Although the corporatisation model took away the 
involvement of government in operational matters, with continued government 
ownership there was always the possibility of politicians interfering and disrupting the 
commercial objectives of the industry. Faith had also been lost in the government's 
ability to deliver the required results due to the length of time the reform process had 
taken. One government official put it thus: 
I think historically there are lots of examples, because governments 
when they are involved in industry, stuff it up. The reasons for that is 
that the considerations of the government are not only solely 
commercial. Political considerations play a great part and 
governments tend to tinker with things because there is a perception 
that it needs tinkering with. There might actually be economically that 
there is no reason to tinker with it, and the industry is operating 
reasonably efficiently. But because there is a perception in government 
that something needs to be altered, it gets altered and upsets the 
equilibrium and the new equilibrium is not as efficient for everybody as 
it might be. 
Industry managers believed that the industry could become more efficient with the 
elimination of possible government interference through ownership changes because 
government could not divorce the commercial realities from political gain. They 
believed that the government had a role as a facilitator and not as an owner and player 
in the industry. 
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I think they (the government) should just be involved in the high level 
framework; in making sure that there is a natural playing ground 
requiring that the Commerce Commission is making sure that there is 
competition and we don't see subsequent mergers that result in one 
company being dominant like ECNZ. Other than that I can't see any 
reason why the industry can't just operate like any other business. 
There are the structures in place to allow competition. 
In future I think the government needs to closely monitor the industry 
because it is still an integral part of our community and well being and 
they can't just turn a blind eye on it. I think they need to keep an eye on 
the industry to make sure that the companies are honest, so to speak, 
and that the customers are getting the benefits. And that is from 
domestic right through to commercial, so it flows into the economy. 
Otherwise their role is simply to legislate as necessary to complete the 
breakdown of old structures, so that they are competitive: and once 
you've set that up you can leave it to the industry. 
The government clearly has a role as a regulator. There's no doubt that 
bits of the industry are monopolies and they've got to control these 
monopolies by regulation, as there's no other way. 
The capital requirements necessary in the electricity industry make the generation, 
transmission, distribution and retailing of electricity a very risky business. Some 
industry managers and treasury officials believe that further privatisation which 
involved the reallocation of property rights would remove the government from the 
investment risk present in the industry. Some industry managers also believed that 
there would be gains from any programme that involved the reallocation of property 
rights. 
I think probably the main benefit is that you bring in very strong capital 
market disciplines, where investment in the industry is done, as I said 
before, very carefully on the basis of good analysis in the market, and 
there are strong incentives to ensure that the performance levels are 
maintained and costs are reduced. 
I just really think the tension of private ownership and return versus 
competition trying to keep things down, fighting each other, the good 
side of private ownership and return is that it will keep costs down. 
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Privatisation proponents also believed that the reallocation of property rights would 
free up capital for the government, as well as provide new capital from any asset sales 
which could be used to provide other essential services that only government could 
provide such as policing, health and education. 
The reforms in the demand side of the industry after 1994 resulted in some larger 
EPBs opting for private ownership and subsequently some had their shares traded on 
the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZSE). 
Most of the power boards concluded that their customers owned them 
in one form or another and in a lot of cases these ownership were 
progressed through a trust arrangement, where the beneficiaries of the 
trust are either the community, or the customer, or some charitable 
organisation. 
In March 1999, the government announced the sale of Contact Energy with forty 
percent sold to a cornerstone shareholder and the rest of the shares floated on the 
NZSE, allowing ordinary citizens to acquire shares. The proceeds of the sale of 
Contact Energy were to be used by the government to repay some of its debt 
obligations. 
The separation of line and energy businesses on the demand side in 1999 has fostered 
the drive to see a fully privatised electricity industry. Local authorities have been 
forced to sell either their lines or energy businesses and the buyers so far have largely 
been from the private sector. ECNZ also bought some retail businesses and these 
were handed over to the newly formed SOEs after the split of ECNZ. The 
government has, however, said that the three new SOEs will not be privatised in the 
foreseeable future. 
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The changes in the electricity industry in New Zealand have been largely based on an 
ideology, which, over the last fifteen years has been focused towards increasing the 
economic efficiency of the industry. 
In late 80s it was about efficiency and getting the historical sort of 
franchise or barriers to efficiency removed and in the last ten years it 
has been about bringing that to a conclusion, but it is still about 
efficiency. But I would like to think that even though there is always a 
political or some political content, I would still like to believe that at 
the end of the day what we end up with is in the interest of New 
Zealand's economic well being, and not just satisfying political 
aspirations of particular individuals. I am convinced that it is about 
efficiency, and we will certainly have a far more efficient industry when 
all this is over, when the reform is over. So it's all about efficiency. 
4.5 Implementation of Change 
The direction and the outcome of the change process in the electricity industry in New 
Zealand have been dependent on the implementation process. The implementation of 
change in an industry as complex as the electricity industry was quite demanding and 
needed the commitment of all involved in the process. 
The precursor to the change process was the work carried out by the Treasury. This 
was contained in briefing papers that were very intellectually based, the focus of 
which was on how to make government owned organisations more competitive. The 
papers addressed the three issues of corporatisation, deregulation and ownership 
changes, which have already been discussed above. 
The implementation of the reforms in New Zealand needed people capable and 
experienced in designing and managing change. The New Zealand Treasury served 
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as the ''powerhouse'' of change with regard to policy design. The employment 
regulations in the public sector needed to be changed so that the people who were 
experienced in managing change from the private sector could be brought on board to 
lead the change process in the government owned companies. Changes were made in 
employment laws within the public sector contemporaneously with the corporatisation 
process and this brought the employment conditions in the public sector in line with 
those in the private sector. 
4.5.1 Boards of Directors 
The first stage in the implementation process was the appointment of establishment 
and transition boards to prepare the organisations for corporatisation. Most of these 
establishment and transition boards later became the incumbent boards after 
corporatisation. The former head of the State Services Commission (SSC) who 
played a significant part in the reform process in New Zealand was very instrumental 
in establishing the boards for the newly formed SOBs, as explained to me by a senior 
manager in the industry. 
Because of his association with the finance and banking sector over a 
period of time at a senior level, he knew a lot of private sector 
entrepreneurs and industrialists and so as head of the sse, he was 
asked to put together a series of boards for the SOEs. They formed the 
nine new SOEs and he and a team at the sse advised the government 
on whom to appoint, and they appointed really outstanding 
businessmen. For a period some of the people who went on the 
boards were some of New Zealand's very best business people and so 
they then appointed chief executives who knew what to do and away 
they went. Now they've stopped doing that and they've gone back to 
their old habits. They're getting a mixture of people and some of them 
political people 
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The boards' prime objectives were to lay down the policies of the SOEs and the 
electricity companies and set objectives for the management of the organisations. The 
boards were also given enough freedom to get on with the job and appoint the chief 
executives and managers of the various companies that make up the industry. 
According to a former manager in the industry 
Most board members were not good managers but they were good 
strategists and knew where to look for and get people who understood 
the strategy and could manage the company. 
The board members were competent and had expenence in strategy and policy 
formulation which they passed on to the new organisations they were directors in. 
There was synergy between the various interests group charged with implementing 
the reforms in the industry and this helped the implementation process, as explained 
by a manager. 
For a period of some years, there was a remarkable coincidence of 
common sense of directions between the politicians, the businessmen 
who helped them and the people that got put into executive positions in 
the corporations. 
4.5.2 Outside Influence 
After the boards had been set up, it was necessary to put in place the required staff to 
implement the. changes that were required to make the industry more efficient. Most 
of the organisations within the industry brought in new chief executives with 
commercial backgrounds to lead the reform process. Most of these CEOs had either 
been working in the private sector or had undertaken similar restructuring exercises in 
other industries. The culture prevalent in the industry before the reforms was 
predominantly a public service culture, which was not commercially oriented. The 
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new chief executives were brought in to change this culture and to help make the 
industry more commercial. The changes undertaken in the various organisations 
within the industry were greatly influenced by the CEOs, and this was repeatedly 
reiterated to me during the interviews I conducted. 
They must come with the right skills. It is always a balance as to 
whether the person comes with knowledge in the industry and 
background or whether he comes in with a whole lot of experience in 
management from other areas. But clearly the chief executives that 
have come from outside the industry have clearly changed it and there 
is no doubt that the overall change in the industry is for the good. 
The CEOs, with the approval of their boards, quickly developed new organisational 
structures and proceeded to appoint people to fill these positions. Some companies 
were more radical than others and declared all positions vacant and requested 
everyone to apply for a new job in the organisation. Other organisations were "less 
revolutionary" and appointed new and existing staff to the available positions in the 
companies. In all cases those staff who failed to win jobs in the new organisations 
were made redundant. 
The ideology behind the corporatisation process was to introduce private sector 
practices in the public sector. This process required new ways of thinking and new 
rnindsets in the organisations. Most of the companies had an entrenched inefficient 
public service culture. Most organisations found it necessary to look outside their 
traditional boundaries for the required expertise to go with the new ideological change 
in the new organisations. A major feature that characterised the change in the New 
Zealand electricity industry was that most companies brought in outsiders who had 
had no previous experience in the electricity industry to help implement the reforms. 
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Most of the senior management teams were appointed from outside the organisations 
and outside the electricity industry. The driving force behind the appointments was 
competence. These appointments brought in a new lease of life for the organisations 
as; 
it got rid of the people who were holding the company back. Generally 
people had been here a long time, and there were ways of doing things. 
Now if you break that mould and re-energise it and get new people in, 
then it is a totally different ball game. 
The new executives brought in new skills which were necessary in the new 
environment that the compames were expected to operate in and which were 
previously absent in the organisations. An outsider who was brought into one of the 
electricity organisations explained that: 
It was important to change the people at the top and to get in new 
blood. We had some key appointments from outside. We obviously had 
to have a treasurer who understood the international borrowing 
market. We had to have somebody like me, who understood how 
companies work. I had been a finance director in the private sector 
and managing director of an investment company and we had a very 
good industrial relations man as well. Without people like those, you 
could not have done it. It is critical bringing in the right people from 
outside, the chairman and chief executive are the most critical of all. 
The chairman has to come from outside, you can't have politicians on 
the board. I believe firmly that you've got to bring in the outsiders to do 
it. 
As well as the much-needed expertise, outsiders were brought in to help change the 
culture and bring in fresh ideas that enabled the companies to do things differently 
from the past. 
The management was extremely switched on, used to competition and 
understood how to operate in that environment, not necessarily though 
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out of the industry, like our trading director came out of the finance 
industry. 
The new people have been brought in because they want a blend of the 
old and the new so that the new people challenge the old and bring in 
fresh skills. 
The changes, however, were not all about bringing in outsiders. Some organisations 
promoted from positions within the organisations, which prior to the change were 
three or four layers down the structure. One CEO described the new philosophy thus: 
I wasn't set on getting outsiders. I was set on getting managers who 
understood what we were doing and could do it. It was about getting 
the right mindset and the right talents. Some came from inside and 
some came from outside. 
4.5.3 Selection 
The methods of staff selection used varied widely from company to company. Some 
completely re-advertised all positions, whereas others recruited the key skills from 
outside as well as inside the organisation, without making everybody apply for a new 
job. Every person was considered on his/her merit and no preferences were given to 
outsiders or insiders. In internal appointments, it wasn't the longest serving person 
who was given the job, but rather the most deserving person. Issues such as the 
competence and integrity of the employee as well as their communication abilities 
were taken into consideration when internal appointments were made. External 
appointments were more difficult and most companies took more time in making the 
appropriate selection. 
It is quite high risk hiring somebody from outside the company. Easy to 
get it wrong, easy for somebody to have a problem that you can't find 
out about beforehand and then very hard to get rid of them. If you want 
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to do it in a humane way, it takes time. You have to give them warnings 
and you've got to see if they can measure up. 
4.5.4 Downsizing 
The implementation of change in the industry resulted in a significant number of 
people being made redundant. 
You have to essentially figure out how much work is being done, how 
much work has to be done and the people required to do that job, and 
you then have to take away all the other people. 
All organisations embarked upon identifying processes that were essential to operate 
the new businesses. All processes that were considered not essential for the new 
environment were done away with. The staff involved in processes that were done 
away with were either reassigned to other processes that they had the skill and 
competence for, or they were laid off. Redundancies were also carried out to stem out 
resistance to change as not everybody agreed with the new culture that change leaders 
were trying to instil in the organisations. 
I think the staff that didn't want to change, they were at all levels from 
the lowest to even the management team and that was overcome by 
those people no longer being with us. 
The reforms included changes to the organisational structures of the companies. Most 
companies prior to the reforms had pyramidal organisational structures. However, 
the new environment demanded swift action and making people more accountable for 
their actions. To achieve this the pyramidal structures were reduced to flatter 
structures and many jobs were lost as a result. The changes in the electricity industry 
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resulted in the workforce being reduced from 15,000 employees in 1987, to fewer 
than 3,000 employees in 1997. One manager described it thus: 
Downsizing has been continuous. There have been very big blocks, but 
the reality is that every week the company is making people redundant. 
It is just a part of a continuing process. 
The initial downsizing exercises were poorly handled. In most cases workers turned 
up for work only to be told that they no longer had jobs in the companies. As the 
reforms progressed, more humane downsizing practices were employed as most 
companies put in place exit strategies to deal with redundancies. Outside specialists 
and consultants were recruited to help staff deal with depression, anger management, 
stress, and other related problems that arise when a person is made redundant. 
According to a CEO in the industry: 
The only way to reorganise is to be very fair about how you do it, 
because some people are going to get disadvantaged and then when 
they are disadvantaged, you should be very careful how you handle it. 
You've got to give them a lot of consideration, you've got to treat them 
honestly and you've got to pay them out fairly. 
The later reforms in the industry were characterised by the development of 
communication mechanisms between management and employees to let them know 
about management plans, the economic environment and how it could affect 
employees. This was very useful in letting employees know, ahead of time, any 
possible job losses that might be forthcoming and it also helped them to devise 
strategies ahead of time to cope with such eventualities. 
We've also had very open information systems. We've told everybody 
what's going on all the time and why, so people are ready for the 
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change and they are expecting the change. They can see the logic of it. 
We try to explain to them why it is that the changes are being made and 
the route by which they are being taken (that is to say the splitting of 
line and energy business is just a typical example where we explain why 
it is that the government is trying to separate the line and energy 
business and what they hope to get out of it). So we try to operate, in a 
time like this, a very open kind of communication system where we can 
educate people of what the new climate is all about. I think it is quite 
valuable, indeed, having open communication systems. 
A CEO in the industry summed up the manner in which he felt the issue of change, 
downsizing and communication should be handled when going through a change 
process: 
I think mainly through communication, talking to them, trying to keep 
them on board, trying to treat people with dignity even though they 
might lose their jobs, trying to help them all you can in finding other 
jobs and giving them support when it is still going on. Hopefully trying 
to get them to see that it wasn't necessarily just us doing it for our own 
ego trips, but it is for the benefit of the company overall and for the 
country. 
4.5.5 Leadership of Change 
Most of the changes to improve economic efficiency within the companies in the 
industry were internally generated. The directors who were responsible for policy and 
the managers who carried out the implementation of policy worked closely together 
and devised operational strategy to meet the demands of the commercial environment 
in which they operated. Most organisations, at one point or another during the change 
process, made use of outside consultants to help them change; however larger 
companies made more use of consultants than smaller companies, due to the high costs 
involved in sourcing consulting services. According to one manager in the industry: 
The changes have been internally driven. We have had no high 
powered consultants or anything like that. In fact one of the things that 
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I mentioned is that the industry has very good people, there's absolutely 
no question about that. The people in the industry are more than 
capable of doing the job themselves. The outcomes that you see are 
almost entirely derived from people's ideas inside the company. 
The driving forces of change in most of the companies were the CEOs. Most of the 
CEOs were sourced from outside the industry, they had extensive commercial 
experience and some had undertaken similar change initiatives in other industries. 
They led from the front and exhibited valuable leadership skills and vision. One CEO 
described his style thus: 
My style is to establish the sense of direction, the Vlswn and the 
direction, get the right people, give them the power to do it, but monitor 
them closely. I make sure I try to create an environment where they get 
as much help as they can to deliver the results. 
The CEOs were not the only driving force behind the changes. The senior 
management team, who in almost all cases were new, assisted the CEOs and together 
they formed dynamic forces for change. There was a repeated emphasis on teamwork 
between the CEOs and the senior management teams and between individual 
members of the senior management teams. Programmes were developed to facilitate 
teamwork, to prevent barriers building up within the teams, and to ensure that team 
members were able to operate effectively with each other. The teams set up were 
required to communicate frequently with one another so that everyone was aware of 
what was going on in the organisations. The autocratic hierarchical approach that was 
predominant in the old organisations became a thing of the past and consultative 
approaches were adopted among the senior management teams with emphasis placed 
on team play, team behaviour and team support. One executive in the industry 
described this new work ethos thus: 
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Another thing we did was to put the executive team in one row, so we 
are all actually together here. Previously we were on different floors of 
the organisation. We have easy access and, as executives, we see each 
other a lot more often than we see our staff. 
The executive teams, CEO included, developed clear values, clear vision and adopted 
business planning processes and tightly defined budgetary processes for the 
companies in the industry. The whole strategy was about knowing what the task 
ahead was and going out and doing exactly that. 
Focused, it is that simple. We have core strategy, we stick to core 
strategy and we are extracting value from core strategy. We have the 
ability to modify core strategy, and there has been little modification of 
core strategy. We have the ability to make decisions around core 
strategy, but in the end, the strength of this organisation cOl11:es from 
being focused. We are not distracted, we don't have to be distracted, 
we don't have to do stuff that does not contribute towards core strategy. 
4.5.6 Performance Management 
Performance management systems were introduced in all companies as a means to 
motivate employees and give them the right incentives to perform, so that the desired 
objectives, as set in the business plans, could be attained. 
We have a performance management system whereby people have very 
clear objectives and they are embodied in the performance agreement. 
Those objectives must be measurable and achievable and are done in 
such a way that they fit in with the overall framework of the company. 
So what we do is we set the strategy of the company and the high level 
objectives of the company and then, within that, the objectives of 
individuals, their personal contributions is set. 
The freeing up of labour rules made it possible for remuneration packages to be 
substantially increased from the salary packages available under government (central 
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and local) departmental days. The introduction of the Employment Contracts Act 
1991 gave employees the choice of either having individual or collective employment 
contracts. Most employees in the industry opted for individual contracts. Employees 
also opted for performance based remuneration systems, which resulted in more focus 
being placed on performance and outcomes. Performance pay in the industry was 
made up of a base salary and a component of that base was additional reward for 
achieving the stipulated objectives. Performance based remuneration ensured that the 
objectives of "core strategy" were not lost and that people had a clearer focus. It was 
possible, with most companies, to earn up to 120% of base pay if the performance 
targets were surpassed. The performance management systems also introduced 
sanctions for underachievement, which were punishable by either non-payment of the 
performance component of the remuneration package or termination of employment. 
Improved monitoring facilities were put in place to monitor performance against 
objectives. Adequate feedback systems were also put in place to provide employees 
with feedback on their performance in order to get the real changes and performance 
behaviour necessary to achieve the desired results. Employees responded well to the 
changes knowing fully well that they were going to be recognised and rewarded if they 
performed well. A manager described the feeling he perceived employees had in the 
new work environment: 
The hundred or so people we've got now, when they leave here at the 
end of the day and go home they say 'yes I did a reasonably good job 
today'. Whereas prior to the change, they'll go home and say, 'what 
happened today, where were we?' 
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4.6 Roadblocks of Change 
Large-scale change in any industry or organisation is always fraught with problems, 
and the electricity industry was no exception. The changes in the industry, from public 
sector government department to a private sector model, were largely ideological and 
this created problems. 
I think that the benefits were not sufficiently proven, that some of the 
changes have been a bit of an article of faith rather than a proven 
analysis of the benefits, that's the first thing. 
4.6.1 Interest Group Resistance 
One of the problems faced by the industry in bringing about change is what could be 
termed as "interest group resistance", with the various interest groups who have a 
stake in the industry trying to protect their group/sector/interest. The electricity 
industry is made up of a supply side and a demand side, with both sides having both 
competitive and natural monopoly sectors. Both sides acknowledged that the industry 
was inefficient, but they were constantly making accusations that the other side was 
responsible for the inefficiencies, which were partly responsible for the high prices 
paid for electricity by consumers. 
What actually happened in the industry was that the distribution supply 
companies told the government everything that was wrong with the 
generation side and the generation side attacked the distribution 
companies. 
EeNZ believed that the problems in the industry, especially the high prices 
consumers had to pay for electricity, were caused by the monopoly rents charged by 
the distributors. They buttressed their arguments by noting that the real prices of 
electricity at the wholesale level had fallen since corporatisation, and that the 
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distributors were capturing the gains realised from corporatisation. The distributors, 
on the other hand, felt that the reason for the high prices was the fact that there was 
insufficient competition in the wholesale market as ECNZ occupied a dominant 
position in the generation market. The number of players on the demand side of the 
industry was quite high and each argued for its own advantage, which understandably, 
in most cases, was against the ideology guiding the reform programme, as distributors 
were well aware of the huge gains that could be derived from vertical integration. 
If you're already in a monopoly situation and you're collecting 
monopoly rents, then the incentives to improve efficiency fire quite low 
and so that's why the companies did not have a big incentive to change, 
they were already a bit protected. 
On the supply side, ECNZ opposed the separation of Transpower, the split of Contact 
Energy, and later on the further split of ECNZ into three new SOEs. The reason cited 
was that the generation and transmission of electricity involved technical complexities 
and, with a break-up, the possibility existed for a loss in system co-ordination, and 
eventually security of supply could not be guaranteed in the industry. An inside 
source however, felt that the reasons adduced to by ECNZ were feeble and it was an 
issue of size and profitability rather than co-ordination and security of supply: 
Well, would you rather be a senior manager in a company that makes 
$500 million or one that makes $150 million? It's afairly easy choice, 
we were a big company and we didn't want to let it go. 
Resistance to change in the industry also came from the engineering profession. Prior 
to the reforms the engineers, "who believed that capital was a free good supplied by 
the taxpayer", dominated the industry. In line with this trend of thought, the engineers 
were more concerned with technical prowess and excellence. During the years that 
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they were in charge, they built up a lot of technical ground breaking projects and this 
partly contributed to the excess capacity that the industry had at the time of 
corporatisation. The new ideology was to treat electricity as a business as a result of 
which the engineers' dominance in the industry was threatened. Not wanting to lose 
this dominance, the engineers vigourously opposed the reforms. Opposition from the 
engineers and their unions had more to do with their self-interest than with the 
technical complexities that they were putting forward as reasons why the reforms must 
not be allowed to progress. A senior manager, who is a not an engineer, in the 
industry had this to say about the domination by engineers: 
The domination by engineers didn't give it a right focus. It was not 
deliberate on the part of those technical engineering people, it was just 
the way it was and the way it had been for decades, if you like. I think 
that was probably a barrier to change till they broke through that. 
They might not see it that way, but that's how I see it. 
Prior to the reforms, the unions were consulted over a lot of issues and their approval 
was essential before important decisions could be made. One of the senior managers 
in the government departmental days noted that the power of the unions prior to the 
reforms could be comparable to the power that was vested in the boards of directors 
after the reforms. Due to the potential loss of power and influence, the unions also 
opposed change in the electricity sector. 
Each of the parties in the value chain have their own objectives, 
whether you're a board accountable to a trust or a board accountable 
to shareholders or a board accountable to a government. So 
conflicting or non-aligned objectives ,is a significant issue when you are 
trying to change something. 
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4.6.2 Political Problems 
Politics had always played a part in the industry and politics also played a part in the 
changes. The politics associated with the industry was complex, embedded, and 
parochial. Difficulties were encountered with politicians who dealt with reform both 
at the national and the local level. The industry was, and is still (although this is 
changing) heavily influenced by politics as each local power company had "their own 
little pack of local politicians who regarded it as their own patch ", making 
micro economic reform particularly difficult. Political ownership at all levels was 
unhealthy because politicians were known to have disrupted the commercial objectives 
of the companies. Political ownership was largely responsible for the cross-
subsidisation at the local level as voters got cheaper power than was actually 
justifiable. SOBs were also not allowed to increase their prices arbitrarily. A 
proposed price increase by BeNZ in 1991 was met with disapproval from the 
government. 
The political problems at the national level were mainly due to government indecision. 
The political term of government in New Zealand is only three years, which is not 
long enough for a government to make meaningful changes in any industry. The 
former government (National government 1990-1999) had only a slim majority in 
parliament for two of the three terms it was in office (1993-1999) and found it very 
difficult to legislate to bring about changes in the industry after 1993. The shift to an 
MMP system of government in 1996 further compounded the problems, as the 
efficiency objectives became clouded by political survival. The coalition agreement of 
1996 strictly prohibited, among other things, the privatisation of electricity assets. 
Lack of continuity affected the industry because several politicians had, at one time or 
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the other, responsibility for electricity reform. Each politician came in with his own 
agenda and this hampered the overall reform process. 
Industry managers have seen the continued government ownership of major parts of 
the electricity industry as a barrier to achieving economic efficiency. Most 
participants in the industry, as well as the right wing political parties (the Act party in 
particular), believe that there is no need for government ownership in the industry and 
advocate for the full privatisation (complete reallocation of property rights) of the 
industry, albeit with some regulation for the natural monopoly sectors. Due to the fact 
that electricity is an essential service, the government has been reluctant to sell 
electricity assets, for political rather than economic reasons. Government involvement 
in the industry has slowed down the reform considerably and this has resulted in some 
inefficiencies still remaining in the industry. 
If you are going on a trajectory and suddenly the government's got cold 
feet and the speed of change slows and there is an election and new 
policy, you might actually - if you plotted the reform process in the time 
period we're talking, - there would be periods of even going 
backwards. 
4.6.3 Speed of Change 
The rate at which change has occurred in the electricity industry in New Zealand has 
been relatively slow, especially when compared with similar changes in other 
industries, that were once government controlled. Electricity, however, is quite 
complex and this might have accounted for the slow rate of reform. The extremely 
slow rate of change was a great concern to many industry participants. 
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All the things that are happening now were known as needed in 1989 
when the Task Force report was published. So there is nothing new 
happening now that was not planned, discussed, analysed, and 
organised in 1989. The difficulty has been getting the politicians in line 
to actually do it. 
The political problems already discussed above slowed down the reforms. There was 
a lack of political will on the side of the government, which resulted in the changes 
being very drawn out and very lengthy. They involved a lot of argument and a lot of 
debate and one manager noted that "the business of spending three years debating 
legislation is bad for business, bad for staff". The industry was also slow in 
responding to the various reforms, partly due to their self-interested nature as well as 
being uncertain about government's plans and the outcomes of the reforms. The 
debates within the various organisations making up the industry were a source of 
distraction for the companies involved and diverted them from thinking about industry 
wide strategies, as well as internal strategies for improving efficiency. Managers in 
the industry noted that this was a source of distraction as "there was a lot of wasting of 
time, we talked and talked and nothing happened". 
Surprisingly though, the industry responded faster than was anticipated to the decision 
by government to separate lines businesses from energy retailing, probably due to the 
significant privatisation and reallocation of property rights that went with separation. 
What's happening with the energy trading over a couple of weeks, 
months until the legislation came out this year, it was happening but it 
took five years. Actually we've achieved more in the last few months 
than we did in the whole of the past five years in terms of rationalising 
energy trading. 
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The slow rate of reform gave people the perception that the entire reform programme 
had been a failure. This was due to the fact that the reforms in the industry had been 
piecemeal in nature, and most of the full benefits of the reform programme would only 
be evident to the consumer after all the reform stages were completed. It was a widely 
held belief in the industry that the government should have acted more decisively in 
1992, when it corporatised the demand side of the industry. Corporatisation, most 
industry participants argued, should have been accompanied by the split of generators 
and distributors. The slow rate of change and the indecision of government also 
affected the industry, because it gave the opposition and the interest groups enough 
time to organise themselves to stall and disrupt the reform programme. 
4.6.4 Staffing Problems 
The slow rate of reform caused a lot of staffing problems within the industry as it 
raised employee anxiety. 
The worst thing is that if you leave people hanging around for years 
waiting for something to happen, not knowing what was going to 
happen, everybody seems to think its fine, but long term it is actually 
very disruptive. It could turn people off. They don't really focus on 
what they should be doing. 
You destroy people when they know that their jobs are under threat and 
when they see a sword hanging over them for a year or two years or 
something like that. They can't make long term plans for their lives and 
they just wonder what's going to happen. 
The changes in the electricity industry had a huge impact on people's lives as they 
were accompanied by significant downsizing. The industry shrank from around 
15,000 employees to fewer than 3,000 employees in twelve years. Not all of the 
changes were trouble-free; the corporatisation of ECNZ was received with protests, 
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accompanied by industrial action by the electricity workers and engineers' unions. 
The workers "switched off the lights twice" in protest against the poor handling of 
redundancies in the industry. 
The very first one was terrible. Basically my boss came out and 
addressed my staff, about forty staff or fifty staff, and said, 'Right in two 
weeks time half of you are redundant'. That was pretty bad. 
Poorly handled redundancies affected staff morale in the industry. Low staff morale 
was transferred to the job and stress levels increased, productivity dropped, accidents 
increased and safety became an issue of concern. 
Because of the massive reduction in numbers, I think it put a lot of 
pressure on people in terms of quantity of work and what they had to 
achieve. It tested people and sometimes it just tested them a little bit 
too far in terms of the pressures on them. 
Most of the electricity companies adopted an outsourcing strategy to reduce costs and 
overheads within the various companies. A lot of work was contracted outside the 
organisations, reducing the amount of work carried out within the organisation. This 
was a source of concern for employees, as it also led to redundancies. 
If you give work away to other people, then your own people don't have 
it and you have to shed staff because you've given work away. It is not 
popular, a lot of tension there. Flatter management structure reduces 
opportunities for career advancement and is perceived by some 
employees as a loss of power. 
The influx of "outsiders" into the industry was another source of staffing problems. 
Staff retained in the industry were jealous of outsiders filling all the top positions in 
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the companies. They felt that the outsiders had very little understanding of electrical 
systems and were too business focused. 
You've got a lot of people coming into an industry they don't 
understand. I talked to Meridian Energy yesterday: they are bringing 
in all new people at the senior level. There is only one person there 
that understands about the electricity industry, the chief executive does, 
but they are green, they'll try a lot of new things and they'll complain a 
lot and good luck to them with the new things. They'll also get their 
nose bloodied a lot as the people coming in are fly-boys that know all 
about selling bloody popcorn or selling something, they are really good 
salesmen, they are good at their trade, but they don't understand 
electricity, so it will be fun and games. 
Some of the staff retained by the companies were very unfamiliar with the new 
concepts and had problems understanding commercial operations. This was especially 
typical of the engineers, who had dominated the industry prior to the reforms. 
They were bright but they were in a little world of their own. They were 
naive in terms of what the world was doing around them, the risks that 
they were facing. They were only thinking in technical terms as that 
was their only frame of reference. They didn't realise that they as 
engineers, they could learn to manage and read the balance sheet and 
operating report just like anyone else,' just like an accountant could 
come to understand some of the technical stuff in the industry. 
The redundancy packages awarded were very generous and, where voluntary 
retirement schemes were in place, they precipitated the loss of institutional memory as 
a few good people in the industry opted for the financial packages on offer and left. 
Some organisations had to spend a lot of money to entice such individuals to stay on 
and not take voluntary redundancy. 
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4.7 Outcomes of Change 
The reforms undertaken in the New Zealand electricity industry led to a number of 
favourable, and a few unfavourable, outcomes. 
4.7.1 Investments 
The overall aim of the reforms was to increase the efficiency of the industry. In most 
cases, the outcomes have shown that there have been substantial increases in economic 
efficiency in the electricity industry. Major efficiency gains were observed in the area 
of new investment. Pre-reform, the investment decisions had been centrally controlled 
by government and a lot of problems were encountered ranging from brownouts and 
blackouts to poor investment decisions, such as the Clyde Dam project. As a result of 
the reforms, economic signals were now being received from the NZEM on when and 
where to build new generation. Transpower shelved plans to extend the HVDC line 
from Wellington to Hamilton, and Contact Energy abandoned plans to build another 
dam on the Clutha River in the South Island and instead built a combined cycle gas 
turbine plant at Otahuhu in the North Island. Price signals were being received from 
the market to help avoid electricity shortages in periods of drought, as the New 
Zealand electricity system is largely dependent on hydro plants for electricity 
generation. The move towards further privatisation in the industry with the 
reallocation of property rights to the private sector has moved the risks involved in 
capital investments from the taxpayers to the private sector, and investments have 
become more commercially sound. 
Now today, nobody will, in a competitive market, put equity capital in, 
if they believe that they are not going to get at least a commercial 
return on it. So that's a very beneficial thing, particularly if the 
124 
economy is somewhat capital-constrained and a market brings that 
particular dictate. 
4.7.2 Price 
The reforms resulted in more efficient pricing in the industry. Prices charged prior to 
the reforms did not reflect the true cost of production and delivery of electricity. 
Inefficient pricing was reflected through the cross-subsidisation that was practised on 
the demand side. The current prices in the industry have been more responsive to 
supply and demand than they have historically been due to the presence of the NZEM 
and competition. 
The separation of line and energy and the increasing competition in the industry 
resulting from the split of EeNZ have, however, resulted in substantial price increases 
contrary to what was expected from this stage of the reform process. Line companies 
have all increased their charges, which retailers have had to pass on to the end 
consumer. Retailers have also increased their prices by adding a fixed charged to 
consumer electricity bills and changing the way consumption is charged 
disadvantaging consumers who do not use a lot of electricity. The increase in the price 
of electricity is mainly due to the absence of specific regulation in the electricity 
industry. Regulation in the electricity industry in New Zealand is deficient as it is 
based on a light-handed approach that does not cater for the complexity associated 
with the electdcity industry. There is talk within political circles of regulating the 
lines businesses, but the political balance in parliament has prevented this from being 
achieved. Different political parties have a qifferent idea on how the industry should 
be handled and the coalition government does not have sufficient support within its 
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ranks as well as among the other parties in parliament to pass through regulatory 
legislation. 
4.7.3 Productivity 
Staff levels in the industry have dropped from 15,000 employees to fewer than 3,000 
employees. New technology has been introduced into the industry and most work 
processes are now automated and remotely controlled. This technology has resulted in 
the displacement and retrenchment of staff. As a result of the lower staff levels, the 
productivity levels in the industry have gone up significantly. The availability in 
terms of generators has also gone up and the same generation assets now produce 
more electricity, increasing the technical efficiency of the industry. The water in the 
hydro systems is now being more effectively used as commercial values have been 
placed on the water in lakes. The annual reports of the various companies have all 
shown the productivity gains that have been achieved in the industry. 
4.7.4 Costs 
Cost savings have been realised through the elimination of wastage, the lower staff 
numbers employed and the outsourcing that was introduced into most companies. 
Outsourcing took away the need to keep on staff when they were not actually needed. 
The introduction of competition led to further cost cutting exercises as strategies were 
employed to niake the businesses more competitive and win over customers. Mergers 
and acquisitions in the industry were another source of cost savings as the bigger 
companies were able to work with increasing economies of scale. 
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4.7.5 Cultural Change 
The industry became much more commercially focused as a result of the reforms. 
Every company was driving for a greater commercial return and was less concerned 
with looking after the public good, which was the predominant culture prior to the 
reforms. This change in culture resulted in most companies acting in their own self-
interest because of the presence of competition: 
There is no comparison, it is just a complete reversal of culture. The 
previous one was one of government servant whereby now it is entirely 
a commercial industry focused on delivering a quality product to the 
consumer, whereas the old government service days it was actually 
keeping the minister happy. 
In the old days it was possible to directly negotiate that Joe Bloggs has 
got this problem and why don't you, who is near, do something about it. 
It was possible to do that, but now there is no motivation to do so. 
The culture within the industry has gradually changed and become more accepting of 
change as a result of the numerous reforms that the industry has gone through. People 
no longer have the impression that their jobs are predestined for life. The attitude, 
which is now understood by employees, is "unless you are adding value, you probably 
won't survive". This new attitude has affected employee loyalty and employees will 
move from one job to another if they have better offers within the industry or outside. 
The increased commercialisation of the industry resulted in most participants in the 
industry becoming very proactive, more flexible and more responsive to customer 
needs. This resulted in companies moving towards a culture that became more 
tolerant of openness and trust and one that recognised and rewarded people according 
to merit and achievement. The new commercialised culture encouraged more 
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delegation to be pushed downwards in the various companies and frontline people 
were made to take ownership of their decisions. 
It used to be a dictatorial type of management culture where the 
general manager, what the general manager said, wanted, was done. 
He even used to sign the cheques, every cheque that went out in our 
company, (there where 360 employees here) the general manager used 
to sign the cheques. Now it is three or four managers down that sign 
the cheques. You just put that philosophy right throughout the 
management team and that is your answer. We have delegation that we 
didn't use to have. The buzzword is collective responsibility, but I think 
it is more a buzzword than reality. We are, however, some way towards 
it, and that has contributed immensely towards the change. We 
wouldn't have got where we are without these. 
The changes saw the elimination of little private kingdoms, or fiefdoms, as the 
competition moved outside rather than within the organisation and everyone had to 
become focused to defeat the enemy. Emphasis was placed on teamwork in order to 
meet the demands of the changing environment brought about by competition. 
The changes resulted in increased profitability for all players in the industry. The 
annual reports showed that the companies were all making acceptable commercial 
returns on their assets and capital employed. 
So instead of the government having to put money into it each year, 
which it had been doing for many years, and instead of not paying any 
taxes and not paying any dividends, we started to both earn proper 
profits and we paid taxes and we paid interest on our capital. 
One of the unfavourable outcomes of the reform programme in the New Zealand 
electricity industry was the large number of redundancies that resulted from the cost 
cutting exercises carried out. The resulting unemployment had a more profound effect 
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on small communities, and led to social problems and anti-social behaviour, especially 
in small rural communities. 
What we've got to recognise is that although I certainly believe that it is 
in the best interest of the NZ economy what's going on, in terms of the 
local community there's a lot of, obviously a lot of, downside, more 
unemployment. Efficiency does not always remove that problem; it 
often encourages it. So there's the whole restructuring, the costs of 
restructuring within the local community, which is ongoing. And in 
particular redundancy, in some areas of NZ it will be a significant cost 
to the community. 
4.8 Summary 
The changes that have taken place in the electricity industry in New Zealand have 
been categorised under corporatisation, deregulation and ownership changes. 
Different strategies have been used in the different stages to achieve the desired 
objective, which in every stage was the drive to obtain greater efficiencies in the 
industry. The changes were carried out with the hope that improved efficiency in the 
industry would in the long run lead to the lowering of prices for consumers. The 
industry has indeed benefited from increased efficiencies, however, these have not 
translated into lower prices as prices in the demand side of the industry have all risen 
since the reforms. 
The introduction of private sector practices brought about change in the industry as a 
culture of corrimercialisation was adopted. Changes were made to pricing models 
whereby these became more responsive to the supply and demand for electricity, and 
the cross-subsidisation which was historically prevalent in the industry was reduced. 
Competition in the industry was achieved through separating out the competitive from 
the non-competitive sectors of the industry. Competition was partly responsible for 
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bringing down prices (in real terms) on the supply side of the industry and for making 
investment decisions more efficient. These reductions of prices on the supply side 
have however, not been passed on to consumers. 
Most of the change managers responsible for implementing the changes carried out 
were recruited from outside the industry. The boards and senior management of the 
companies worked together as a team and were made up of people with private sector 
and commercial experience, as the expertise needed in the new environment was not 
internally available in the companies previous to the reforms. The selection criteria 
used were based on the needs of the organisations. The new, as well as old, 
appointees were appointed on merit and the criteria used was based on competence 
and integrity and not on seniority or length of service. Staff who were no longer 
needed in the companies, or those who opposed the changes that were being 
introduced, were made redundant. Performance based remuneration systems were 
introduced and these induced employees to perform better. 
The rate of reform, however, was very slow, creating a lot of anxiety along the way. 
This slow rate resulted in employee disillusionment and also served to build up 
opposition to the changes. 
The reforms have resulted in all sectors of the industry becoming profitable. The 
price of electricity at the wholesale level has been reduced in real terms, productivity 
has increased and a lot of cost savings have resulted. The changes have resulted in a 
culture that has become commercialised, moving employees' mindsets away from the 
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civil service mindset, which embodies inefficiency. Employees are now responsible 
for themselves, as accountability has been pushed right down to the frontline. 
This chapter has described the changes in the New Zealand electricity industry. The 
next chapter describes the changes that have occurred in the Gambian electricity 
industry. 
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Chapter 5 
The Story of Change in the Gambian Electricity Industry 
5.1 Introduction 
The importance of electricity as an engine for economic and industrial development 
was recognised by the Gambian authorities soon after The Gambia gained its 
independence from Britain in 1965. The authorities in The Gambia also realised that 
in order to develop and improve the living standards of its citizens, an adequate and 
reliable supply of electricity must be provided. The electricity industry in The 
Gambia historically developed as a vertically integrated industry due to the small size 
of the country and the small size of the electricity industry. The electricity sector also 
developed as part of a wider utility organisation, which included the provision and 
distribution of water and the disposal of sewerage. 
The production of electricity in The Gambia could only be achieved through thermal 
means because of the geographic landscape of the country. The country is completely 
flat and there are no mountains that could facilitate the damming of the main river that 
runs through the entire length of the country. Being devoid of any natural resource, 
all fuel for generation purposes must be imported. The worldwide economic decline 
and the oil crises of the seventies had a heavy toll on the Gambian economy in general 
and the electricity industry in particular. The electricity industry was 
underperforming and could not supply enough electricity to meet the demand. This 
gave rise to regular and frequent blackouts. An economy wide reform programme 
was instituted with the help of the World Bank and the IMF, and the electricity 
industry was one of the industries to be reformed. The industry has over the years 
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undergone several reform programmes and these have been categorised under various 
eras in this chapter. The changes have largely been institutional changes, some of 
which were prescribed by legislation. 
The chapter starts out by discussing the background of electricity generation and 
distribution in The Gambia and then the main eras of change are discussed. Four 
distinct eras of change have been identified and for each era, the changes, the manner 
of implementation, the problems encountered and the outcomes of the change 
programme are discussed. The chapter also outlines the critical role that donor 
agencies, in particular the World Bank and the IMF, played in bringing about change 
in The Gambia. The role of the government and politics in the change process is also 
discussed. 
The story of change in The Gambia has been captured by mainly using the quotations 
from the interviews conducted, using the same style of reporting as in chapter four. A 
timeline of the changes in the Gambian electricity industry has been included for ease 
of reference in Table 5 overleaf. 
5.2 Background 
The Gambia is one of Africa's smallest countries occupying an area of 11,000 square 
kilometres and situated on the West Coast of Africa. It was a colony of Great Britain 
until 1965 when it attained its independence. Being a small country devoid of natural 
resources, the introduction of electricity happened relatively late, mainly because The 
Gambia was of no economic benefit to its colonial masters. Electricity was 
introduced in 1925 and was confined to the capital Banjul. Initially the production 
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and distribution of electricity was only meant for the colonial offices and the 
residences of the colonial administrators. 
Table 5 Timeline of Change in Electricity Industry in The Gambia 
Year Event 
1925 Introduction of Electricity in The Gambia 
1965 Attainment of Independence 
1972 Establishment of GUC 
1977 Explosion of generator 
1982 German Co-operation Agreement 
1987 End of German Co-operation 
1988 Performance Contract signed 
1989 Performance contract terminated 
1989 Start of Finance Steering Committee supervision 
1991 End of Finance Steering Committee supervision 
1991 Appointment of Dawda Jawara as Managing Director (MD) 
Explosion of generator 
Resignation of Dawda Jawara as MD 
1993 Management Leasing Agreement 
Reduction of staffing levels by 30% 
Explosion of generator 
1994 Military Coup 
Termination of Lease Contract 
1995 Appointment of Batchi Baldeh as MD UHC 
Management Support Contract with ESBIIBiwater 
Termination of Management Support Contract 
Formation of Nawec 
1996 Return to Civilian Rule 
Formation of Gampower 
1997 Installation of additional capacity 
Termination of Batchi Baldeh as MD 
Appointment of Sering J obe as MD. 
1999 Signing of BEECL agreement for 20MW 
Signing of Bassam Agreement for 100MW 
Leasing of Nawec to Bassam 
Termination of Leasing Agreement with Bassam 
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Electricity generation and distribution came under the purview of the Director of 
Telephones and Telegraph. An electrical engineer was employed and his 
responsibilities included supervision of the generating plant, supervising the radio and 
telephone installations and being responsible for an ice plant that was for the use of 
the colonial administrators. 
A study commissioned by the colonial government in the late forties recommended 
the expansion of electricity services. A new powerhouse was built in 1955 and 
additional equipment was purchased. The generating capacity was increased from 
O.3MW in the old powerhouse to 1.8MW in the new. A separate department, the 
Electricity Department, was created to look after the generation and distribution of 
electricity. The population of Banjul in the late fifties was quite small and the 
Electricity Department had an excess supply of generating capacity and, as a result, 
the electricity services were expanded to cover nearby towns and villages. The 
management of the Electricity Department was the responsibility of the colonial 
administrators. There was strict discipline within the sector and Gambians were only 
involved at lower levels of management, the highest position of which was at foreman 
level in the powerhouse. 
I must say that it was a very good system and there was a lot of 
discipline in the sector. We had white people as superintendents and 
these people were very powerful and the no nonsense type. They also 
had foremen who worked under them and they were responsible for the 
general workers. There was an established chain of command and it 
was forbidden for ordinary workers and labourers to talk to these white 
men. You had to go through the for:emen and they were the link-pins 
between the superintendents and the workers. Any worker who 
breached this code of conduct was severely punished. 
Decisions were solely taken by the white guys, but from time to time 
they will seek the suggestions from the foremen but this was rather the 
exception than the norm. It was generally a good period as we were all 
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enthusiastic, as we were working in a sector that was producing power 
to the people. Of course at that time, only few homes had electricity 
and so we were proud of being part of that. The foremen were also 
very powerful in those days unlike today's engineers. This I think was 
because of the position they held in the colonial department as 
middlemen. The foremen could do a lot of things especially to the rank 
and file employees who were in awe of them because of their status. 
Electricity consumption, before the attainment of independence, was low because the 
disposable income of the majority of Gambians was not sufficient to meet the costs 
associated with the consumption of electricity. After the attainment of independence 
in 1965, the government wanted to make electricity more widely accessible to the 
general population. However, the government still kept the same departmental 
structures inherited from the colonial era, which were not conducive to making 
electricity widely available. Central government controlled the budgeting, finance 
and human resources of the Electricity Department, and the department was treated as 
an ordinary department within government. 
5.3 The GUC Era (1972 -1993) 
After independence in 1965, as more Gambians got jobs their economic status 
improved and as a consequence the demand for electricity increased. The government 
realised that an adequate and widely available supply of electricity could play an 
important role in helping it meet its developmental goals. In accordance with this 
realisation, in 1972 the government announced a major policy shift and the Electricity 
Department was merged with the Water Works Department through the GUC Act 
1972 (a review of the GUC Act 1972 is given in Appendix One). A new organisation 
called the Gambia Utilities Corporation (GUC) was formed to cater for the utility 
needs of The Gambia. According to a former senior government official: 
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The rationale was to improve efficiency and economise on scarce 
resources to provide as much of these amenities as possible to as many 
people as possible. As you know we are a developing country and 
electricity and water were not as widely available as one could have 
wished and any amalgamation of water and electricity would be aimed 
at improving the efficiency so as to make it as widely available as 
possible. 
This policy shift was implemented as a result of the advice received from external 
sources. Although independence had been attained, the Gambia was very largely 
dependent on British advice due to a dearth of adequate management capability to 
plan major policy initiatives. 
Our principal donor at the time, which was the British government, had 
recommended that this was the best way to proceed at that time. It was 
agreed that a parastatal should handle it and government would reap 
the benefits 
This policy shift was implemented because it was the belief at the time that: 
The Gambia needed to adhere to the standards in other countries in the 
sub-region, and that was to become a parastatal. It was felt that this 
step will bring some amount of independence to the organisation and 
they will become semi-autonomous in a sense. 
The establishment of the GUC was meant to introduce commercial concepts in the 
organisation to make the provisions of utility services more commercial and minimise 
the inefficiencies associated with services provided through government departments. 
The GUC Act 1972 stipulated that GUC was to operate under sound commercial lines 
and ensure a reasonable rate of return on the fair amount of capital it employed. 
Government was supposed to provide grants in the form of subventions for any non-
commercial activity to be undertaken by the corporation for social and economic 
reasons. 
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5.3.1 Implementation of Change 
The outcomes of the change process during the GUC era were dependent on the 
manner in which change was implemented. 
5.3.1.1 Board of Directors 
With the establishment of the GUC, a board of directors was constituted to govern the 
affairs of the corporation. 
It was supposed to operate with a board of directors that was supposed 
to govern the affairs of the company. The board was supposed to be 
answerable to the minister and no one else. The board was supposed to 
be responsible for policy matters. 
The various boards in the lifetime of the GUC were made up mainly of civil servants. 
The board members had limited commercial experience and expertise, and most of 
them had never before operated in commercial environments. The composition of the 
boards made provision for two people to represent the interests of industrial and 
domestic consumers. The shareholding minister made appointments to the board. 
Initially this was the Minister of Works, but later on responsibility for electricity was 
transferred from the Ministry of Works to the Ministry of Trade, Industry and 
Employment and subsequently the Minister of Trade became the shareholding 
Minister. 
5.3.1.2 Selection 
The appointment of the Managing Director (MD) was the prerogative of the President. 
The board was responsible for the appointment of people to serve in senior 
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management positions, whilst management was responsible for appointing lower level 
staff. The initial MDs of GUC were transferred from the civil service, because the 
government felt that the GUC needed seasoned administrators to bring about 
administrative stability in the organisation. Staff from the Electricity Department 
were given the option of either joining GUC or transferred to some other department 
within the government civil service. Most of the Electricity Department staff opted to 
join the GUc. The number of qualified people within the country before 
independence was small and the formation of GUC coincided with the return of the 
first Gambian engineers from overseas university studies. Most of the newly returned 
engineers were given middle management positions in the GUC. 
The selection criteria used for recruiting additional staff to assist in expanding the 
services was based more on political and considerations such as nepotism rather than 
on competence, merit and experience. The selection criteria resulted in the 
corporation employing a lot of people with substandard qualifications as well as many 
illiterate and semi-literate people. 
People were hired and put into the system without any prior knowledge 
of what electricity was. 
Nepotism featured a lot in the selection process. Management, the 
board, the ministers all have people whom they favour and ask 
management to employ. Friends and relatives were brought into the 
organisation and most of these people did not have the necessary 
qualifications to warrant their employment. 
The problem that GUC has is that the worliforce is basically illiterate. 
I can give you an indication, in my section I had a staff of over 100 
people and in the staff only about ten 'or twelve can read or write. 
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5.3.1.3 Training 
The performance of the GUC management was unsatisfactory to government because 
of the continuous losses made by the corporation year after year and its inability to 
provide adequate electricity to consumers. The under-performance of the sector was 
partly attributed to a lack of adequate management capability and competence within 
the organisation. The government therefore sought external assistance from donor 
agencies and countries to assist in training staff of the GUC. In 1982 a co-operation 
agreement, which was to last for five years, was signed with the German government. 
A German team was put in place to manage the GUC and also to train senior Gambian 
managers of the corporation. 
I think the problem was that there were no qualified Gambians at the 
senior level. So it was recognised that this being deficient, it was 
necessary to sign a support contract whereby Gambians could be 
trained. The Germans were very forthcoming and I guess that was the 
reason why they were chosen. 
The Germans provided technical assistance with a view to revamping 
and reorganising the GUc. They had some Gambian counterparts in 
the top management positions. 
The German management team brought in professionalism into the management of 
the company. They were able to work without interference from the government. A 
senior manager attributed this lack of interference from the government to the fact that 
the Germans were not directly answerable to the Gambian government. 
This German attitude enabled us to be able to carry on with the job, do 
the maintenance on schedule and time was taken to make sure that 
there was no extraordinary pressure put on us to complete the job· 
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The agreement with the Germans included a training component, which allowed some 
technical staff to be sent to Germany for technical training. At the end of the German 
contract, the counterpart of the German MD became the new MD of GUc. 
After the Germans left, we had a Gambian MD and we also had a 
board of directors. Unfortunately Gambians were now responsible for 
our own affairs and the problems started again. 
5.3.1.4 Performance Contract 
The end of the German contract coincided with the period during which, as a result of 
a worldwide economic recession, the Gambian economy was undergoing severe strife. 
There was a scarcity of foreign exchange and basic commodities, and the government 
decided to seek assistance from the World Bank and the IMP to help stabilise the 
economy. The World Bank and the IMP initiated an Economic Recovery Programme 
(ERP) to deal with reform in the whole economy. Part of the ERP dealt with public 
enterprise reform for economic stabilisation. 
Within the public enterprise reform, there was what was referred to as 
the performance contract system, which basically identified the 
strategic public enterprises, and these were subjected to the 
performance contract. The peiformance contract essentially entails 
clarifying the objectives between government and the enterprises and 
what the rules of the game should be in terms of accountability and 
transparency, delegation of management, management autonomy and 
putting some benchmarks as to what the operational results should be. 
The performance contract also outlined the terms of government 
obligations to the enterprises, such as making sure that they paid their 
bills and that they did not interfere in management. 
The performance contracting system was part of the conditionality agreement between 
the Gambian government and the WB/IMF. In order to receive monetary assistance 
needed for economic stabilisation, the government had to comply with the 
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conditionality agreement. The performance contracts in The Gambia were signed 
between the operational directors, who were also executive directors, of the public 
enterprises and the government. The contracts were to be monitored by a government 
agency, the National Investment Board (NIB). 
The performance contract was meant to encourage management to 
improve their performance in terms of the bottom line profitability, in 
terms of the productive use of resources, both labour and capital. 
Prior to the signing of the performance contract in the GUC, the line managers in the 
GUC became board members, as the performance contract was between the 
government and executive directors of GUC. A one-year trial period for the 
performance contract was undertaken to break down resistance and to get the directors 
and managers on board. 
We felt that if we brought the other managers on board who were not 
actively involved in the running of the organisations it would have more 
support. From our observations we knew were we had hope of making 
it work and which managers were competent and those incompetent to 
carry through the reforms. 
Very little consultation was undertaken with the board and management of the GUC 
before the performance contract was introduced. The GUC board and management 
had no option but to comply with the directives of government, as it was an economy 
wide reform programme directed by the World Bank and IMF. 
After the first year we realised that the GUC was in a very poor state 
and did not have the wherewithal to be subjected to the rig ours of 
performance contract and it was cancelled. 
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With the termination of the performance contract the government introduced an 
external finance supervisory committee to monitor and approve all financial 
transactions in GUC. 
The government put the GUC under the supervlslOn of a steering 
committee as well as the NIB. Things got so worse that the company 
could not even buy spare parts. The government told you when to buy 
fuel and when not to purchase spare parts. 
5.3.1.5 Management Style 
GUC underwent several changes of management during its existence. The average 
term of a MD was around two years, and each MD brought in his own style of 
management. The management styles adopted by most of the managers were very 
similar to that experienced in the civil service in The Gambia due to the initial 
influence of the MDs who had come from the civil service. 
Well I feel that the culture sometimes typified that of time wasting and a 
lethargic attitude towards work. Some of the managers and senior 
officials didn't care at all, it was a government institution and what did 
they have to lose? Nothing! They came to work late and left early, it 
was a very disorganised attitude generally and this is what was 
translated right down the entire company. 
The management style of the MDs was very autocratic and this was a source of 
tension in management circles. 
There was very little consultation between the MD and his managers 
and certain views, which we held, were really not regarded at all or 
given any weight and the MD had the tendency to just overrule and do 
as he liked. It was very autocratic I must say, and a very arrogant style 
that did not allow for teamwork. 
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In the early nineties there was yet another change in MD and the son of the President 
was appointed as the new MD. His style of management was different from the past 
and he encouraged participation and consultation within the senior management team. 
From 1991-93 we had fortnightly management meetings which were 
unheard of prior to 1991 and this allowed the MD and the line 
managers to influence the decision making process. It also gave the 
opportunity to senior engineers like the station manager Kotu power 
station and the distribution manag"er to also be present when certain 
decisions were being taken, and also to air their views. There was co-
operation between the engineers and the managers as a whole. This 
co-operation played a significant role. I remember during these 
meetings we used to decide which operations would require spending, 
we were a very capital intensive organisation and we spent a lot of 
money on gas oil and a lot of money was also spent on spare parts and 
these all had to be imported. Hence the purchasing aspect was very 
important because if the imports were not done on time and if there 
were no spare parts, it had a very negative impact on the company and 
the community at large. Because of the new "esprit de corps" we were 
able to prioritise our purchasing, and see that we had the spare parts 
when needed, and the meagre resources of the company were well 
taken care of 
The other thing that he tried to change was to give people responsibility 
because he felt that we had some very bright and competent people who 
were simply not being given responsibility. We had at the Kotu Power 
Station some very good managers and engineers there, but in the past 
they had never really been able to do anything and even if they needed 
a small item they had to go to headquarters. So things like giving 
people money within the budget and saying up to a certain limit you 
manage it and questions won't be asked, just get on with it and make 
sure that it works. He definitely did that, and said to us his colleagues, 
that we were the ones who knew how to do the job and he emphasised 
that his role was to support us. 
The new MD brought in a new outlook for the corporation: 
I think we as colleagues viewed him, as somebody who wanted to do a 
job and very quickly we were able to build up a very good co-operative 
spirit within the organisation. He really focused on that because I think 
he felt that in the past that particular area had always been a problem. 
There was a lot of conflict in the organisation prior to his appointment, 
but he was able to really focus on that and give leadership on that and 
say, look we really must try to work together and I think he really 
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showed it by example. I think once people had confidence that he was 
genuine, and that he was not favouring anybody, and that he was going 
to lead them in a fair way, then he got the co-operation, and I have to 
say that the co-operation from us as colleagues was very good. I think 
the sort of language that was coming from the way we were, and the 
way people saw us working together, and the way we were talking 
about things, we were being a lot more positive, and that created a lot 
of public confidence as well. 
5.3.1.6 Organisational Structure 
GUC was made up of three divisions, the electricity division, the water division and 
the finance division. In 1981, a fourth division, the sewerage division, was added 
when the company started a sewerage disposal process. An engineer headed each 
division with the exception of the finance division, which had an accountant as 
director. The GUC structure was pyramidal in shape (see fig 3 overleaf) and the 
senior management team was mostly comprised of engineers. 
That is how it should be. I am against the British way of doing things, 
as we had a British consultant who said that financial people should be 
in charge. It is an engineering concern and if the man does not have 
the management skills he could develop them whereas a financial 
person can never be an engineer. 
5.3.1.7 Rewards 
GUC's pay structure was a slightly improved version of the government pay structure, 
but was substantially less than what employees in other public enterprises were 
earning, due to the fact that it was a loss making entity. The government tightly 
controlled the salary structure and salary increments had to have the approval of the 
shareholding ministry and the President's office. 
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There were no performance incentives for the staff; however, the performance 
contract system made provisions for the payment of bonuses to management if the 
performance targets were met. The performance targets set by the government were 
never achieved in ODe and as a result no bonuses were ever paid. 
5.3.2 Problems Encountered 
The implementation of change during the ODe era encountered many problems, 
amongst which were problems of planning, corruption, government interference and 
lack of adequate financial resources to undertake capacity expansions. 
5.3.2.1 Planning 
The implementation of the change programme in ODe lacked the coherent planning 
and analysis that was necessary for the implementation of a major policy shift. 
Adequate plans were needed, because of the long lead times that goes into power 
station construction, to meet the increased demand especially in a developing country. 
Plans were also needed to cater for expansion in the distribution network, as 
electricity was only available to less than 10% of the population. The lack of proper 
planning was one of the factors responsible for the acute capacity problem, which 
resulted in electricity not being available twenty-four hours a day. The absence of 
adequate electricity and poor planning was largely responsible for the absence of any 
major industrial activity in the country. 
The problem here was that it was not planned and this posed a lot of 
problems and because government by virtue of the way in which the 
civil service operates, they applied the same principles to the industry, 
it was not compatible. As a result the industry began to run into very 
serious problems technically, financially and managerially. 
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The lack of planning was partly due to the poor calibre of staff available within the 
company. There was a dearth of adequate, competent and sufficiently trained 
manpower in the company. 
Some of the management problems in GUC days were that people did 
not have the capacity to have a real understanding of the sector. 
People did not have specialised education in the sector, some of the 
people in management at the time were just people who came through 
the ladder and received very little skills training and were just elevated 
over the years to that position. But the real strategic management, long 
range planning, strategic planning, strategic implementation, staff 
development and things like that were lacking. The visionary thinking 
and visionary direction was lacking, as those people did not have the 
capacity. 
5.3.2.2 Corruption 
The levels of conuption at all levels of the company affected the performance of 
GUc. The culture of employees was also affected by the corruption in the company. 
Corruption first got into the industry in the procurement area as 
suppliers started offering 10% for purchases and it became very 
profitable and rewarding to anybody involved in purchasing to buy 
from where they could get the best deal for their pockets. So corruption 
started and since then has been transferred to all levels of the company. 
Corruption was also present in the selection process, and recruitment was carried out 
with very little regard for competence or qualifications. Merit and ability no longer 
became the determining criteria for appointments. Appointments to the company 
were rather based on connections and "whom you know rather than what you know". 
The corruption involved in the selection process was partly responsible for the 
overstaffing of the company. By the late eighties there were over a thousand 
employees in the GUc. 
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Yes we were overstaffed, but the overstaffing was at the junior level and 
did not make much difference to the operations. Basically you have a 
job which can be done by three people but with GUC we had ten people 
and whilst the three would be working the others would be chatting. 
The large employee numbers and the low employee wages fuelled more corruption in 
the company. 
The junior ranks also took advantage of the fact that there was no 
efficient monitoring system and if they could give you an illegal 
connection and make a short-term gain they did. They didn't realise 
that this was at the expense of everybody else because GUC could not 
get the full revenue due to them. 
Corruption was not only restricted to GUC, it was endemic in the whole Gambian 
fabric and formed part of the culture. The GUC employees were just extending this 
cultural malaise to their company. 
People out here take their salaries for granted, so even to make some of 
them do their jobs is difficult and sometimes they even ask you to bribe 
them. 
5.3.2.3 Government & Political Interference 
The board of GUC, being the governing body of the corporation, was responsible for 
policy. However, the board was never given the required autonomy to be able to 
guide the corporation. 
Government has really been interfering in the affairs of the company. 
It directs what should be done and does not give the board or the 
management the necessary autonomy they need in order to advance the 
power industry. 
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The government was always involved in operational and investment decisions, which 
ordinarily should have been undertaken by the board and management. 
The case of the Japanese engine was a case in point, it is rumoured that 
it caused a lot of uproar in cabinet. It later became known as the battle 
of generators, because there were different factions advocating for 
different generators because of what had transpired earlier under the 
tables, as it was rumoured. This generator was plagued with problems 
from the start and had to undergo several engine overhauls and 
eventually in the midst of one such overhaul it exploded. If such 
decisions had been left to the experts, the consequences might have 
been different. I am certain we would not have gone for that generator. 
In fact we had earlier advised them against it. 
Political interference from both government and politicians affected management's 
ability to maintain discipline in the sector. 
We had sometimes messengers who were more powerful than the MD 
because of their political connections. We also had people who did not 
turn up for work because they were party militants. So that was the 
type of politics and political inteiference that was in play in the sector 
and it affected the administration. Everybody was supposed to be equal 
but some were more equal than others. It was very difficult to get rid of 
them because your job is at stake if you got rid of them and so they 
were never got ridden off. Even the MD did not have the authority to 
sack people because the sacked person would go and see the minister 
and then the MD might end up being sacked and that attitude filtered 
down. It was a case of not who you were but whom you knew. 
As I said we were running a public parastatal answerable to 
government and the retrenching of staff always had political 
connotations which the government had to be prepared for. We could 
not just retrench staff without letting the government know. We were 
only able to do so if the directive came from above, if we had it from the 
NIB or the cabinet, but we couldn't of our own volition, based on our 
management assessment of the situation, decide to retrench staff even if 
we knew that the termination of their services would have no impact 
whatsoever on the corporation at all .. 
The subvention that government promised to pay for unprofitable ventures undertaken 
by the corporation was never paid. Requests were always received, based on political 
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motives, for electricity to be provided to villages that had only a handful of people 
with the means to pay for electricity. 
Politicians are shortsighted and can only see as far as the next election 
and this is counterproductive. They would do anything that would 
ensure that they are returned after the next election. 
For the politician the profit motive is not the driving force, they see it 
as a social service and they want it to be provided across the board 
irrespective of the means to payor the need for electricity. 
Politics was also a source of distraction as the GUC management was unsure of who 
their real master was. Directives were always being received from various parties 
who had an interest in the sector. 
There were people outside government that were bypassing the minister 
and the board and going directly to management. Likewise we had 
people in cabinet and also the President bypassing the chain of 
authority and going direct to management and vice versa. This served 
to usurp power and in the end there was total chaos in the institution. 
The autocratic management style that was in place was a source of further chaos in 
GUC, as there were individual differences in the senior management team. These 
differences led to the formation of camps in GUc. The "camp culture" was a culture 
whereby allegiances within the organisation were divided and fiefdoms were created. 
People· owed their allegiance to the individual managers rather than 
the organisation as a whole. They were prepared to do anything to 
enhance their standing in their camp and would do anything to destroy 
other camps. 
Most of the employees in the senior and middle management teams belonged to 
camps and owed their allegiance to the leader of their camp. The camp culture was 
developed as a result of the corrupt selection process as most of the proponents of the 
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camp culture had achieved their positions through their political and organisational 
connections rather than their competence or as a result of their qualifications. 
The period during which GUC was under German management was a period which 
was relatively free from interference from government and politicians. However, 
nearer the end of the German contract the desire by members of the German team to 
stay on longer than was required of them made them vulnerable to external wishes 
and pressures to the extent that the autonomy they had was sometimes compromised. 
The Jawara (name of President's son) management on the other hand was one of the 
few times in the history of the utility that political interference was absent. 
He could negate any moves made by ministers or government officials 
to influence the work of the company as you cannot be closer to the 
President than his son. It was the best chance for the corporation to 
redeem itself, because as the son of the President nobody would dare 
sabotage the operations, everybody will co-operate. 
5.3.2.4 Lack of Financial Resources 
The GUC was formed with the desire to expand the provision of water and electricity 
to consumers in The Gambia. There was an expectation that this would foster 
industrial and economic development. Expansion in the electricity sector was to 
involve the acquisition of more generating capacity, and the expansion of both the 
transmission and distribution networks. GUC was undercapitalised from its 
formation, although in the early days the government was able to contract loans on its 
behalf. Corruption, government interference, the lack of commercial skills and the 
inadequate revenue collection methods employed led to the under-performance of the 
corporation. The corporation became riddled with debt, and with the declining 
economic situation in the country, the debt burden continued to burgeon. 
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It is also important to mention that the then GUC had been defaulting 
on all its loan repayments to the government and lending agencies. 
They were neither paying the interest nor the principal on these loans. 
It was a situation that could not continue and in the end we found it 
very difficult to contract any new debt. 
Without the necessary finance the corporation was unable to invest in the capacity 
needed for expansion. A few years after the formation of the corporation, the supply 
could no longer keep up with the demand for electricity. GUC failed to make any 
major investments of its own and relied on donors to expand its asset base. 
5.3.2.5 Resistance to Change 
There was resistance from the technical staff of the two amalgamated departments 
when the first MDs were transferred from the civil service to bring administrative 
stability to GUc. 
The staff were unhappy as they could not understand how an 
administrator could be taken to head such a technical department and 
that led to some problems of an industrial nature. Some people lost 
their jobs and this happened just around the time when the engine at 
Banjul was lost. 
The introduction of performance measures into public enterprises was met with stiff 
resistance from the management of these enterprises.· GUC and other parastatals got 
together and sent a delegation of MDs to the National Investment Board (NIB) to try 
to reverse the decision. 
When we introduced the performance contract and we were moving 
things very fast and firmly, at one time in the NIB we received a 
delegation of MDs and practically they were threatening us with all 
kinds of awful things. We were not moved by that because we had 
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absolute support from the Office of the President. Maybe there is an 
element of once you want to take a certain course of action, people see 
their interest affected and they mobilise and then send relatives and all 
that to stop the action. 
The resistance was from the end of the MDs even though the incentive 
system that was put in place to support the performance contract was 
very generous. They were opposed to that. It shows that maybe they 
were making more money. 
We run into all these difficulties because we retain old people who are 
of that old mould, they are not forward thinking and they thought they 
had their kingdoms and they were being stopped by the NIB. 
Some government ministers also felt threatened by the introduction of the 
performance contract and they opposed it. 
It was also met with a lot of resistance from ministers, as they felt that 
their powers were being eroded. There was also opposition from the 
civil service as they were linked (the minister and the permanent 
secretary). So the resistance was very strong there, but we had the 
support of the World Bank and the President's office. 
To minimise interference from ministers, ultimate responsibility of public enterprises 
was transferred from ministers to the President. It was acknowledged that he had no 
time for that but it was purely done to cut off ministerial interference in the running of 
the parastatals, as ministers would be less likely to interfere in the affairs of the GUC 
when they knew that the President had ultimate responsibility. 
5.3.3 Change Outcomes 
During government departmental days, most of the employees in the Electricity 
Department were on a daily wage and were. not entitled to any other benefits. With 
the formation of the GUC all the employees were made permanent staff and GUC 
made contributions to a medical scheme as well as a social security scheme. 
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The required investment in capacity expansion necessary to ensure that supply kept 
pace with demand was never available. 
From time to time the government received aid from donor countries 
such as Britain, Japan, Denmark and Germany and over time the 
generating system became a mixed bag of all kinds of machines. There 
was no coherent planning for investment, which would meet the rising 
demand for electricity in any systematic way, and there was a 
haphazard way of increasing capacity and of course that led to failure. 
GUC costs were high as thermal means of generation were employed. The main fuel 
used was diesel, which was inefficient for large-scale thermal generation. As The 
Gambia was devoid of mineral resources, all the fuel for electricity generation had to 
be imported, resulting in a high cost and consequently a high price for electricity. The 
tariff charged to consumers was not set using economic criteria, as management did 
not have the required expertise to do so. 
I don't think and remember any pricing model being developed in order 
to arrive at an economic or realistic pricing for electricity. We arrived 
at a price by looking at our expenses and looked at our revenue and 
arrived at a figure we thought we had to charge in order to keep on 
operating. So really we were just trying to break even. 
The tariff setting was also subject to political interference, as tariffs could not be 
changed without the consent of the government and parliament. The price never 
reflected the true cost of producing electricity. By the end of the GUC era the price of 
electricity was very high due to the high costs involved in fuel purchase as well as the 
inefficiencies within the system. The high staffing levels and the corruption in the 
industry also resulted in increased costs in the sector, which were reflected in the 
pnce. 
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The culture after the formation of GUC gradually became one of cronyism, one of 
jealousy and mistrust. It was one in which employees tried to acquire as much as 
possible in the shortest possible time. There was no co-operation between employees 
and everyone wanted to protect his or her job. 
There was too much infighting and everybody was trying for a higher 
position and the only way they knew how, instead of performance, was 
to suck up to their bosses and those in power hoping that they will be 
well looked after. 
This encouraged the growth and spread of the camp culture throughout the entire 
organisation and various camps were in place. Corruption blossomed under the 
conditions that were present in GUC. 
It was very chaotic, people were doing whatever they liked. The 
financial management was bad as people were holding on to the 
revenue collected for days or weeks and there was no accountability. 
All monies were paid to the chief cashier who lumped all of them 
together, and there was no accountability. We found it very difficult to 
reconcile things. 
5.4 The Management Lease Contract Era (1993 -1995) 
The progress made by the GUC in the provision and expansion of electricity services 
was deemed to be unsatisfactory by government as well as the general public. There 
were constant blackouts and the quality of electricity received by consumers was 
poor. In some areas the brightness of a light bulb was dimmer than a candle due to 
very low voltage levels in those areas. GUC was faced with numerous problems; 
there was a shortage of the required spare parts for the generators leading to frequent 
breakdowns; they could not purchase fuel for the generators and sometimes the 
corporation ran into difficulties paying staff salaries at the end of the month. The 
utility sector eventually became a net drain on public finances. Such a situation was 
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undesirable as it prevented government from putting money into health, education and 
other vital sectors of the economy. Change in the electricity sector was necessary to 
make the organisation more responsive and to provide the added capacity (generating, 
transmission and distribution) that was lacking in the past. 
I think in the context of The Gambia, power supply is really very 
crucial. It impacts upon virtually every facet of development and we 
had a situation where we had very poor power supply at high cost and 
so it was logical to look again at what the problem was and what 
reform could take place. 
The WB/IMF continued their programme of reform in The Gambia after the failure of 
the performance contracting system in GUc. The WB/IMF conditionality programme 
shifted from economic recovery to structural adjustment, and another conditionality 
agreement, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), was signed with the 
Gambian government. SAP was part of the WB/IMF drive to introduce more private 
sector participation into the economy. It required the Gambian government to further 
divest itself of the need to produce certain services, which could be more efficiently 
provided by the private sector. The GUC was one of the sectors identified by the 
WB/IMF for more private sector participation as the model of corporatisation (GUC) 
had not achieved the desired objectives and the corporation was still performing 
poorly. 
It was a desperate situation and at the time the WBIIMF carne in and 
said we are prepared to loan you money but you have to undergo some 
more institutional changes before that money would be forthcoming. 
The Gambia is a poor country and it depends for most part from grants 
from these international bodies and our budget is predominantly 
dependent on aid and as such the government had no alternative but to 
comply with the wishes of the World Bank. 
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The WB was able to convince the government that the best-suited form of more 
private sector participation for GUC was a management leasing arrangement that was 
similar to the leasing arrangements that the Bank had pioneered in two countries in 
the West African sub-region, Guinea Conakry and La Cote D'Ivoire. 
So these things had been tried before and the management lease was 
seen as an option, which was middle ground where the assets still 
remained with government but the day-to-day operation was with the 
private sector. It was just an operational lease and we felt that this 
would introduce further efficiency in the sector. 
On the insistence of the WB, a holding company called the Utilities Holding 
Corporation (UHC) was formed to own the assets of GUc. This holding company 
was to make the necessary investments in the industry, whilst the day-to-day 
operations were to be contracted out to a private sector company. The legal 
framework for the leasing arrangement was already in place as the Public Enterprise 
Act 1990 (a review of this Act is contained in Appendix One) permitted the 
government to set up public enterprises to promote improved performance of 
government's commercial activities. In July 1993, UHC entered into a contract with a 
private company from France (Sogea) to operate UHC assets and provide utility 
services in The Gambia. The responsibilities of the UHC included the planning and 
financing of investments, the preparation and implementation of projects, and the 
monitoring of the management lease contract with Sogea for compliance. 
I think one of the reasons why we sought to bring a private company 
was to improve the commercial aspe9t of it. What we saw initially was 
the commercial aspect, we saw that it would generate more revenue 
without necessarily hiking tariffs, it would have resulted in better 
service coverage, and better reliability and really the intangibles or the 
spin-offs and those were the reasons why we did it. Generally we 
thought that there would be a greater degree of confidence from the 
funding agencies and in the long run they would continue to support us. 
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Both UHC and Sogea were expected to source their revenues for investment and for 
operations from the electricity tariff paid by consumers. The lessee was responsible 
for collecting the revenue and paying a surcharge to the lessor. 
5.4.1 Implementation of Change 
The outcomes of the change process during the Management Lease Contract era were 
dependent on the manner in which the change programme was implemented. 
5.4.1.1 Planning 
A Task Force was set up by the Gambian government to work through the delicate 
stage of overseeing the leasing process and negotiations. 
The initial study was carried out by consultants and the negotiations 
were carried out by the GUc. But let me just say here that the sort of 
GUC/government side of it was represented by a very wide range of 
interest. There was the managing director of the GUC, there was the 
NIB who had overall responsibility for that sort of thing, the Attorney 
Generals chambers, the Ministry of Finance, the parent ministry of 
GUC that is the Ministry of Trade. So everything that was done was 
done in the presence of these people who were represented at all stages. 
Consultants were also brought in and the managing director of GUC 
had one or two technical advisers helping him. 
The Task Force prepared tender documents, which were opened up for competitive 
bidding from international companies. Several proposals were received from 
prospective contractors. 
We had asked them to give us a price for operating the system, how 
much they would charge or how much they were willing to pay the 
holding company for every kWh sold. When the proposals arrived, the 
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only deciding factor was the price, and the one who had the lowest 
price was the guy who won. 
The contract was awarded to a French civil works contractor Sogea. Sogea had taken 
on a Danish electrical works contractor BWSC as a partner. Both parties had 
previously been involved in construction work in The Gambia. 
We thought that it was a good partnership and even though Sogea was 
mainly in civil works having BWSC as their partner was going to put 
them in a good position to provide the service. At the last minute the 
partnership fell apart. Sogea said they were teaming up with somebody 
else, and we tried to find out who the new partner was. Although we 
were given something on paper, we never saw them on the ground. 
Like I said government had already made a decision and there was no 
way we could reverse the decision. 
Sogea set up a limited liability company called Management Services Gambia 
Limited (MSG) to carry out the operations and maintenance of the UHC assets. 
Government through UHC retained the investment portfolio because it felt that 
foreign governments and donors would be more willing to give grants to the Gambian 
government rather than to a private company. The government also stood a better 
chance of getting better loan rates from the international market than commercial 
companies. This it was felt would lead to the lowering of the high price already 
charged to electricity consumers. 
5.4.1.2 Staff Selection 
MSG had informed government during the negotiation phase that they would bring in 
foreign staff to take-over all senior and middle management positions in the company. 
This was unacceptable to the government and after much negotiation MSG agreed to 
limit foreigners to the most senior positions in the company. 
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I think the significant thing they did was to change the whole top 
management team to French and Gambians didn't really know what 
was going on. 
Senegalese nationals were brought in to fill some of the middle management and 
administrative positions in MSG primarily because of the language barrier. The 
Senegalese officials spoke French and they also spoke a common local language with 
Gambians. They could thus serve as intermediaries as well as interpreters between 
the senior management team, who spoke very little English, and the rest of the local 
staff, most of whom did not speak any French. 
Before the contract became effective, the Gambian Staff were given two options by 
government to either join the UHC or be transferred over to MSG. 
Well initially people were given questionnaires to ask whether they 
wanted to be employed by MSG or UHC. It was made clear that the 
holding company would only take eighteen people, and so naturally 
most people chose MSG. It was also stated that if MSG did not find a 
suitable position for them, they would pay them six months salary. It 
was left with MSG to choose whom they wanted or not. 
Most of the staff required by UHC were at the managerial level. The President 
appointed a new MD and the other members of the UHC management were 
handpicked by the outgoing GUC MD and the incoming UHC MD. MSG on the 
other hand had handpicked a few Gambian staff from GUC who they considered to be 
competent. The staff MSG handpicked were required to assist the MSG management 
in staff selection, as they knew the capabilities of most of the Gambian staff having 
worked with them. MSG also utilised the services of the outgoing GUC MD in staff 
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selection who, after the signing of the lease agreement, was taken on as a private 
consultant. 
Before they took over, they came here enquiring about the qualification 
of each and every individual that was employed with GUC and it was in 
consultation with us who were here. The structure was there but they 
needed these number of people and instead of needing four for a job 
they said we need two and we decided on that and the others would go 
and of course the capability and the capacity of the workers was taken 
into consideration. 
MSG merged the water and sewerage divisions due to the similarity of the two 
operations. A formalised organisation stmcture was never put in place, although 
French nationals headed all departments and divisions. UHC on the other hand 
maintained the previous GUC functional stmcture for monitoring as they had 
constraints on their operations and budgets. 
We were also guided by the WB and they had determined that the cost 
of our operations (UHC) should not be more than 22% of our gross 
income and that was just an arbitrary figure which created a lot of 
problems later on. 
5.4.1.3 Downsizing 
Over a thousand employees joined MSG from GUc. The consultation exerCIse 
carried out by MSG prior to the commencement of the contract was to determine the 
number of employees it needed to mn the operations and which employees to layoff. 
A downsizing exercise was carried out on the first day the contract became effective 
to weed out unproductive workers and keep only those whom they felt were 
competent enough to get the job done. The downsizing exercise was also carried out 
to minimise the labour cost. 
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In addition to being a foreign company they were very concerned with 
the overstaffing. So from day one they thought it should be much more 
streamlined and they provided them with much of the tools and 
equipment that they needed to do their work and got rid of excess fat. 
MSG laid off over two hundred and fifty people on the first day, the majority of 
whom were middle management and junior level staff, although some senior 
management staff were also laid off. By the end of the MSG era over four hundred 
workers had been made redundant. Workers who were laid off were paid their 
redundancy benefits. 
Well they abided by what was in the contract and that was six months 
pay and a months notice. Where a month's notice is not given you are 
entitled to a month's salary and in most cases people who were 
downsized walked away with seven month's salary. 
5.4.1.4 Management Style 
The senior management team in MSG was new and like the GUC management team 
before them, they also adopted a very autocratic style. 
It was very autocratic and I think this was from the mindset at the 
beginning. It was very clear what was communicated to them, we have 
a hopeless situation and hopeless people and when you take over you 
cannot help but treat them that way. 
They gave you whatever they wanted, gave you whatever responsibility 
they wanted. They terrorised the Gambians and were very tough on 
attendance and punctually. That was the style very very autocratic, and 
as Nixon used to say 'either my way or the highway'. 
Some of the Gambian staff, especially those at the middle management level, were 
involved in some planning with the expatriates. Middle managers were also given a 
limited amount of autonomy to get on with the job. 
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Well when it comes to work planning and that sort of thing we were 
very much consulted, but when it came to administration, management, 
and remuneration, they kept that close to their chests. 
5.4.1.5 Rewards 
The lease did not allow MSG to pay employees anything less than they earned under 
GUc. Most MSG employees were given a very nominal increase in salary. However, 
a few key employees (especially those who helped MSG in staff selection) were 
selected and given significant salary increments. Employees who were perceived by 
senior management to have performed well were rewarded with a bonus payment at 
the end of the month. There was no performance appraisal policy and rewards, 
according to a senior manager who worked under MSG, were based "more on whim, 
somebody comes to me I look at him and decide that he should be at that level and 
paid him so much". 
5.4.2 Problems Encountered 
Problems were encountered during the implementation of the change programme in 
the MSG era. The problems encountered and the manner in which they were dealt 
with affected the outcomes of the change programme during this era. 
5.4.2.1 Participation 
Only the GUC MD participated from among GUC staff in the complex negotiations 
that brought about the lease contract. 
The participation at the time of GUC staJfwas very limited as this was 
being kept as a secret. It was expected that the people in GUC would 
be involved when it was going to be implemented. It would have been 
better if there was GUC involvement at the inception of the contract 
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and you would have had the support, and people would have 
contributed to develop the contract because it is important to have the 
support. 
It could have been extremely good if technocrats are put on board at 
the very early stage. It is unfortunate that in this country technocrats 
are short-circuited and are only brought on board when things go bad. 
In my opinion it could have worked extremely well if technocrats were 
put on boardfrom the early stage. 
5.4.2.2 Political Problems 
The Ministry of Finance played an important role in the negotiations. However, the 
negotiations happened at a time when finance officials were being distracted by 
political infighting involving their minister, and as a result they could not devote the 
required time and effort to negotiate a good contract. 
I think it was political ambition of the players particularly at the latter 
stage. The Ministry of Finance they should have been pushing the NIB 
for bringing about change, but unfortunately we have to talk about 
personalities, and the Minister of Finance competed with the Vice 
President for succession of the President. That really complicated 
matters, and they had no time to focus on policy and were only 
interested in playing politics. That was a major problem that could 
only have been solved by the President himself. There was the 
competition at the top and they had no time for us at the NIB, for policy 
and the programme of change. 
5.4.2.3 Resistance to Change 
Some senior staff in GUC were sceptical about changing from the corporatisation 
model to the private sector model of management contracts, as they were unsure of 
their future positions in either UHC or MSG. Some members of the senior 
management team also felt that some progress had been made during the Jawara 
administration and further change was undesirable. 
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Now it was also done at the time when most people thought that GUC 
had just begun to turn the corner. Turn the corner in the sense that the 
last GUC MD had the technical know how and was highly trained and, 
most importantly, he had the political clout as he coincidentally was the 
son of the President and he could say no to a minister without second 
thoughts. He had all the elements in terms of the political clout, he was 
technically trained, he was a highly trained engineer and GUC had 
already started to turn the corner. 
There was no resistance from the junior staff. Most of them were happy because they 
had heard rumours of increased salaries and that was their major concern - their take 
home pay. 
We are a poor country and jobs are hard to come by, and we are not a 
free market economy where you can leave one job if you don't like the 
conditions and go to another one. So the staff have no choice and have 
to accept whatever is decided by government or by the management. 
5.4.2.4 Downsizing 
A lot of social problems resulted from the downsizing exercise undertaken by MSG. 
Most of the people who lost jobs under MSG were the major breadwinners in their 
families, and this adversely affected their families. Workers who had spent over 
twenty years in the utility sector and those who had spent a year were given the same 
redundancy package of six or seven months' salary depending on whether a notice of 
redundancy was given or not. 
There are people who took MSG to court for wrongful dismissal at the 
time, but like I said MSG had a strong foothold and were able to 
manipulate the system to their advantage, and nothing really came out 
of it for most of the people. 
In some cases more numbers were cut than was necessary and a few key areas of the 
industry were left unmanned by MSG. 
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This is not Europe and if they want to do that they have to train people 
adequately and also they have to look at the resources, then they can 
perform like their counterparts in Europe. Over here it is labour 
intensive and they lost sight of that and drove out a lot of people. 
But they did that without really understanding all the factors, as they 
were not really an operational company. They were not familiar with 
operating such a facility in the third world and they unfortunately got 
rid of people who mattered. When they started operating they 
encountered a lot of difficulties and they had to reverse some of their 
decisions and take on more people. 
5.4.2.5 Contractual Problems 
Sogea had no previous experience III utility operations and its competence was 
questioned in many quarters. Some senior managers believed that the process of pre-
qualification and selection was not open and transparent. 
The government made a mistake by looking at only somebody who had 
the financial muscle and basically what they did was to pre-qualify 
without realising that certain companies were construction companies. 
The result was that we landed with a company that had considerable 
experience and expertise in construction but not operation. When it 
started it was a joint venture between BWSC and Sogea and BWSC 
were manufacturers and construction experts. Shortly after the 
contract was won, BWSC pulled out and we asked Sogea to give us 
another partner and they gave us a name, but until the contract was 
terminated these people were never part of the game. We tried to 
ascertain this but to no avail and there was not much we could do about 
it. 
I think there was a lot of corruption in the way the MSG contract was 
set up, as there were lots of people within government circles who were 
taken on as consultants by MSG after they had won the contract. 
The contract with Sogea and UHC (on behalf of the Gambian government) was signed 
under a lot of pressure from the World Bank. It was not tightly defined and problems 
were encountered from the first day in the interpretation of certain clauses of the 
contract. 
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One of the major problems was that there were no clear terms defining 
clearly what MSG, in terms of the capital replacement, what specific 
things they were supposed to be doing. That was a loophole which 
MSG took advantage of 
Government had, before the commencement of the contract, introduced a duty 
element on fuel, and urged MSG to absorb the added cost. This was a source of 
problems and a lot of confusion arose as to the interpretation of the clauses related to 
the tariff structure. MSG wanted to pay as little as possible in terms of the surcharge 
and UHC wanted them to pay as much as possible. This was because the surcharge to 
be paid by MSG wasn't based on a straight percentage. 
5.4.2.6 Investment 
Investment in the electricity sector was the responsibility of UHC. UHC expected to 
raise the necessary finance for investment from the surcharge received from MSG and 
through grants from donors and possibly loans from bilateral partners. 
Some of us of course wanted to tie in investment and management, and 
the companies we invited to manage must be required to invest. But 
here we were being pushed so hard and so fast by the WB that we were 
not able to tie this into the agreements. Our major problem was not 
management but investment. But sometimes they were a bit reckless 
attaining what they want the WB, and they don't give you any chance as 
they control the funds that come to you and they don't give you the best 
programme suitable for your condition. That was one reason really 
and a lot of it was being driven from Washington and not from The 
Gambia. I don't think this was a good thing. I think they also had their 
performance targets to meet from their end and they were ready to ride 
roughshod over our own needs just to meet their own targets. It was 
not very good, as we were not given adequate time to put in some of 
these things we were thinking of The investment side was being looked 
at closely and we thought at one point that the best way to go about it 
was to invite investment from outside so that the bottleneck would be 
broken. The two, investment and management, would have been linked 
if the WB hadn't stepped into the picture. 
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It is ironic that what Gambians could do most was what was privatised, 
and the one that they needed support with - investment - was what was 
left in Gambian hands. 
5.4.2.7 Monitoring 
Monitoring the leasing agreement was the role of UHC. It quickly became evident 
that UHC did not have the manpower, the resources and the competence to carry out 
the functions that were expected of them. 
When the UHC was set up it was clear what we were supposed to do 
and monitor. However, we ended up monitoring a lot more. It was a 
problem determining what was due to us and we realised that we had to 
determine exactly how many units were sold, and even after agreeing 
they refused to pay and we ended up dealing with a lot of issues that 
were never supposed to be the case. It put a strain on us and we did not 
monitor as effectively as we should have. 
They (MSG) kept a lot of information from the holding company and in 
some instances they refused to provide information that they were 
contractually obliged to provide. 
UHC did not have the full support and the mandate of the government 
to follow MSG, because MSG was able to manipulate a lot of the 
politicians and bring them to their side. 
The expectations of consumers with the take-over of the activities of the GUC by 
MSG were that the provision of electricity would become more available and 
blackouts would be a thing of the past. Customers instead became more dissatisfied 
as MSG embarked on disconnection campaigns and customer disputes were not dealt 
with unless the disputed amount was paid in full. MSG it seemed, by their actions, 
were more interested in making money than keeping the customers happy. 
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5.4.3 Outcomes of Change 
The major outcomes of the change during the change from GUC to MSG were in the 
areas of cultural change and the adoption of more commercial principles. 
5.4.3.1 Cultural Change 
The change from GUC to MSG was accompanied by a marked change in culture. 
MSG management had made it known that if people were found idling around and not 
working they would be dismissed immediately. 
As I said the people who were coming from GUC had no culture. The 
change helped to hammer home the point that you were working for 
somebody who wanted to make money. It was not about coming to 
work and sitting down and going home at four a 'clock, you had to add 
value everyday wherever you are for the company to continue to 
survive. 
Discipline certainly went up, people cared about their jobs and 
performance went up, attendance and punctually went up, you had 
fewer staff and productivity went up. Generally things improved a 
great deal and the culture was one were people knew they had to work. 
Productivity increased as the work force was reduced by 30%. MSG also brought in 
new plant and equipment, which helped in raising productivity levels as previous to 
the change most of the work was carried out using manual labour. 
When MSG came they cut the pork out and it was a lean and very 
efficient system. Indeed there were some measurable changes which 
took place as a lot of deadwood within the system were weeded out and 
that was good, because for a long time government was unable to scale 
down the staff of GUC and we benefited from that. 
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5.4.3.2 Commercialisation 
MSG was keen from the onset to demonstrate that their operations were of a 
commercial nature. They introduced a lot of controls to minimise waste and to 
eliminate the corruption that was present during the GUC era. 
They concentrated on service connections and replaced a lot of meters, 
as that was their cash register, and they were very strong in the 
commercial aspect. 
Revenue collection was given the priority it deserved, and all GUC's VIP lists were 
eliminated. The disconnection campaigns that were undertaken instilled a culture 
among consumers that their bills had to be settled on time if they were to continue to 
enjoy utility services. This new commercial attitude brought to the limelight, in The 
Gambia, the benefits that could accrue from further private sector participation in the 
economy. 
I think it was in our best interest basically because, for the first time, we 
were able to focus management minds on the things that mattered in 
running any organisation, making sure that you control costs, making 
sure that you put your resources to the best possible use, making sure 
also that you develop your human resources to the level required to 
maintain the organisation. I think in that sense it was very successful. 
It was also preparing them towards a modernisation programme and 
for the first time they were compelled to use modern management 
techniques and the ultimate aim was to move the organisation to the 
point where it can operate on a purely private sector basis. It was very 
vital. 
5.4.3.3 Termination 
The UHC/MSG marriage was fraught with a lot of problems. MSG was not interested 
in the unprofitable provincial operations and neglected this part of its operations. It 
was also very heavy handed with consumers which prompted consumers, for the first 
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time in The Gambia, to form an association to deal with the numerous problems that 
were being encountered. In July 1994 there was a change in government and a 
military government overthrew the democratically elected government. The military 
government was very concerned with the state of the utility sector, and statements 
made by it, soon after taking power suggested that the deplorable state of the sector 
was one of the reasons for carrying out the coup. Despite the change in government, 
MSG continued on its disconnection campaigns and cut off some major local area 
councils who provided water to needy communities. 
This was affecting the popularity of the government and they (MSG) 
were instructed to reconnect. URC was contacted by MSG to ask 
whether URC will give the guarantees for the monies owed to them by 
the local councils. URC couldn't give these guarantees to MSG and 
they (MSG) refused to reconnect. Government just called them in and 
terminated the contract. 
MSG had embarked on the computerisation of the customer and billing records of the 
utility sector and these were stored in Sogea's headquarters in France and accessed 
through a computer link. On termination of the contract, the link was broken and no 
access was made available from The Gambia to the database held in France. 
5.5 The UBC Era (1995 -1996) 
On terminating the MSG contract, the government decided to revert from the 
management contract model of private sector participation to the corporatisation 
model and decreed (all laws during the military period were in the form of military 
decrees) that UHC would be responsible for the entire operations of the utility sector. 
Thereafter it was a very difficult transition for URC. URC was a 
holding company and not an operating company and they were directed 
to take over the operations. We were lucky we still had Gambians 
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around as they were mostly sidelined during MSG time, and had we not 
had them we would have been in serious trouble. 
5.5.1 Implementation of Change 
The outcome of the change process during the UHC era was dependent on the 
implementation of the change programme. This programme was basically concerned 
with ensuring that stability was brought back into the utility sector after the 
tumultuous MSG era. 
5.5.1.1 Management Support 
The President appointed a new MD who, at that time, was the only one in UHC who 
had both engineering and management qualifications (BSc. and MBA). The new 
management team was inexperienced as most of the team had not been previously 
involved at a senior level in the utility sector and had very little operational and 
business skills. 
The priority was to stabilise and the twelve or so experts who formed the 
senior management team under MSG left immediately. The Gambians 
who were there did not necessarily have access to the information and 
were not necessary competent to be managers. 
The government decided to bring in an external team of experts to guide and support 
the new UHC management team. 
When the contract was terminated, you have a lot of sharks in this 
world and they are always looking to see where they can take 
advantage of developing countries. Biwater and ESB! came in as they 
knew there was a contract terminated in The Gambia and it was an 
opportune moment for them to come in and maximise whatever benefit 
they could have. So they came in and persuaded the government to 
enter into a management support contract to assist UHC in what they 
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perceived at the time as being lack of proper skill and capacity to 
manage the sector. 
ESBI (Electricity Supply Board of Ireland) and Biwater (UK) formed a Joint Venture 
(JV) company and signed a contract with UHC for management support for a year. 
The JV partners were also required to assist UHC in bringing in additional capacity as 
no new capacity had been added during the MSG era. In fact during the MSG era 
there was a reduction in capacity as one of the engines at the power station had 
exploded reducing the available capacity by 33%. The head of the JV team became 
the General Manager of operations but worked under the MD of UHC. 
Each manager had a counterpart not a boss, and they would sign 
invoices jointly and everything was done jointly. That gave the UHC MD 
the time to focus on the legal problems, the restructuring problems, and 
that worked very well indeed. 
5.5.1.2 Organisational Structure 
There was no formal organisation structure in MSG. UHC therefore had to formulate 
a working organisational structure. An interim structure (Fig. 4 overleaf) was put in 
place within three months, and it was decided that there would be no overall head of 
the various divisions rather there would be a string of managers for every section until 
a well-defined structure could be formulated. The interim structure was formulated 
by the chairman of the newly formed UHC board, who was a human resources expert 
from the private sector, the JV General Manager and the MD of UHC. 
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The first thing they did was to identify what needed to be done because in 
electricity you have generation, transmission and distribution. They 
looked at generation and identified what needed to be done and the 
whole chain of activity was broken down into tasks, and then the tasks 
were grouped together into jobs, and it was after all these things had 
been done that they started assigning individuals to jobs. They told us 
that they forgot about everything else, names, individuals and everything 
and identified what needed to be done. After they felt that they had it 
right and tasks had been identified and lumped together into jobs, they 
started putting people into jobs and found out that some more people 
were needed. 
Some of the people whom MSG had laid off were rehired to fill the jobs identified as 
needed when the interim organisation structure was developed. 
5.5.2 Problems Encountered 
Even with the presence of the JV partners, decision making in UHC was slow. 
The only problem we had at the time was that the managers were very 
young and very inexperienced and it took us a very long time to make 
very significant decisions, and that was very bad for the organisation. 
We felt that we should not be rushing things, as we would have made 
very bad mistakes. 
MSG cut off the link with the computerised customer and billing records on 
termination of the management lease contract. UHC inherited the operations of MSG 
without knowing who their customers were and their liabilities 
It was very tough and when UHC took over there was no billing and we 
had to reinitiate a manual billing system whilst Quantum Associates, a 
computer company, worked on designing a new computerised billing 
system for us. 
There was no time to sit down at management meetings to discuss the 
affairs of UHC and all we were trying to do was maintain the services 
and what that entailed. We had gas oil and the little money we had was 
able to buy spares and pay the staff whilst we were still trying to put the 
commercial division back into shape. It took us two and a half months 
working under duress. 
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The disconnection campaign of MSG made the government very unpopular and it had 
to terminate the contract to restore its popularity. All the MSG staff, including the 
Senegalese administrators, had to be absorbed by UHC. 
In the transition from GUC to MSG, it was very clear that the staff had 
to be taken over and there was the choice of saying yes or no. UHC 
had the difficult task of taking over the entire staff of MSG for two 
reasons, one was the matter of termination, but the second one was the 
political situation at the time. Once the government comes in to 
intervene it was like saying again this is our national assets, and when 
that sense of belonging is there it is everybody who owns it and you 
cannot start by chopping off heads really because you are saying that 
these heads do not belong. That was the political side of things, which 
was a little difficult. Also on the staff issue there was the critical 
element of foreign staff particularly Senegalese and this was a time we 
could not venture to strain the relationship with any of our sister 
countries because of the transition. We had a new government that had 
to be accepted by other countries and we could not say these were not 
Gambians and so they cannot work here, and so we had to take in 
everybody. 
UHC inherited a lot of salary discrepancies from MSG because there was no defined 
salary structure in MSG. A considerable time was spent working through these to 
limit employee dissatisfaction. UHC also had to negotiate with the government to pay 
their staff more than what the public enterprise policy stipulated because of the 
discrepancies inherited from MSG. 
Having taken over from a private company that did not have any 
structure and remunerating by whim, first of all it meant that we still 
had that hangover and you really had to make some people suffer by 
cutting their income or drastically increase your labour cost. None of 
these were easy because we had limited room to increase our labour 
cost, and at the same time we were concerned of people in the lower 
level who were receiving one and a half times of the people above them. 
I remember at the time of the termination our secretary here was 
earning up to two times more than an engineer in the Transmission & 
Distribution section. So you can imagine having to deal with such 
issues, they were so delicate as you are dealing with people, but at the 
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same time so difficult for a manager to decide how people fit in and 
where. 
The negotiation of the management support contract with the JV partners was rushed 
through because of the desperate need of assistance after the termination of the MSG 
contract. Due to poor planning and the speed with which negotiations were carried 
out, midway through the contract, problems of interpretation of the contract arose 
between UHC and the JV partners. The contract fee of the JV partners was also too 
high and was a cause of concern within certain quarters in UHC. 
Clearly it was not in our interest to go in for such an arrangement, 
because for six so called experts that the IV partners provided, they 
were paid far more than what the whole worliforce of UHC was paid in 
a year, a worliforce of about 700-800 workers. We felt that that was a 
very bad arrangement and after the first year we refused to renew the 
contract. We felt that we were being exploited and their input into the 
company was far less than what we were paying them. We thought at 
the time we could stabilise things as we had a lot of indigenous people 
that could take over from them, and so we terminated the contract. 
Another reason for terminating the contract was that the JV partners were trying to 
create an atmosphere of dependency to prolong their stay. 
However the European/African relationship is that, inasmuch as they 
would want to transfer their knowledge, there is always this 
apprehension or jealousy, and they would always want to prolong their 
stay. Europeans particularly when they come and get all the benefits 
and all the privileges, they usually don't want to go back. With that in 
mind, inasmuch as they are going out to train Gambians, they are 
reluctant to encourage Gambians. 
5.5.3 Outcomes of Change 
In the year that the management support contract was in place, the generating capacity 
was increased by I.5MW, an organisation structure and a pay structure were put in 
place. With the help of the JV partners a corporate plan was developed for UHC. 
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During the UHC era management stability was brought into the organisation and the 
initial problems caused by the abrupt termination of the MSG contract were gradually 
overcome. 
5.6 The Nawec Era (1996 - ) 
A major part of the UHC corporate plan was devoted to the investment required in the 
utility sector to meet the rising demand for electricity. Donor agencies and The 
Gambia's bilateral partners had cut off all assistance to The Gambia in the aftermath 
of the military coup of 1994. The government was unable to meet the investment 
requirements and realised that only private sector capital could provide the needed 
investment for additional capacity in the electricity industry. 
There was a recognztlOn by government that in fact the budgetary 
situation would not allow investment in the energy sector in the 
magnitude that was desired to catalyse development, because it is 
evident that one of the preconditions of development is the provision of 
sustainable, reliable and affordable energy supply. I think right up to, 
and after the leasing, the factors have been that government has not 
been able to supply sufficient energy to the people. 
In 1996, in recognition of the investment requirements of the sector, the government 
established a limited liability company called the National Water and Electricity 
Company (Nawec) under the Companies Act 1955, and transferred the UHC assets to 
Nawec under the Public Enterprise Act 1990. 
The intention being that now there is recognition that government can 
not go it alone in the provision of energy, and that the provision of 
energy in itself is a profitable and viable private venture. To 
incorporate a private company will make a lot of sense in attracting 
private resources in the generation and transmission and management 
of energy resources. So that was the reason why Nawec was set up and 
I think that Nawec, given that orientation, is a good way forward. 
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5.6.1 Implementation of Change 
Three of the better performing public enterprises III The Gambia (Gambia 
Telecommunications Company Ltd (Gamtel), Gambia Ports Authority (GPA) , Social 
Security and Housing Finance Corporation (SSHFC» were asked by the government 
to become the initial investors in the newly created company, and each were allocated 
shares in Nawec. Government had 99% and the three parastatals shared 1 %. 
However, Nawec was still considered a public enterprise, and answerable to 
government through its parent ministry. 
A new board was constituted to reflect the changes in the institutional structure of 
Nawec. Each of the MDs from the shareholding parastatals was given a seat on the 
board, together with the permanent secretaries of the ministries of Trade and Finance 
and the MD of Nawec. The board also had two private individuals representing the 
industrial sector and the domestic sector, one of which was to be the chairman of the 
board. It was hoped that the commercial experiences of the parastatal representatives 
and private board members would be brought to the board. 
I would say that among the public enterprise, both the previous and 
second boards were one of the best in the country. We used to have a 
lot of debates and there were private people on the board and we had 
professionals. We had some that were commercially oriented like the 
two previous chairmen and even the other professional had some 
commercial experience. 
5.6.1.1 Organisation Structure and Staff Selection 
In 1998, the Nawec management felt that there was a need to change the UHC 
structure to make it more responsive to the needs of the organisation. The UHC 
structure was only meant to be an interim structure. The management team developed 
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a new organisational structure (Fig. 5 overleaf) and new divisions were created. Most 
of these divisions were to be headed by directors. 
Strategy wise, people have looked at individual departments and we 
were missing a layer of our organisational structure since 1995 and 
these are the people who should have been doing the strategic thinking 
in the company. The positions were vacant since 1995 until mid 1998 
and these should have been the people who should have been doing the 
thinking and consulting with the shop floor, and keeping the company 
focused. But nonetheless we have kept patching up the gap through 
consultations with the next layer, and this made it difficult because they 
were engaged in planning as well as operations. 
All positions in the new Nawec structure were advertised. The board was involved in 
conducting the interviews and making the appointments at the senior management 
level. The members of the board realised that in order to move the organisation 
forward it must appoint competent people to the new positions in Nawec. 
The board was very involved in getting the right type of people in the 
organisation within the normal constraints of government. Senior 
people were vetted before being promoted or appointed to any position 
within the company. However there were occasions when this was 
beyond the control of the board. As I have stressed throughout this 
interview we are dealing with a D200 million company and it was 
necessary that we have people who have good characters to run the 
company, as the likelihood of corruption is great especially if we have 
unscrupulous people appointed. 
Most of the people appointed to the new positions, that were identified as needed after 
the development of the organisation structure, were promoted from within. However, 
problems were encountered in filling some of the middle management positions. 
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We had problems getting professional staff especially engineers and it 
has been difficult. For the last three years we advertised for these 
positions but we have only been able to get one or two and there are 
still a lot of vacancies in the sector for skilled professionals. On the IT 
side we have been unable to recruit an IT manager. Computer 
engineers are difficult to get mainly because of the salary structure, as 
most of them prefer to work in the private sector. However in the case 
of electrical engineers, they are just not available in the country and 
even if they are, they have already been taken. So getting quality 
people has become a great problem. 
5.6.1.2 Management Style 
The UHC MD was appointed as the Nawec MD and had matured considerably in the 
year that he worked closely with the JV management team. He was highly competent 
and showed exceptional qualities during his tenure at the helm of N awec and was held 
in high esteem by his colleagues. 
I think he had a lot to be admired and he also had the ability, and the 
training to handle the job. He was able to work with people and keep 
everybody focused on an o~jective, and have a shared vision. That was 
his leadership skills. It was one of coaching people, one of 
encouraging people, and he was able to keep everybody focused. 
He fostered a spirit in the semor management team of teamwork, embodying 
consultation, participation, communication and collaboration. 
He consulted and it was like a family arrangement and there was a link 
between all of us. We were able to blend in and work as a team, and 
whatever problems and differences there were, we tried to solve them in 
the open. We disagreed to agree on issues and there was no other 
agenda because that did not even surface. 
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The new MD encouraged training at all levels in Nawec, and the staff were sent on 
training courses both locally and overseas. Senior managers, who were mostly 
engineers, were also encouraged to acquire business skills. 
We have been trying to train them and some of them have been sent on 
business courses, and some of them have been sent to do the MBA. 
These have improved their business skills tremendously and some of 
them now think commercially. We hope that in the next three to four 
years, all of them will have business skills. 
There was a rotation of managers to encourage multi-skilling as a means of job 
enrichment for the management team. The creation of dependency was frowned upon 
and everyone was encouraged to know about other areas of the company. Managers 
were given a considerable amount of autonomy and were encouraged to delegate 
responsibility downwards wherever possible. They were, however, not allowed to 
commit the company's money and the MD's approval was required for every 
expenditure made. One senior manager in Nawec described his style of management 
thus: 
My style here is to give the job to my subordinates as much as possible 
and it is for them to come back to me. I tell them this is what I want to 
do, and I don't want them to come back to me and say I cannot do this. 
I want them to study the problem and solve it and come back to me and 
say this is what I need to have the work done, and this is the only way 
we can move forward. 
Consultation, participation and communication were used as effective management 
tools and committees were formed to look into different aspects of the company's 
operations. 
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We gathered information from all sources that we could before we 
made decisions. I think at that time you could say that it was collective 
decision making because the MD never made any unilateral decisions 
except if the circumstances necessitated them. 
We are consulted on every matter and we know everything that is 
happening in the company. You see I am not part of the electricity 
division, but I can tell you what's happening in the electricity division. 
Every decision is a management decision. We discuss the issues and 
agree on everything. It is definitely participatory. The MD can make 
the decisions but he never did that, and we had management meetings 
were we discussed issues. Even when we don't have meetings, we are 
informed of what is happening through memos and the like, and we are 
fully kept abreast of what is happening. 
The Baldeh (name of Nawec MD) management team was made up of young 
managers who had the academic training, experience and the competence to get on 
with the job. They also worked well together. 
We are all the same age group and the same generation. We went to 
school together, we played games together and there was this open 
attitude towards each other and even the people who we did not go to 
school together, it was easy for them to assimilate and join in. It was 
really a good management relationship. This, I believe, contributed to 
the success of Nawec because if you can discuss with someone openly, 
then the tendency is that you will trust them, and once you trust people, 
and when they realise that you've entrusted something to them, the 
tendency is that they will do well with it. 
5.6.1.3 Private Sector Participation 
Intense negotiations were undertaken between UHC (later Nawec) and Sogea to find 
an amicable solution to the termination of the management lease contract by the 
Gambian government. A solution was eventually reached and Sogea and Nawec 
decided to enter into a joint venture. A joint venture company was formed called 
Gampower with Nawec owning fifty-four percent and Sogea forty-six percent of the 
company. Gampower purchased a second hand generator and the company became 
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The Gambia's first Independent Power Producer (IPP). Gampower sold power to 
Nawec for onward transmission and distribution to consumers under terms agreed 
upon in a power sale agreement. 
GIl although it is a second hand engine, it has filled a very important 
gap and anytime it goes down it is felt by every consumer. However, I 
know that we can still do better. 
After the formation of Gampower and the purchase of G 11, the government received 
proposals from investors around the world who were interested in participating in the 
sector as Independent Power Producers (IPPs). An Energy Steering Committee 
(ESC), similar in composition to the Task Force that negotiated the management lease 
contract in 1993, was set up to look into the proposals that were received from 
interested parties. 
We have on the table several proposals and we have two at the moment 
that have been signed. You have the BEECL agreement where they are 
proposing to build a 20MW power plant, and we have already signed 
the power sale agreement. Then you have the Ivorian businessman 
(Bassam) who is also trying to come in, in a very big way, and he has 
signed a contract with government without the knowledge of Nawec to 
develop and install a IOOMW plant. 
In January 1999, in the midst of the ESC deliberations, an unexpected management 
shake-up occurred and the ESC was dissolved. The services of the Nawec MD 
together with the entire board and the shareholding minister were terminated. A new 
board was appointed and a former MD in the GUC era was appointed as the new 
Nawec MD. In July 1999, the government.agreed to lease all of Nawec's assets to 
Bassam, however, in August 1999 this agreement was rescinded. Other agreements 
have been signed since August 1999. One agreement was with ESKOM a South 
186 
African company, and another agreement was with ESBI and Bi-Water who had 
participated in the management support contract during the UHC era. These 
compames have declared their intention to invest in the generation sector in The 
Gambia. 
5.6.2 Problems Encountered 
Some problems were encountered during the implementation of the change 
programme in the Nawec era. These problems and the way they were dealt with 
affected the outcomes of the change programme. 
5.6.2.1 Board of Directors 
Although the board of Nawec had people from parastatals who were expected to be 
commercially oriented, several managers of the company questioned their 
commitment to the company. Board members also wanted to be involved in matters 
that were more operational than strategic and this created some friction between 
management and the board. 
The board on the one hand has not been commercial at all. The board 
is mainly comprised of public officials who do not have a clue in the 
way in which business should be run. I have noticed that people in the 
boards are more interested in the board sitting fees that is available, 
rather than devising adequate financial policy that would make the 
industry viable. Board members should have· the interest of the 
shareholders at heart, but this appears not to be the case. 
We sometimes did not have representation from the highest authority 
particularly from Finance and Trade and even the parastatals sent 
different representatives from time to time. We have cases where 
decisions will be taken at the board level supported by everyone only to 
be told later, when they consulted with their superiors especially with 
finance, that they actually do not support the decision. This was very 
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frustrating. We had to resort to discussing this later and as such this 
hampered progress in the institution. 
5.6.2.2 Government and Political Interference 
Government interference in operational matters initially decreased but later increased 
during the Nawec era. 
It also coincided with the time we had the military government and 
some of the time we would get some instructions from above and those 
were circumstances we had no room to debate or see what to do. If you 
had instructions from the top, and especially from a military 
government, then you have no alternative but to do as they say. 
The public sector was an area that was targeted by the military government for 
reform. Many top civil and public servants lost their jobs either because they were 
associated with the former government or for alleged corruption, which in most cases 
were never proven. This resulted in the loss of vital institutional memory in the 
public sector in general and Nawec in particular. 
When you talk about instability people tend to talk about political 
instability. Political instability is when everything breaks loose, but 
here the real instability is institutional and administrative instability 
and this is what has set in. 
The quest to secure private sector participation in the industry was fraught with a lot 
of political interference as many unsolicited proposals were received which had to be 
studied by N awec and the ESC. 
Those coming from below were easy to deal with, however those 
coming from above were not so easy to deal with because you had 
groups lobbying, even where their proposals were not so attractive, and 
there was a lot of pressure from above. 
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A former MD of GUC, who was an active party militant, submitted a proposal to the 
ESC. This proposal was rejected because it did not meet the standards required by the 
ESC for participation in the electricity industry. However, within a week the former 
GUC MD was appointed as the new Nawec MD and the people who were thought to 
have been blocking his proposal were terminated. An agreement was later signed 
with his private company to participate in the electricity sector as an Independent 
Power Producer. 
The present MD has served in the corporation before as an engineer 
and he was sacked. He later came in as MD and was again sacked and 
he has now been brought in again. There is a gross conflict of interest 
as he is the owner of Banjul Electrical Engineering Company Ltd 
(BEECL) which has just signed a D280 million contract to build a 
powerhouse and he is also MD of Nawec. I feel that this is unethical 
and should not have been allowed at all. 
The MD who has just been fired left at a time when Nawec made the 
highest profits in their history, for that particular year, they clocked 
over D 13 million net profit, it had never happened. The previous year 
they clocked over D 1 million and before that the utility sector had never 
made any profit, it had always been losses. So what would have been 
the wisdom in firing that guy? 
5.6.2.3 Planning 
There was a lack of any coherent planning at the policy level for the introduction of 
private sector participation into Nawec. Some of the proposals signed by Nawec 
(Bassam & BEECL) were signed without proper planning and any framework in place 
for further private sector participation in the industry. 
There is no omnibus framework governing the electricity sub sector in 
terms of what the objectives are, what the roles are, who the players 
are, and what the operational modalities are going to be. If that is 
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developed, then you'll have a structured framework, which makes it 
easy to evaluate any proposal on IPPs on the basis of the framework, 
and the vision you have for the sector. What seems to be happening is 
that things are being done the other way round, proposals are coming 
from all corners and then you try to see how those proposals fit into 
your scheme. 
Private sector participation has also been narrowly focused on the acquiring of 
additional generating capacity. 
The only talk at the moment is about generating capacity. It is true that 
this is limited, however the addition of more capacity will not solve the 
problems in the electricity sub sector. This is good but not good 
enough because enough attention is not being paid to the whole system, 
and electricity must be considered in its totality as that is what will 
solve the problem. Having generators and producing electricity is easy 
and could easily be achieved, however the big problems lie in the 
transmission and distribution sub-sectors. These sectors have not 
received the attention that is due to them. 
Due to the big problems associated with the electricity sector, the water and sewerage 
sectors have not been accorded the attention they deserve and no plans have been 
made to cater for their expansion or further development. 
Eventually I think they should be separated, yes I think sewerage and 
water should be separated from energy because I think one tends to 
suffer in terms of attention and direction when they are lumped 
together. We haven't given as much attention to water and sewerage as 
we gave to energy and these are also very important. 
5.6.2.4 Private Sector Participation 
The actions of the Gambian government have lowered the confidence of the private 
sector in investing in The Gambia. The government has twice terminated contracts 
with private sector participants in the electricity industry (MSG and Bassam). It has 
also, in the recent past, seized the assets of a private entity (Gambia Groundnut 
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Council (GGC)), and accused it of wrongdoing and money laundering, although it 
offered no proof and later backed down and tried to secure an out of court settlement. 
If I was a major investor and wanted to invest in sectors such as 
groundnuts or energy, I will think twice because I cannot recover my 
investment in one day or in one year, and I would want to recover my 
investment over time. In fact that is the best thing for government that 
investments are recovered over the longest time possible, so that the 
costs that come as a result of those investments will be sustainable and 
affordable to industry and to consumers. I will think twice, I will ask 
myself don't I stand the risk of putting huge investments only to be 
asked to walk out the next day? Money does not come easily because if 
it came easily we would not be looking for foreign investors. I think 
government has to resolve the GGC case amicably, and then they also 
need to take steps in their actions to assure the entire investment world 
that that was an error and it is not our nature to do that, and it will 
never happen again in this country. 
There was a general apprehension to the concept of privatisation, especially foreign 
participation (European), from managers within the sector. Most managers intimated 
that they would prefer Gambian privatisation, or in its absence, the sale of assets to 
private investors from other African countries. 
There is always a hidden agenda with these people, as they don't come 
here to help us develop the sector, they are only interested in making 
money. These white people are never here to help us, they are here for 
what they could get. 
The reason why they are here is because our charges are high and they 
see an opportunity to make profits because they could cut down their 
costs and make a handsome return. That is why they are coming and 
not to help us develop. This should be borne in mind by all and sundry. 
5.6.2.5 Resistance to Change 
The resistance to change in Nawec was mostly confined to the senior levels of the 
company. The board was concerned about the costs and motives behind the need for 
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the new organisational structure. Some board members felt that the status quo should 
prevail. 
Management always comes with proposals to change the structure of 
the company, and most times these have been based on what pertains in 
other parastatals and not on what is actually needed. The recent 
creation of the director positions was a consequence of senior 
managers wanting to reward themselves with all types of allowances, 
such as responsibility allowance, professional allowance and the like. 
They fought very hard for these positions and eventually the board had 
to agree, even though afew were sceptical of the proposal. 
Some senior managers in Nawec, who thought they would lose out with the adoption 
of the new structure, vigorously opposed it. 
This is not what they want to do, they want to promote everybody at 
once including the director and give 1****** responsibility allowance 
and what. I don't think that is the way forward and just to create new 
positions just to put people there and they don't do anything. What are 
the directors doing? What is my director doing for me? Nothing, I do 
all the work and pass it on to him. It adds to the bureaucracy and you 
create that position, and you leave the poor boys who are doing the 
work without any salary increment. 
5.6.3 Outcomes of Change 
The outcomes of change programme during the Nawec era were very positive. The 
utility sector had never been profitable under the GUC and UHC eras. However, this 
all changed during the Nawec era. 
Well I must say that the sector under Mr. Baldeh had started to turn for 
the better. It was gratifying to note that, for the first time in its history, 
the utility sector actually registered a profit. I think this was attributed 
to the fact that it was the very first time that the management team 
started to work as a team. 
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The utility sector, for the first time in its history, was able to carry out major projects 
that expanded generating and transmission capacities without external support. A 
new 3.4MW engine was installed and, together with the Gampower arrangement, 
capacity was increased by more than 50%. 
You can see that since MSG left, electricity supply has been extended to 
several new places, and several places have been electrified. Since 
1995 to date, capacity has almost doubled and our customer base has 
increased tremendously. Now we have electricity most of the time, 
especially for those who have electricity installations, except when one 
of our big engines is on maintenance. 
The board put in place control measures to curb excessive management spending and 
corruption. Management also put in place control mechanisms to curb corruption at 
lower levels and measures to limit malpractice within Nawec. Control in the technical 
areas was also strengthened to minimise theft and pilferage, especially of diesel. 
Mr. Baldeh put structures and control in place and not a single pole 
could be erected now without people knowing. I think that was a very 
good thing. 
More attention was focused on administering to the needs of consumers. Consumer 
disputes were sorted out by allowing them to pay fifty percent of the disputed amount 
and then enter into negotiations with Nawec on resolving the disputes. A new prepaid 
meter was introduced to enable consumers to control their energy consumption. A 
consumer affairs division was also created to deal exclusively with consumer affairs. 
Some outsourcing was carried out as the Nawec management realised that there was 
too much work internally for the staff to handle. The management felt that greater 
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efficiencies could result if a limited outsourcing strategy was applied in a few areas of 
its operations. 
The other thing is that people want their services immediately, they do 
not want to wait for three to four weeks as in the past. We have started 
giving out network expansions to private consultants, and that was one 
area we outsourced. We also outsourced some recruitment and we got 
KPMG to do some of this for us. Fuel and certain inputs we do through 
tender and the IT portfolio is done by Quantum Associates. There is 
talk of billing but it is a step by step process. 
There was a favourable change in the management culture in Nawec from the 
management culture in the GUC era. Managers were more aware of their 
responsibilities and were better trained to handle these than before. 
I think we have matured and developed so much over the years because 
I guess it is the exposure that most of us have. This is just a stepping 
stone for better things and you develop yourself, you understand that 
each of us is a co-owner and everyone has something to contribute and 
we should be able to tap the attributes of one another. The focal point 
here is to get the job done and if it is done, and if it is the primary 
focus, then there should not be any problems and this was something 
that was lacking before. 
There was also a heightened sense of professionalism among the management team. 
Most of them were not prepared to sacrifice their principles to meet the personal gains 
of politicians. 
Now people are leaving their jobs not because they are looking for job 
security, but because they don't agree with the style of management and 
the principles of management, and they are unhappy with the way 
things are going. They have the opportunity to air their views. Now it 
is management by consensus and this is what was lacking in GUc. 
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There was also a guiding management philosophy in Nawec that was absent in the 
pre-Nawec days as explained by a senior manager in the company. 
We combine speed and care. We want to move fast today on everything 
and we also want to be so careful that we do not lose track of the 
essential elements. 
The change in culture at the lower level brought about by MSG continued for a time, 
as workers knew that if they didn't perform well they would lose their jobs. 
However, with a Gambian management team at the helm, things started to slip again 
at the lower levels of the company compared to the situation in the GUC era. 
There is a change in the culture that was developed during MSG. 
However, people here now feel that it is government and that the white 
master is not there anymore. For me I take cognisance of the social, 
cultural, and traditional issues, and if I have to do something, even 
though I have the mandate and the authority, I don't just exercise it 
because of the social consequences. 
The changes that took place at the semor management level in 1999 adversely 
affected the senior management culture in Nawec. The senior management team was 
demoralised by the sacking of a MD who had done so much to foster change within 
management ranks and to make Nawec a company that every manager would be 
proud of. 
5.7 Summary 
The GUC was formed in 1972 to provide utility services in The Gambia. GUC was 
set up as a parastatal to operate on commercial lines with a board of directors 
appointed to govern its affairs. GUC's operations were, however, plagued with 
intelference from government and politicians, as well as internal infighting resulting 
195 
in the under-performance of the company. The World Bank and the IMF were invited 
by the government to help revive the economy, which was in a state of decline as a 
result of a worldwide economic recession in the eighties. GUC was one of the 
industries in the Gambian economy that was reformed as part of the World BanklIMF 
programme. The WB/IMF insisted on more private sector participation in the 
industry, and the operations of GUC were contracted out under a management leasing 
arrangement to Sogea who formed a company called MSG to operate the assets. The 
government formed a Utilities Holding Company (UHC) to own the assets, carry out 
major investments in the electricity industry as well as monitor the performance of 
MSG. 
MSG downsized the GUC workforce by thirty percent and introduced commercial 
concepts into the utility sector. The contract between UHC and MSG was hastily 
drawn up and lopsided in favour of MSG, resulting in disagreements and antagonism 
between the parties to the contract. The antagonism and disagreements coupled with 
growing consumer dissatisfaction led to the termination of the contract by the military 
government in 1995. The government assigned responsibility for the sector to UHC. 
In 1996, the government transformed UHC into a limited liability company called 
Nawec to facilitate the introduction of more private sector participation into the 
industry. During the Nawec era, the MD showed exceptional leadership skills, which 
was characterised by his style of management embodying consultation, participation 
and collaboration. During the Nawec era, Nawec entered into a joint venture with 
Sogea and together formed a company called Gampower. Gampower became The 
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Gambia's first Independent Power Producer and the electricity generated by 
Gampower's GIl was sold to Nawec. 
The changes made by Nawec were internally driven, and the company was able, for 
the first time, to expand its asset base, introduce new management techniques as well 
as record a profit. 
This chapter has described the changes in the Gambian electricity industry. Analysis 
of this case together with the case on the changes in the New Zealand electricity 
industry is carried out in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Cross Case Comparison of the Changes in New Zealand and The Gambia 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter compares the change process undertaken in New Zealand and The 
Gambia. The reasons behind the privatisation concepts adopted by both countries in 
the process of undergoing organisational change have been identified. The chapter 
explains the change objectives and the process in light of the extant literature 
discussed in the third chapter. 
6.2 The need for change 
As elsewhere, the potential of electricity as an engine of growth resulted in significant 
government participation in the electricity industries in New Zealand and The 
Gambia. This inherently led to the adoption of structures that were similar to the civil 
service structures in both countries, although in New Zealand the distribution of 
electricity was the responsibility of local government. 
In New Zealand, change became necessary when the economy started to decline in the 
late seventies after the failure of the "think big" programmes of the Muldoon 
government (Massey, 1995; Easton, 1997). Foreign debt escalated, inflation was 
high, economic stagnation endured, the budget deficit became increasingly larger 
(Bollard and Buckle, 1987; Kelsey, 1993) ,and New Zealanders were faced with a 
declining standard of living. During this period of decline, the government controlled 
a large percentage of the New Zealand gross domestic product (GDP) and the 
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government was also involved in many commercial activities. The government sector 
was perceived to be less efficient than the private sector and on a coarse 
measurement, the amount of assets under the control of the government was much 
higher than the percentage of GDP contributed by those assets (Duncan and Bollard, 
1992; Massey, 1995). It was felt necessary to do something to get the government out 
of business, as the government wasn't doing a good job running the businesses it 
controlled. 
In New Zealand, the goal was achieving efficiency whereas in The Gambia it was to 
achieve expansion. Although the economic situation in The Gambia wasn't immune 
to worldwide trends, change was necessary because of the need to expand the 
generation, transmission and distribution of energy from that which was inherited 
from the colonial period. No meaningful development could have taken place with 
the infrastructure that was left by the British at the end of colonisation. Consequently, 
after independence in 1965 the government initiated a change programme to bring 
about the much-needed expansion in the industry, with the hope that this would 
catalyse development. 
According to Garner (1983) and Mascarenhas (1991), the poor performance of public 
enterprises, in most cases, could be traced back to the institutional framework put in 
place by governments. The institutional framework in both countries resulted in the 
under-performance of the public enterprise sector, and this precipitated the changes 
that were embarked upon. Tichy and Ulrich (1984) and Isabella (1992) refer to 
events, such as under-performance, that lead to change as trigger events. Deane 
(1995) believes that sometimes before effective change can take place "it helps to 
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start with a CrISIS, or at least with a set of circumstances which force people to 
reassess the existing ways of doing things and to think about new ways of delivering 
value" (p.4). Porras and Silvers (1991) note that organisational change is usually 
triggered by a relevant environmental shift and leads to an intentionally generated 
response. In New Zealand a foreign exchange crisis precipitated a holistic look at the 
economy and resulted in the change programmes that were undertaken. In The 
Gambia poor economic performance and a burgeoning budget deficit coupled with a 
lack of adequate electricity have been the driving forces of change. Ramamurti 
(1992) and Bruno (1996) posit that macroeconomic crisis is usually a driving force for 
privatisation. 
In order to reform their public enterprises, both countries relied on various pieces of 
legislation (reviewed in Appendix One) to bring about change in the institutional 
frameworks governing the industries to be reformed. These pieces of legislation 
allowed the organisations to adopt structures that would make the organisations more 
commercial. The legislation in both countries catered for the shifting of the electricity 
industry from government department status to government company status. The 
legislation required the introduction of private sector practices in the form of 
commercial objectives in both countries. A review of the legislation guiding the 
reform process in both countries revealed many similarities such as the heavy 
influence agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 
1983b) had in designing governance and control mechanisms. 
The need for change in New Zealand continued to be driven by the need for increased 
efficiencies in the economy and all the changes that took place were guided by this 
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objective. In The Gambia the need for change was initially driven by the need for 
expansion however, this later on shifted to include efficiency objectives as well. 
There was a need for any expansion of the electricity system to be accompanied by 
efficient means of production and distribution. Despite the similarities of the causes 
driving change and the similarity in legislation, the outcomes of the change process 
were different in the two countries. This was mainly because the institutional context 
which surrounded the changes in the two countries were different and the manner in 
which change was implemented in the two countries was also different. 
6.3 Focus of change 
The transformations that took place in both countries saw the evolution of government 
departments into commercial entities embodying private sector concepts. In some 
cases the transformations involved the complete reallocation of property rights, 
especially within the distribution sector of the electricity industry in New Zealand. 
The concept of change in New Zealand had, to a large extent, been institutionally 
driven. By the time the changes were implemented in New Zealand, the institutional 
environment was composed of rationalising myths relating to markets and private 
ownership. In The Gambia, on the other hand, such an institutional context was 
absent. The ideology guiding the reform programme in New Zealand had largely 
been to inject more private sector practices into the public sector. Castles, Gerritsen 
and Vowles (1996), note that the changes in New Zealand could be put down to the 
fact that similar changes were being encountered in other countries where there was 
an enthusiasm for deregulation and economic rationalism from the political right 
(Reagan, Thatcher, Kohl). There was a substantial body of literature on privatisation 
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and deregulation that was available to some very influential people in New Zealand 
(Treasury officials and members of the New Zealand Business Roundtable). These 
people believed that economic rationalism was the only means to attaining economic 
efficiency. They were able to convince some politicians in the fourth Labour 
government and they accepted the ideologies as the best way to bring about economic 
reform in New Zealand. These politicians were able to overcome political obstacles 
and push through the reforms. 
Scott and Gorringe (1989) traced the theoretical and other influences that shaped the 
reforms in New Zealand. They concluded that the changes were influenced by 
organisational economic theories, most notably agency theory. Boston et al (1991, 
1996) also identified the ideologies guiding the reform programme in New Zealand. 
They concluded that, in addition to organisational economic theories, public choice 
theory and the new public management theories influenced the reforms. According to 
Duncan and Bollard (1992), there was a single clear objective underneath all the 
various ideologies guiding the reforms - the maximisation of commercial 
peliormance. These writings and ideas permeated the institutional environment and 
constituted the framework and interpretive scheme (Greenwood and Hinings, 1993, 
1996) for change in New Zealand. 
There was no single clear objective in The Gambia such as that espoused in New 
Zealand. Although economic efficiency was important, so was the expansion of the 
system to catalyse development, as well as the creation of jobs for Gambians. The 
focus of change was thus multi-pronged and became blurred from the onset. Another 
factor that added towards blurring the focus of change was the integration of three 
202 
separate businesses into one. Management, in addition to electricity, also had to deal 
with water production and distribution as well as the disposal of sewerage. In most 
countries, water production and sewerage disposal are usually treated separately as 
managing these alone could be quite difficult. The combination of all three functions 
into one company in The Gambia led to a multiplicity of objectives unlike New 
Zealand, where the focus was just on electricity and the maximisation of commercial 
performance. 
During my interviews and as a result of my engineering background, I found out that 
some of the real problems faced in the Gambian electricity industry were not really 
being addressed. The efforts of the electricity authorities were only directed towards 
increasing generating capacity with little or no attention being paid to the other 
sectors of the industry. However, there were a lot of problems associated with the 
network as the present network, which in some areas was installed well before 
independence, would be incapable of transmitting any increased generating capacity. 
This raised the issue of focus or the lack of it. By dwelling on generation, the desired 
economic efficiencies in the sector would not be attained because the sector would 
have more generating capacity than it could transmit. Generating plants would 
therefore not be running at their optimum output, reducing the technical efficiencies 
of the sector. This lack of a clear objective and focus of change is not immediately 
noticeable because of the present lack of generating capacity. However, this would 
become more evident whenever new capacity is installed as the present problems 
being faced by consumers such as blackouts and low voltage levels would continue. 
This lack of a clear focus of change in the electricity industry puts the whole change 
programme at risk in The Gambia. 
203 
The importance of maintaining a clear focus during change was also evident in New 
Zealand, where anecdotal evidence suggests that trying to do too many things at once 
blurs the focus of change. Newman (2000) argues that too much institutional change 
could result in the non-achievement of change objectives. The outcome of the 
1998/99 changes, which involved the splitting up of generation and the separation of 
the lines business from the energy retailing business, was supposed to result in lower 
prices for end use consumers. However, the prices to domestic consumers, since the 
introduction of the reforms, have risen in all cases and the objectives of lower prices 
in the sector have not been achieved. Previous changes in the New Zealand electricity 
industry had been piecemeal in nature and limited to either the generation or the 
distribution sector. This piecemeal nature enabled focus to be maintained at all times. 
Many of the change objectives during the piecemeal change programme were 
achieved. 
6.4 Government interference 
The legislation governing the utility sector in The Gambia provided for the 
independence of the organisation in commercial decision making. However 
respondents, who worked in different eras in the evolution of the sector, complained 
of persistent government interference in the electricity industry. 
Jennings and Cameron (1987) note that political intelference could lead to politically 
motivated appointments, the results of which may give rise to inferior quality of 
managers. The quality of the managers in the Gambian electricity industry came up 
in almost every interview as the cause of the problems faced by the industry. I was 
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also able to detect this poor quality especially at the level of government where 
officials responsible for policy were unable to understand some of the basic concepts, 
such as privatisation, that they were attempting to explain to me. These same officials 
were members of the board and were involved in drafting policies that were under 
consideration by government at the time of the interviews. I was a bit worried about 
the outcomes of any programmes that were designed by them. Prebble (1996) in his 
book "I've been thinking" posits that the attainment of economic objectives can only 
come about with the right leadership. There was an absence of the right leadership in 
The Gambia, especially within the government. Government officials were largely 
responsible for most of the economic policy decisions that were made and these 
adversely affected every industry and more particularly the electricity industry. 
Niskanen (1971) and Buchanan (1972) note that politicians and government officials 
impose objectives on organisations that might help the politicians to gain votes and 
the government officials to remain in their jobs, but these objectives might conflict 
with efficiency objectives. The government officials I interviewed in the various 
ministries in The Gambia seemed to lack the experience and competence to provide 
the right direction for policy development. Lack of an appropriate and robust 
government policy would inevitably be translated to the industry. A flawed policy 
would only lead to a flawed change programme and the non-achievement of change 
objectives. 
There was political and government interference in the managerial selection process 
in The Gambia. The appointment of managing directors in the utility sector was the 
prerogative of the President. All major managerial decisions had to be passed through 
the government before a final decision could be made. The capital and operational 
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budgets of the sector had to first go through the board, then the shareholding ministry, 
the National Investment Board and then the President's office making it a long 
winded process and the budgets were never approved on time. The interference in the 
industry slowed down the change process and important decisions could not be made 
on time, due to the need and time taken for approval from government to be obtained. 
This adversely affected the change process and the poor results of change in The 
Gambia could be partly attributed to the repeated government and political 
interference in the entire economy. 
There is a need for some amount of government interference in any change process, 
however changes that involve movements away from government departments to 
more private sector participation should have governments develop appropriate policy 
to ensure that there is a level playing field to facilitate competition. Governments 
should therefore not be concerned with operational issues but rather with issues such 
as policy, strategy and regulation. 
6.5 Downsizing 
During the process of change in New Zealand, downsizing was used as a tool to get 
rid of those who opposed change, as well as the unproductive members of the 
workforce. Downsizing was consistent with the institutional norms of efficiency and 
productivity. In The Gambia, downsizing was politically unacceptable and during the 
change process, except the MSG change, the organisation continued to carry more 
workers than was deemed necessary by management. The reason for carrying excess 
staff was due to the fact that the organisation was a public parastatal answerable to the 
government and the retrenching of staff had political connotations that the 
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government had to be prepared for. The company could just not retrench staff of its 
own accord. The government was therefore involved in all decisions that involved the 
laying-off of staff. The unwillingness to downsize the workforce in The Gambia was 
a consistent behaviour in public enterprises all over Africa as Ghai (1983) found out 
in his study on African public enterprises. During the MSG era, government 
interference was reduced and the management contractors were able to downsize the 
workforce by thirty percent. 
Cameron, Freeman and Mishra (1991), in their study of organisations in the United 
States automobile industry, concluded that the manner in which downsizing occurred 
was more important than the amount of people laid off. The initial downsizing 
exercises in New Zealand and that of MSG in The Gambia were similar in that 
workers were given very little notice of impending job losses. Apart from the 
redundancy payments given to workers, no exit strategies were put in place for the 
workers who lost their jobs and no counselling was arranged for those who survived 
and stayed on in their jobs. Such a treatment of employees according to Labib and 
Appelbaum (1993) has a "major negative impact on the organisations themselves, on 
their surviving and terminated employees, on the government, and on society as a 
whole" (p.69). I have over my working life and during data collection interacted with 
people who were either laid off or were connected in one way or the other to people 
who were laid off in The Gambia. All of them mentioned the traumatising period 
they underwent and put the blame squarely on the government for not doing anything 
to help them. The majority of the people in. The Gambia were thus averse to further 
changes that had the potential of resulting in redundancies. This change averse 
syndrome is corroborated by a number of researchers in psychology, who according 
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to Labib and Appelbaum (1993), have found out that a high degree of stress on many 
levels is experienced not only by employees, but by their families as well. 
6.6 Privatisation 
Most respondents in the study in New Zealand suggested that further privatisation 
where there was a total reallocation of property rights was the next logical step after 
corporatisation, which had introduced commercial concepts into the industry. The 
property rights associated with the industry under corporatisation were non-
transferable. This according to Jennings and Cameron (1987), Vuylsteke (1988), 
Wortzel (1988) and Deane (1989) reduced the incentives for satisfactory performance 
by agents. It was widely believed that further privatisation in New Zealand would 
minimise the problems associated with poorly defined property rights. Various lobby 
groups were trying to get the government to move towards full privatisation as the 
SOB model, they argued, was fragile and could be SUbjected to conflicting political 
goals (New Zealand Business Roundtable, 1992). Conflicting political goals in 
public enterprises was also an issue that had been taken up by the World Bank and 
studied by some of its economists. In one of the Bank's publications, Kikeri, Nellis, 
and Shirley (1992) pointed out that some SOBs had been efficient and well managed 
for some periods, but continued government ownership seldom permitted sustained 
good performance over more than a few years. They further went on to add that 
private enterprise presented a greater opportunity for efficient performance. The drive 
for governments to adopt privatisation programmes that involved the full reallocation 
of property rights, according to Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988), sometimes results in 
economic efficiency issues being relegated to the back burner. This, according to 
Cook and Kirkpatrick (1995), was evident in New Zealand where considerable 
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efficiencies had been achieved through corporatisation and it was doubtful whether 
any more significant efficiency would result from a full privatisation programme. 
There was therefore a desire to move towards conformity (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983) in New Zealand to a full private sector model irrespective of the efficiency 
outcomes (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Donaldson, 1995) because that was the 
prescription provided by the ideology and framework guiding the reform programme. 
The authorities in The Gambia were also advocating privatisation, but for a 
completely different reason from that in New Zealand. The drive for further 
privatisation in The Gambia initially came from the World Bank, although more 
recently the drive for more privatisation has come from the realisation by the 
Gambian government that they do not have the financial capability of making the 
necessary investments required in the electricity industry. A World Bank Publication 
(1995) noted that most parastatals in many LDCs are significant burdens on 
government budgets; they hinder growth, impede market liberalisation and limit 
efforts to reduce poverty. The World Bank was therefore able to convince the 
Gambian government that privatisation was its only option for change. This was 
easily accepted by a government strapped for funding and in need of IMFIWB loans. 
The government therefore embarked upon further privatisation by entering into a 
management contract with a foreign company. 
The Thatcher government in the UK in the early eighties embarked on an extensive 
privatisation programme which mainly involved the sale of assets. This privatisation 
programme led to "a massive expansion in the number of shareholders, billions of 
pounds have been raised for the exchequer, and state involvement in industrial 
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decision making has been drastically reduced" (Vickers and Yarrow, 1988: p.425). 
The experience with privatisation in the UK was widely acclaimed as successful 
(Pirie, 1988; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988) and was accorded legitimacy (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Zucker, 1987). Privatisation programmes were developed in other 
countries and it soon became a worldwide trend that became institutionalised. 
Privatisation has, thereafter, become an institutional myth and other notions of 
organisational form and structure are now unthinkable (Zucker, 1987). 
The drive in New Zealand for privatisation, although ideological, was also in pursuit 
of legitimacy. Proponents of privatisation in New Zealand made reference to the 
British privatisation programmes and sent delegations to the UK as well as to other 
European countries such as Sweden and Norway who had undertaken reform of their 
electricity industries. Some Treasury officials were pushing for an imitative or 
mimetic adaptation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) of the British and European reform 
programmes. According to Suleiman and Waterbury (1990), "a measure adapted 
elsewhere can be imported more easily because it arrives wrapped in a certain 
legitimacy" (p.3). John Ikenbery (1990) described the mimetic adaptation of 
privatisation programmes as "a sort of policy bandwagon" (p.1 0 1). 
Herbst (1990) notes that there is an emerging consensus that "African SOEs are 
extremely inefficient and tend to drain even more resources from the state than 
parastatals in other parts of the world" (p.234). This statement is very representative 
of the electricity sector in The Gambia, which led the government to seek assistance 
from the WB/IMP. Financial assistance from the WB/IMF was made contingent on 
liberalising reforms in the economy (Babai, 1988). Eisenstadt (1959) emphasised the 
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importance of the dependence of organisations on their social setting, particularly 
their dependence on external resources and power in influencing structural 
characteristics and activities. Herbst (1990) believes that most of the reforms in 
Africa could be traced directly to the demands of foreign actors. In The Gambia, 
programmes of reforms sanctioned by the WB/IMF have included the performance 
contract, the management lease contract in the electricity sector, and privatisation 
programmes in other sectors of the economy. The influence of external governments 
and external funding agencies in The Gambia's economic programme is largely due to 
the fact that The Gambia is a poor country and depends on these international bodies 
for aid. Without external aid the government would be unlikely to meet its budgetary 
commitments and therefore has to comply with the wishes of the donor agencies in 
order to receive the aid. 
6.6.1 Opposition to privatisation 
Opposition to privatisation has been more vocal in New Zealand than in The Gambia. 
The level of democracy and political stability enjoyed in New Zealand has given rise 
to various groups having an interest in different activities and defending what they 
perceive as abuse in some cases. Some of the interest groups in New Zealand have 
been opposed to privatisation especially the variety that involves assets sales and 
programmes that lead to redundancies. Privatisation, as has been discussed in chapter 
three, is not only an economic issue but also a political one (Ramanadham, 1993; 
Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994; Fligstein, 1996; Kogut, 1996; Ramamurti, 2000). 
Privatisation was a central issue in the general elections of 1996 in New Zealand and 
several parties campaigned against the sale of state assets. According to Vickers and 
Yarrow (1988) "differences in attitudes to public and private ownership are frequently 
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some of the main distinguishing characteristics of political parties. It may, however, 
simply be a reflection of beliefs either that the ownership of firms is a factor of 
relatively little economic importance and/or that public policy in this area is 
influenced much more by political philosophy and political expediency than by the 
niceties of economic analysis" (pp.l-2). Opposition to privatisation by politicians and 
interest groups in New Zealand has been the result of the perception that certain state 
enterprises are national symbols and therefore must not be sold, especially to foreign 
investors (Alkhafaji, 1993). There was also the issue of pride, and New Zealanders 
were proud of having built SOEs from scratch without foreign help and they did not 
want to lose control of this. Privatisation exercises worldwide have usually been 
accompanied by redundancies (Vuylsteke, 1988) and this perception of privatisation 
further fuelled opposition in New Zealand. Unions in New Zealand in particular have 
been very vocal over the last fifteen years and have vigorously opposed the gradual 
movement towards more private sector participation in the New Zealand economy. 
They claim that workers' rights have been trampled on, and past legislation, in 
particular the Employment Contracts Act 1991, has favoured employers to the 
detriment of employees. The electricity sector in New Zealand has shrunk from 
15,000 employees to fewer than 3,000 employees since the commencement of the 
reform programmes in the mid-eighties. 
No organised opposition to privatisation was discovered in The Gambia, mainly 
because of the absence of true democracy and free speech. The Gambia is supposed 
to be a democratic state, however there h<).ve, in the recent past, been detentions, 
abductions and a general disregard of the law and the judiciary by the government. 
Government behaviour and actions have instilled fear in many people and have 
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lessened their propensity to oppose change. A World Bank report (1995) noted that 
privatisation is an issue that has political ramifications and the presence of an 
authoritarian leadership in any country could lessen political opposition. Haggard and 
Kaufman (1995) note that authoritarian regimes rely on intimidation, manipulation 
and co-optation to restrict the activity of independent interest groups and political 
oppositions. 
Opposition to privatisation was also low in The Gambia due to the very high illiteracy 
rates in the country (the IMF (1999) estimated that in 1997 67% of the population 
above fifteen years of age were illiterate). This high illiteracy rate meant that few 
people were aware of what privatisation actually meant. This reduced the potential 
for opposition to privatisation to the few people who were educated and knew what 
the impacts and consequences of privatisation were likely to be. However, most 
people spoken to, although they seemed to welcome privatisation, intimated that a 
cautious approach should be adopted towards the issue. The experiences of the MSG 
leasing arrangement and the other failed privatisation ventures in other sectors of the 
economy, particularly the groundnut sector which in the recent past was a major 
foreign exchange earner, were still fresh in the memories of most managers. 
Privatisation in developing countries is a sensitive issue: potential buyers have to 
come from outside the country because indigenous citizens do not have the capital 
necessary to buy assets from the state (Frydman and Rapaczynski, 1994; Dinavo, 
1995). There was a lack of trust in foreign companies purchasing assets in The 
Gambia mainly because' of the experiences of MSG and The Gambia Groundnut 
Council. Most respondents were more interested to see foreign companies investing 
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III The Gambia becoming developmental partners rather than siphoning off the 
remaining· wealth of the country to the West. There was also a preference to see 
African rather than Western partners in the electricity sector, because it was felt that 
African partners could best identify with the problems faced by The Gambia and 
Gambians. Dinavo (1995) attributed the slow pace of privatisation in developing 
countries to the memories associated with colonialism. It is feared that the wealth of 
The Gambia would be plundered in the same way as it was during colonialism and 
would remain under-developed. The Gambian President, in speeches, over the past 
five years has mentioned that during colonial times Africans were being taught 
nursery rhymes and being told that 'learning is better than silver and gold' whilst our 
'silver and gold' (natural resources) were being shipped off to the West. At a Rotary 
Club dinner I attended in The Gambia, a speaker from the Gambia Chamber of 
Commerce opined that the move being dictated by the WB/IMF towards the 
liberalisation and privatisation of the Gambian economy was a means to colonise The 
Gambia both financially and economically. There was thus a general resentment of 
foreign domination of the Gambian economy. I subscribe to many African discussion 
groups on the internet and the general trend of discussion seem to suggest that the 
problems faced by Africans are a result of a conspiracy by Western countries to 
ensure that Africa remains underdeveloped. There is also a widespread belief that 
Western aid and investment packages are designed and implemented such that Africa 
remains under-developed. 
6.6.2 Planning for Privatisation 
The need for proper planning before embarking on a privatisation exercise has been 
emphasised by Marston (1987), Vuylsteke (1988), Montagu-Pollock (1990), Alkhafaji 
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(1993), and Dinavo (1995). The outcome of a privatisation programme depends on 
both the planning that takes place before the implementation phase as well as the 
implementation process itself. In New Zealand, privatisation had been an issue of 
discussion for more than a decade and careful planning programmes were undertaken 
as a result of the social and political implications of privatisation. Several 
publications on privatisation were written by government officials and scholars (see 
New Zealand Treasury, 1984, 1987; Bollard and Buckle, 1987; Jennings and 
Cameron, 1987; Deane, 1989, 1995; Bollard and Mayes, 1991; Duncan and Bollard, 
1992; Massey, 1995). There have also been a thriving private sector and an active 
capital market for quite sometime in the country, both of which have facilitated the 
introduction of private sector practices into the public sector and the selling of some 
state assets and local government owned distribution companies. 
There has been an absence of any meaningful private sector presence in The Gambia. 
The private sector largely comprises of a few businessmen who are largely importers 
of commodity items, such as food and textiles. Most of these businesses are family 
run businesses that do not employ professionals, but rather school dropouts. These 
businesses are mainly owned by Lebanese nationals and most of the profits are taken 
offshore and not retained for reinvestment in The Gambia. The lack of any significant 
private sector presence has hampered the introduction of private sector techniques 
into the economy. Most professionals are more attuned with civil service practices, 
which have been found to be inefficient especially in commercially oriented 
environments. 
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The idiosyncratic characteristics of an economy's structure can profoundly affect the 
rules of exchange in its markets (North, 1990) and these differences can have a major 
effect on the outcomes that countries or companies can achieve through privatisation 
(Zahra et. aI, 2000). Ferguson (1992) has identified some of the characteristics that 
are necessary before a privatisation programme may be able to achieve some of the 
objectives that are usually set in a privatisation programme. The characteristics 
identified by Ferguson (1992) have been compared between New Zealand and The 
Gambia and are shown in Table 6 below. 
Table 6 New Zealand and The Gambia: Privatisation Characteristics 
Characteristics New Zealand The Gambia 
Financial Markets Present Absent 
Domestic savings (to Available Scarce 
purchase shares) 
Ability to value company Easy Almost impossible due to 
obsolete equipment 
Private Property Rights Clearly assigned Very limited 
Market Signals Reflect scarcity unavailable 
Labour markets Active Scarce 
Competition policy Well developed in some Absent 
areas 
Market management skills Present Absent 
Political will Moderate Partial 
Unlike New Zealand, planning in The Gambia was carried out haphazardly. Poor 
planning, according to Jaycox (1988), is a problem that is rampant all over Africa. He 
noted that the lack of planning in privatisation programmes could be attributed to a 
weak human resource base in most African countries. This "human resource 
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inadequacy" (a category used during coding) was mentioned by several respondents 
during the data collection phase of this study. They noted that the managerial, 
technical and entrepreneurial skills needed to plan for commercial operations III 
general and a privatisation programme in particular were absent in The Gambia. 
Most respondents mentioned that corruption was partly responsible for the poor 
performance and poor planning in the sector. Dinavo (1995) notes that 
mismanagement and cronyism have adversely affected most African economies. 
Cook and Kirkpatrick (1995) believe that the practice of corruption is the reason for 
the lack of transparency in most privatisation programmes in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The planning of pdvatisation programmes should involve the careful selection of 
foreign partners to avoid the problems encountered with Sogea, where the selection 
criteria used was based entirely on price. Thomas (1987), in describing the legal 
considerations associated with management contracts, suggests that bids from 
contractors should be evaluated more on qualification and experience rather than on 
pnce. 
The planning of privatisation programmes, especially in public utilities, must include 
regulation issues as some sectors do possess natural monopoly characteristics 
(Vuylsteke, 1988). A general regulatory regime was catered for in New Zealand by 
way of the Commerce Act 1986, which among other functions was to deter anti-
competitive behaviour in the economy. No regulatory provisions were made for the 
changes undertaken in The Gambia. Exclusive contracts have been signed in the 
utility sector in The Gambia which, according to Kent (1987), should be avoided as 
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one of the virtues of privatisation is to allow competition to strive. Exclusive 
contracts stifle competition. 
6.7 Quality of Leadership and Management 
The reforms of state trading activities in New Zealand have been explicitly driven by 
agency theory (Scott and GOl'finge, 1989; Boston et. aI, 1991, 1996). The reforms in 
The Gambia have been implicitly driven by agency theory, although it is uncertain 
whether the authorities, especially government officials and electricity industry 
managers know this. The reforms have, to a large extent, been driven from 
Washington and Gambian officials have not taken the time to fully understand the 
principles guiding the reform process. 
The legislation which guided the reform process in each country stipulated that a 
board of directors would be the governing body of the organisations. This separated 
ownership from control (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b) whereby the boards were 
responsible for decision control (ratification and monitoring) and management's 
responsibility was decision management (initiation and implementation). 
Principal/agent relationships were established, which according to Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), is "a contract under which one or more persons (the principal) 
engage another (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves 
delegating some decision making authority to the agent" (p.308). Fama and Jensen 
(1983a), argue that the "separation of decision management from control contributes 
to the survival of any organisation where the.important decision managers do not bear 
a substantial share of the wealth effects of their decisions" (p.309). This is a view 
supported by Ghai (1983), who points out that such a separation "allows greater 
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efficiency because functions of government and the enterprise are clearly defined and 
understood" (p.185). The establishment of boards and management teams based on 
agency theory thus emphasised the vital nature of managerial authority. Managerial 
authority was deemed essential to facilitate change and prevent undue interference 
especially from the governments in both countries. 
The range of duties of the boards in New Zealand were more extensive than those in 
The Gambia and included the hiring, firing, the setting of the remuneration of the top 
level decision managers, as well as the ratification of important decisions. In The 
Gambia the appointment of the MD was the prerogative of the President, thus 
bringing politics into the process. The appointment of people to serve on the senior 
management team was supposed to be undertaken by the board however, in most 
cases directives were received from the government on who was to be appointed. 
After the military coup of 1994, the President and/or the other four members of the 
ruling military council sanctioned most of the appointments to senior management 
positions. Although a democratically elected government has been restored most of 
the appointments to senior management positions are still politically sanctioned. Ghai 
(1983) also found similar situations of selection interference in various African 
countries. 
In New Zealand, astute businessmen with considerable commercial experience, 
obtained mainly through their involvement in the private sector, were appointed to 
serve on the boards (Duncan and Bollard, 1992). A review of the annual reports of 
electricity companies in New Zealand reveals that board members not only had a 
variety of skills, but most of them also served as directors on other boards, mainly in 
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the private sector. Werther, Kerr and Wright (1995) stress the importance of the need 
of financial independence for board members. They believe that the dependence of 
board members on their board seats for income could make them vulnerable, as they 
would do anything, even to the extent of impropriety, to guarantee their seat on the 
board. The board members of all the New Zealand companies were financially 
independent and were gainfully employed in the private sector. 
Most board members in The Gambia were not financially independent because most 
were from the civil service and received meagre incomes. Some of them were more 
interested in receiving board fees rather than in developing strategies. Board fees 
were paid after every board meeting and even when some board members did not 
attend board meetings they demanded the fees from the representatives they sent as 
they believed they were legally entitled to the fees as the substantive board members. 
Because of the financial situation some board members found themselves in, it was 
possible to influence the decisions made by the board by offering bribes to those who 
were especially vulnerable. 
Change almost always requires new ways of doing things. This in most cases 
necessarily involves a new kind of leadership (Nadler and Tushman, 1989, 1990; 
Kotter, 1995). In order to attain the desired objectives of change, which in The 
Gambia was not only expanding the system but also enhancing its efficiency, 
leadership of change was important, and it was therefore essential that the right 
leadership was put in place. The successes. recorded in the New Zealand electricity 
industry, according to Spicer et. al (1996), were due to the complementary leadership 
of both the boards and the management teams. This complementary leadership was 
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absent for most of the changes in The Gambia where the boards were comprised of 
civil servants and political stalwarts who lacked the commercial expertise necessary 
to bring about the desired outcomes. The chairmen lacked commercial experience 
and in most cases were usually retired civil servants who were being rewarded for 
past political loyalty. This was consistent with what Pozen (1976) and Teriba (1978) 
discovered in two separate studies undertaken on public enterprises in two different 
East African countries. Ghai (1983), in a study of African public enterprises, found 
out that one of the reasons for the failure of parastatals was a lack of commercial 
expertise and orientation of boards and management. Ghai (1983), also noted that 
while civil servants may have some skills and are closer to the thinking of 
government, they "are not sufficiently oriented to the exigencies of the industrial and 
commercial world" (p.193). Barberis et. al (1996) note that civil servants are good at 
dealing with politicians and possess the wrong skills when faced with competitive 
market conditions. In other words civil servants are not competent enough and do not 
possess sufficient experience to lead commercial organisations. There was also some 
animosity and antagonism in The Gambia between some of the boards (during the 
different eras of change) and the management team. This, coupled with the political 
nature of some appointments and the camp culture that ensued especially in GUC, 
eroded trust in the industry and the complementary leadership that is so important in a 
change process between the board and the management team. 
This thesis supports the organisational change literature which suggests that 
leadership is important in any change process (Kanter, 1983; Tichy, 1983). The study 
shows how the composition of the various boards in the two countries has affected the 
outcomes of change. In cases where a board understands the commercial 
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environment in which the company operates, and has members with the right 
commercial skills, the likelihood of attaining the desired outcomes of change are 
greater, as revealed by the New Zealand case. In The Gambia the initial make up of 
the boards was poor and there was a dearth of commercial experience in the company. 
The initial results of the change programme, as a result of the poor leadership, were 
poor. Most of the objectives of change were not achieved. It was therefore necessary 
to undergo further changes, as the objectives of expansion and efficiency had not been 
achieved. According to Newman (2000) when managers do not understand the 
concepts that underpin the reforms and what is expected in the new environment, they 
are unlikely to be able to function effectively. However, there was an improvement in 
the composition of the boards especially during the UHC and Nawec eras and the 
outcomes of the change programme gradually improved. The continued presence of 
public officials in the boards under Nawec however, still posed a problem, as 
consistency could not be maintained. Representation on the boards was not consistent 
and there were cases when decisions were taken only to be reversed later because the 
substantive board members were not present and they disagreed with the decision 
arrived at in their absence. This inconsistency in board representation results from the 
fact that the property rights associated with the electricity industry in The Gambia is 
not vested in the board members (Furubotn and Pejovic, 1972; Jones, 1983). There 
was no insurable risk attributable to members of the board. According to Jones 
(1983), property rights tend to influence incentives and behaviour and it will vary 
according to whether the rights are vested in the person or the position held by the 
person. 
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The need for strong leadership in implementing change has been emphasised by the 
organisational change literature (Kanter, 1983; Tichy, 1983; Tichy and Ulrich, 1984; 
Nadler and Tushman, 1989, 1990; Kotter, 1995) and its importance has already been 
discussed with regard to the composition of the boards in New Zealand and The 
Gambia above. Changes as those undertaken in New Zealand and The Gambia could 
best be described as discontinuous or "frame-breaking" (Tushman, et. aI, 1986; 
Nadler and Tushman, 1989, 1990; Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). Most of the changes 
in the two countries, as have already been discussed, were in response to trigger 
events (Isabella, 1992; Deane, 1995) in the external environment. Discontinuous 
changes, according to Nadler and Tushman (1995), involve a complete break with the 
past and a major reconstruction of almost every element of the organisation. 
Tushman, et. al (1986), have described discontinuous changes as involving 
simultaneous and sharp shifts in strategy, power, structure and control. 
A feature of discontinuous change is the introduction of "outside influence" or new 
executives to lead the reform process (Tushman, et. aI, 1986). This new guard is 
expected to bring in new ideas and overcome organisational inertia. Tichy and Ulrich 
(1984), believe that the outside influence is needed to bring about change because 
psychologically it is very difficult for people to change especially when they were 
party to creating the problems they are trying to change. 
The use of outside influence was an area where the two countries differed 
considerably. The changes in New Zealand. were characterised by the fact that most 
of the executive teams set up to bring about change were made up of people who had 
never been in the industry. In The Gambia, the executive teams were made up of 
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people who had either been in government or had been in the employ of the 
corporation. In most cases, it was merely a continuation of the status quo. The only 
change that saw the introduction of outside influence was the MSG change, which had 
an executive team made up entirely of foreigners. One of the reasons for not having 
outside influence in The Gambia was to preserve the engineering dominance, which is 
still prevalent in the industry. There is a general feeling in The Gambia that engineers 
are more intelligent than commercial people. This has become institutionalised in the 
education system as schools put students who are underperforming in the commercial 
stream whilst the bright students are put in the science streams. Many engineers I 
spoke to mentioned that as an engineer one could become an expert in commerce and 
become a manager whilst an economist or an accountant could never become an 
engineer neither could they even appreciate and understand the complexity involved 
in dealing with electricity. The absence of a thriving private sector also contributed to 
the engineering dominance and the absence of outside influence in the changes in The 
Gambia. There was a lack of the necessary skills in the country required to run 
successful commercial businesses. The economy was dominated by government 
controlled companies, and these companies were more interested in technical and 
administrative competence rather than commercial excellence. The management 
teams in the electricity sector were therefore engineering oriented to cater for 
technical competence. This engineering dominance contributed significantly to the 
poor performance of the sector, as commercial and economic practices were not 
adopted in most of the changes in the electricity industry in The Gambia. The poor 
commercial and economic practices were. manifested by the pricing mechanism 
adopted for the industry. No economic model was utilised to determine the price of 
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electricity, managers chose a price they felt would result in the company making a 
profit. 
Hambrick and Mason (1984) and Hambrick (1987) posit that the performance of an 
organisation is a reflection of its top managers. Due to the lack of the required 
managerial skills, performance was low in The Gambia. The training of managers 
coming from a civil service background, according to Abernethy (1988), makes them 
averse to personal or organisational risk taking and makes them unsuitable candidates 
to take charge of parastatals that are supposed to operate in a commercial 
environment. Almost all respondents in The Gambia emphasised the dearth of skilled 
personnel, especially during the initial stages of the reform process. This shortage of 
skilled and competent personnel has, to a large extent, been arrested within senior 
management ranks in the Nawec era. There has also been a limited number of outside 
influences especially in areas of finance to increase the level of management 
capability within the company. The senior management team has also become more 
competent than the teams of the past. However, problems still exist at the middle 
management level, where the company is unable to recruit new staff especially 
professionals, as they are not readily available in the country. 
Successful transformations require executive teams which would not only be 
responsible for change but which would also design systems that would support 
change (Nadler and Tushman, 1990). Shaw (1995) notes that "the CEO is the single 
most important factor in managing discontinuous change" (p.69). Duncan and 
Bollard (1992), after studying several former government departments which had 
undergone corporatisation in New Zealand arrived at the same conclusion as Shaw 
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(1995). They concluded that the CEO had a pivotal role to play in the change process. 
The CEO in a change process, especially in a discontinuous change process, should be 
largely responsible for the team and should playa significant role in the team's 
selection. In New Zealand the CEOs, in co-operation with their respective boards, 
were responsible for putting together the change teams. In most cases team members 
had considerable private sector experience and shared similar values with the CEO 
(Hambrick, 1987). 
Most of the MD's in The Gambia were not involved in the selection of their executive 
teams, and the subsequent poor performance of the organisation led to several 
changes in the executive teams. Harrison, Torres and Kukalis (1988) support changes 
made to executive teams as a result of poor performance. They argue that in cases 
where performance of an organisation is poor it makes common sense to bring in a 
new leader who might be able to make improvements in performance. The average 
tenure of a MD in The Gambia was two years because of the continuous poor 
performance of the industry. However, frequent management changes during a 
discontinuous change could be disruptive, as was found out in the Gambian industry. 
The frequent change stifled initiative and decisions were not taken because managers 
were unsure of the consequences of their decisions. Managers were also unsure of the 
length of their tenure in the organisation, as they were not on fixed-term contracts and 
could be fired at the will of the President. 
The more successful changes in The Gambia occurred during a period where the 
management capability within the company had increased from what it used to be 
under GUc. Nawec had a staff of eight hundred and fifty employees and there were 
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more staff members who had acquired degree qualifications than anytime previously 
in the company's history. Out of the eight hundred and fifty employees, nine had 
degree qualifications to masters level, twelve had degree qualifications to the 
bachelors level, and one had a higher national diploma. Most of the senior 
management team in N awec had also acquired business-related qualifications to 
complement their engineering degrees. 
Tushman, et. aI, (1986) argue that changes, similar to the ones undertaken in The 
Gambia and New Zealand, require direct leadership from the top as to where the 
organisation is going and how it is to get there. The data from this thesis show that 
wherever strong leadership is present the changes have achieved most of the 
objectives that were set and where strong leadership is absent the changes have 
somewhat faltered and the change objectives have not been met. A characteristic of 
the changes in New Zealand has been the strong leadership that has come from 
outside the industry. The existence of a fully functional private sector facilitated the 
reforms as experienced executives were recruited from the private sector to lead the 
process of change. Spicer et al (1996) note that the reforms achieved most of their 
objectives due largely to the complementary leadership provided by the board and the 
senior management team, coupled with the absence of government interference in 
operational matters. The changes in The Gambia initially suffered from a lack of 
strong leadership. This lack of leadership was partly due to the lack of the required 
skills to lead change and the lack of a functional private sector which could have 
facilitated the recruitment of change agents. However, the evidence from the 
Gambian case study shows that the calibre of leaders in the board and the senior 
management team improved significantly during the UHC and Nawec eras. The 
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objectives of change were gradually being met although the rate was slow due to the 
various constraints faced by the management in The Gambia particularly the political 
and financial constraints. 
6.8 Teamwork 
In the process of undergoing organisational change there is a need for executive teams 
to work together and complement each other in the team (Prebble, 1996). During the 
process of change different skills, capabilities, styles and value orientations are 
required to both lead change, as well as to manage the reconfigured organisation 
(Nadler and Tushman, 1990). Goss, Pascale and Athos (1993) believe that enough 
people need to be involved in order to create the necessary momentum to carry the 
change process forward. The team leading change must be able to bond together to 
create the right synergies such that the performance of the whole is greater than the 
sum of its parts (Ancona and Nadler, 1989). Hambrick (1997) believes that 
organisational performance is dependent on the sum of characteristics, behaviours, 
and experiences of the entire senior management team and how they are able to work 
together as a team. 
Data from my interviews in New Zealand pointed out that the teams leading change, 
although coming from diverse backgrounds with a variety of skills, were able to blend 
these skills and work together. The working ethos in the various organisations 
completely changed and the emphasis was on team play, team behaviour and 
supporting one another in the team. This supportive nature was not only present at 
work, but it extended outside work and most members of a management team ended 
up socialising, especially those in the smaller electricity companies. Communication 
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channels between team members were opened up and it became easier to get things 
done. Frequent and open communication, according to Ancona and Nadler (1989), is 
essential in the midst of a discontinuous change. In one organisation in the New 
Zealand electricity industry in order to facilitate open communication and to make the 
environment more suitable for teamwork, all the executives were put on the same 
floor and they thus had easy access to one another and consulted each other more 
frequently than before. 
In The Gambia, the GUC era was one that was characterised by infighting within the 
executive team. This infighting led to the establishment of, what later became known 
as, the "camp culture". The "camp culture" was a culture where allegiances within 
the organisation were divided and fiefdoms were created. Most of the employees in 
the senior and middle management levels belonged to camps and owed their 
allegiance to the leader of the camp. Those who belonged to camps looked up to the 
"camp leader" to look after their interests and help them progress within the 
organisation. The "camp culture" created a charged and unhealthy atmosphere, which 
affected the efficient functioning and performance of the organisation. 
The management style of the MDs in the GUC era was autocratic and participation 
from other members of the management team was not encouraged. No management 
meetings were held, and in most cases the MD took all decisions unilaterally without 
consulting anyone. The charged atmosphere within the organisation caused by the 
camp culture compounded by the frequent changes in the management team led to the 
poor performance of the organisation. Ancona and Nadler (1989) argue that the 
aftermath of a succession decision can create interpersonal dynamics that make 
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teamwork difficult or impossible. Losing candidates in the succession decision often 
feel wounded and attempt to prove that a poor choice was made. This was a 
phenomenon that was experienced in GUC and every new MD wanted to discard 
everything from the past and start afresh. This resulted in a lot of stops and starts due 
to the frequent change in management and direction. This inevitably slowed down the 
change process and in some cases adversely affected the process. 
The effects and benefits of having the senior management team working together in 
the utility sector in The Gambia were first demonstrated during the MSG era where 
the senior management team worked closely together. The senior management team, 
comprising of expatriate staff, was able to work together and there was a marked 
improvement in the sector (although there were other factors that also contributed to 
the improvement in performance). Under UHC and Nawec, the style of management 
changed from authoritarian to a collaborative and participative management style. 
This was mainly brought about as a result of a change in leadership. According to 
Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) the characteristics of chief executives are related to 
the strategies they pursue as well as how their organisations perform. Hambrick 
(1987) believes that the values of the CEO are translated to other team members and 
they exhibit values that are similar to that of the CEO. The new MD of Nawec was 
able to get senior management to work together as a team. This was translated 
downwards and members of the senior management team were in turn able to work 
together as a team with their subordinates. Under the UHC and Nawec eras, there 
was an air of openness and constructive candour within the team. No major decisions 
were taken without the knowledge and participation of senior managers. Top 
managers were rotated (Hambrick, 1987) to not only provide them with a knowledge 
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and familiarity of the operations of the entire organisation, but to ensure that within 
the team there was provision for job enrichment. The new work ethos within the 
sector was reflected in the performance of the sector as some of the objectives that 
had been set were achieved. The quality of planning and decision making within the 
organisation improved, and the team was able to make several strategic and 
operational decisions without the help of external consultants. The new work ethos 
was enabled by the fact that most of the members of the senior management team 
were contemporaries. They had known each other since school days and had joined 
the organisation around the same time. They had also risen through the ranks of the 
organisation together. This close association of the members of a senior management 
team, according to Michel and Hambrick (1992), had the effect of increasing team 
cohesion. This increase in team cohesion had a positive effect on the performance of 
the organisation. 
The two cases studied have shown that in any change process cohesion within the 
team implementing change is essential in order to achieve the objectives of change. 
The poor performance during the GUC era could be partly attributed to the absence of 
a cohesive team to push through the changes. 
6.9 Conclusion 
Change in New Zealand has largely been institutionally driven, whereas in The 
Gambia it has been a desire to expand the provision of electricity and to rectify 
previous change programmes that hadn't achieved the objectives set. To achieve the 
objectives of change it is necessary for a focus of change to be maintained at all times. 
A narrow focus of change would likely lead to the achievement of the change 
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objectives than a broad focus of change. Government interference in a change 
process that seeks to minimise the role of government in business should be minimal 
or non-existent because government involvement tends to blur the vision and the path 
along which change proceeds. 
Privatisation has been associated with the reallocation and reassignment of property 
rights. New Zealand opted for a privatisation programme in its electricity industry for 
ideological reasons as well as the legitimate status accorded privatisation as a result of 
the successes of other privatisation programmes in OEeD countries. In The Gambia, 
the further introduction of a privatisation programme in the electricity industry was 
driven by the WB/IMF. Privatisation was seen as the only means of sustaining the 
level of investment needed in the economy. Opposition to privatisation was more 
vocal in New Zealand than in The Gambia largely due to presence of a working 
democracy in New Zealand and an authoritarian regime in The Gambia. 
The changes in both countries were driven by agency theory. New Zealand opted to 
put experienced professionals from the private sector into boards, whereas The 
Gambia opted for people with political affiliation and civil servants. Management in 
New Zealand came from outside the organisation, whereas in The Gambia they came 
from government or within the organisation. The presence of a private sector in New 
Zealand facilitated the reforms, whilst the absence of a thriving private sector in The 
Gambia inhibited the reforms. Teamwork was shown to be important especially 
among the people implementing and driving the change process. The two cases 
studied showed that wherever teamwork was present the outcomes of change were 
more positive. Table 7 overleaf briefly outlines the changes carried out in the 
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electricity industries in New Zealand and The Gambia which have been discussed in 
this chapter. 
Table 7 An overview of the changes in New Zealand and The Gambia 
Description New Zealand The Gambia 
Need for change Economic efficiency Expansion of electricity 
Economic efficiency 
Focus of change Electricity industry Electricity, Water & Sewerage 
Ideology guiding change Private sector practices Coercive isomorphism 
Agency theory Agency theory 
Mimetic Isomorphism Introduction of commercial 
Maximisation of commercial practices 
performance 
Govt. interference Minimal restricted to policy Significant interference 
Downsizing Extensive Limited except under MSG 
Private sector presence Present Absent 
Privatisation Distribution sector Management Lease Contract 
Contact Energy 
Opposition to privatisation Various interest groups and some Minimal opposition 
politicians oppose privatisation African privatisation preferred 
Planning for privatisation Extensive planning in all stages of No significant planning carried out 
reform 
Leadership of change Good leadership from the private Weak leadership. Improved later on 
sector in Nawec 
Management quality Good Ini tiall y poor. Improved later in 
Nawec 
Teamwork Good present throughout change Initially absent. Present later in 
Nawec 
Change Drivers Reforms internally generated Reforms externally generated 
New Zealand Treasury The World Bank, the IMF 
NZ Business Roundtable Bilateral Donor Countries 
Trust in Management Present Initially absent. Trust built up 
during Nawec era 
Management competence High Initially low. Improved under UHC 
and Nawec 
Communication Extensive Initially minimal but improved 
under Nawec 
Selection Process Transparent and fair Politically controlled 
233 
Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Implications of the Study 
7.1 Introduction 
This thesis has examined the dynamics of change at both institutional and 
organisational levels by a comparative study of the process of change in the electricity 
industry in New Zealand and The Gambia. The conventional change management 
literature tends to view the institutional environment as relatively static and 
emphasises changes at the organisational level. The institutional literature on the 
other hand, understates changes at the organisational level. According to Greenwood 
and Rinings (1993), organisational and management systems are best understood if 
considered in holistic terms. Fox-Wolfgramm et. al (1998) argue that any study of 
change should adopt a multi-level perspective that simultaneously examines the 
institutional and organisational contexts within which change occurs. Without a 
multi-level study of change the interplay between institutional and organisational 
forces will be missed. Very few empirical studies have used a multi-level 
perspective. This chapter discusses the conclusions drawn from the data and the case 
studies in chapters four and five and the cross case comparison in the previous chapter 
using a multi-level approach. 
The thesis argues that the outcome of a change process is dependent on whether 
change is internally or externally driven. The thesis also identified trust as an 
influential concept in the organisational change process and argues that it is central in 
determining whether the objectives of change (in this case the objectives of a 
privatisation programme) are achieved. A model of the organisational change process 
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incorporating the influential concept of trust has been developed. The chapter 
concludes by looking at the implications of the study for policy, managerial practice 
and further research. 
7.2 Initiation, Control and Implementation of Reforms 
One of the conclusions drawn from the previous three chapters is the need for change 
to be initiated, controlled and implemented from within (within the organisation or 
within the country). The empirical evidence obtained through data collection and 
analysis suggests that the outcomes of change are better when they are conceived and 
implemented from within. Any such change is more likely to be effective if it is 
supported by an appropriate institutional environment (Scott, 1995). The resulting 
change at the organisational level would then be the product of ideas, values and 
beliefs that originate in the institutional context (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Meyer, 
Scott and Deal, 1983; Zucker, 1987). The thesis argues that change processes that are 
endogenous at both institutional and organisational levels are more likely to achieve 
their desired objectives when compared to changes that are driven exogenously. 
This study has looked at change in the electricity industries in New Zealand and The 
Gambia. The changes in the two countries have occurred in distinct stages, 
facilitating the outcomes of the change process to be assessed at each stage. Data was 
gathered for all of the reform stages in The Gambia and all, but one, of the reform 
stages in New Zealand. However, anecdotal evidence obtained from the last stage of 
the reform process in New Zealand supports the conclusions reached in this thesis. 
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Most of the changes carried out in the New Zealand electricity industry were initiated 
by the Treasury department, and were largely based on organisational economic 
theories - agency theory, transaction cost economics and property rights. Easton 
(1997) notes that the drive for commercialisation in New Zealand came from the 
Treasury. Treasury officials served, and are still serving, as the chief economic and 
financial advisers to the various governments in New Zealand. The Treasury provides 
a brief for the incoming government after every election. In 1984, the brief they 
provided for the incoming Labour government was entitled 'Economic Management' . 
This document later became the basis on which most of the SOE reforms were based 
(Boston et. aI, 1996). Similarly, in 1987, the Treasury's brief was entitled 
'Government Management'. The reforms of the core public sector (the civil service 
comprising mainly of government departments) were based on the 1987 publication. 
The proponents of change in the Treasury were young, and most of them had gained 
their academic credentials in economics from universities in New Zealand and had 
also spent some time either working in the United States or gaining some 
postgraduate qualifications from US universities (Massey, 1995; Easton, 1997). 
They thus shared similar views, as a result of the economic theories that were taught 
to them at the various institutions they attended, illustrating the notion of normative 
isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Greenwood and Rinings (1993) suggest 
that the confIguration or pattern adopted by organisations is provided by the 
underpinning ideas and values that become an interpretive scheme (Ranson, Rinings 
and Greenwood, 1980). These organisational economic theories became the guiding 
principles or the interpretive scheme (Ranson, Rinings and Greenwood, 1980; 
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Greenwood and Hinings, 1993) on which the documents (Economic Management and 
Government Management) and the subsequent reforms were based. 
There were other local inputs into the reform process in New Zealand and these came 
from academics and the business community (Boston et. aI, 1996). The New Zealand 
Business Roundtable, a self-selected lobby group of about forty chief executives of 
some of New Zealand's biggest businesses, was very instrumental in debating issues 
relating to economic reform. This organisation came out with several publications on 
how economic reform could be undertaken in New Zealand to make the economy 
more efficient. The role played by politicians in initiating change in New Zealand 
was also significant as noted by Easton (1997). Easton believes that three politicians 
were largely behind the reform process, and these three politicians were able to get 
others on board to support them and bring about reform in New Zealand. These three 
politicians have been referred to in Easton (1997) as the 'troika'. The reform policies 
of the mid-eighties that were adopted in New Zealand were later dubbed 
'Rogernomics' in honour of the head of the 'troika', Roger Douglas, who was the 
Finance Minister in the fourth Labour government. The other two members of the 
'troika', Richard Prebble and David Caygill were both key ministers in the Labour 
government. There was also an external component to the reforms in New Zealand, 
but this mainly came in the form of information on what was happening elsewhere 
(mainly other OECD countries) and learning from such experiences. 
Even an ideological opponent of the reform.programme such as Kelsey (1993) notes 
that, from a purely economic point of view, most of the reforms have achieved their 
economic goals. For instance, as Duncan and Bollard (1992) note, seven of the initial 
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nine government departments that were corporatised trebled their profits in the first 
four years of operations. Most of these departments previous to the reforms were 
loss-making entities and had to be rescued financially by the government as the 
revenues they generated were not self-sustaining. 
This thesis suggests that the reforms in New Zealand were able to achieve the 
objectives set because they were internally generated and supported by an appropriate 
institutional environment. Present in the institutional environment was a normative 
framework which, based on the theories of neo-classical economics, viewed corporate 
management and free markets as desirable. This was largely, due to the fact that there 
was a thriving private sector that was modelled on neo-classical economics and this 
sector was outperforming public sector companies. It was therefore a widely held 
belief that the public sector needed to be transformed and the way to do it was to 
follow a private sector model. This normative framework existed prior to the 
legislative changes, and helped to facilitate the necessary changes at the institutional 
and organisational levels to achieve the desired efficiency and performance levels in 
New Zealand. Newman (2000) argues that institutional level change encourages 
organisational transformation as the institutional context exerts normative pressure on 
organisations to change. 
The people who initiated the reforms in New Zealand believed in the reforms, they 
took ownership of the reforms, and were able to see them through. In the process, 
they were also able to build up trust at the industry and organisation levels which, as 
will be explained later, was another important element necessary for attaining the 
objectives of change. The positive outcomes of the reform programme in the New 
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Zealand electricity industry were also partly due to the focused manner in which they 
were carried out. It was possible to maintain focus on one aspect of reform at a time 
and bring the programme to a conclusion. 
The later (1998/99) reforms however, did not achieve the desired results, although 
they were internally generated (mostly from the Ministry of Commerce). This was 
partly because the support that the earlier reforms had enjoyed from politicians, 
academics and the business community was largely absent in the reforms. The 
various sectors in the industry could not agree on a framework for reform, and in the 
absence of an agreed framework it is very difficult to achieve the change objectives. 
One reason for this disagreement was that the earlier reforms had achieved substantial 
increases in efficiency in the industry, and it was doubtful whether the proposed 
reforms would result in further increases in efficiency in the industry (Cook and 
Kirkpatrick, 1995). The various sectors within the industry were pointing at each 
other and blaming each other for the perceived lack of economic efficiency in the 
industry. They also blamed each other for the high price of electricity, especially to 
domestic consumers. 
The institutional upheaval that resulted from the Electricity Industry Reform (EIR) 
Act 1998 created ambiguity in the institutional environment. This ambiguity inhibited 
the ability of the sectors within the industry to undertake a rational, adaptive search 
for solutions to the problems that the industry was facing (Lant and Mezias, 1992; 
Newman, 2000). Newman (2000) further argues that changes in such an environment 
may not lead to better outcomes because the context for operation is too chaotic, 
cause-effect relationships cannot be discerned and past experiences have little value 
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and are unable to act as a guide for future action. In contrast to the earlier reforms, 
this period was characterised by a lack of unity among the different segments of the 
industry. This built up a lot of animosity between the segments and there was a 
general lack of trust in the industry. The lack of trust was partly created by demand 
side companies complaining to the government that the supply side companies were 
responsible for the problems and likewise the supply side companies were 
complaining to the government and blaming demand side companies. Both sides 
could not trust what the other side was doing or saying. This thesis found trust to be 
important in the organisational change process. 
The reforms that resulted after the EIR Act 1998 were multi-focused unlike the 
piecemeal nature (single focus) of earlier reforms. The EIR Act 1998 reforms focused 
on both the supply and demand sides of the industry. Anecdotal evidence from this 
stage of the reforms suggests that the price of electricity, which was expected to fall, 
has in fact risen. This could indicate that the reforms have not achieved their 
objective of lowering the price of electricity to the end consumer, especially small 
domestic consumers. Newman (2000) suggests that too much institutional change 
inhibits organisational transformation by encouraging strategic confusion. This leads 
some organisations to enter into businesses for which the organisation does not have 
the requisite resources or capabilities (Newman, 2000). This was present in New 
Zealand after the 1998 changes as generators were entering into the field of retailing 
with no prior knowledge or requisite skills for retailing. Although the reforms were 
internally generated, too much change was attempted and there was a normative 
embeddedness of the sectors within their institutional context (Baum and Oliver, 
1991) which led to problems that inhibited the achievement of the change objectives. 
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The lack of trust in not knowing what the other side of the industry wanted, the lack 
of unity among the participants and the lack of an agreed framework of change also 
resulted in some of the change objectives not being met. 
Most of the reforms undertaken in the electricity sector in The Gambia were 
externally driven. The initial drivers of change were the British, as they had colonised 
the country for almost two hundred years. However, the British influence was 
gradually replaced over the last fifteen years by the Bretton Woods institutions, 
namely the World Bank and the IMP. The WB/IMF, according to Callaghy and 
Wilson III (1988), have been the chief "push factors" driving change in most African 
countries. The changes directed by the WB/IMF have been carried out in a context of 
heavy, direct, and implied conditionality. 
The normative framework within the institutional context which guided the reform 
programme in New Zealand was conspicuously absent in The Gambia. There was no 
widely held belief system as to what may constitute best practice and what may lead 
to better performance. Since a framework for change was absent foreign templates of 
change were adopted. Newman (2000) notes that the use of foreign templates may 
not be as effective as desired due to the fact that the templates might not only be 
unsuitable for the prevailing institutional environment, but they might not be relevant 
to the culture,nor are they likely to be fully understood by the local managers who 
would be responsible for managing the programme of change. The change models 
used in the electricity industry in The Gambia were based on models identified by the 
WB/IMF and were not developed particularly for The Gambia. The electricity 
industry in The Gambia operated within a different institutional context to that from 
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electricity industries in the West, and therefore Western ideas would be imperfectly 
transferred. 
The drivers of change, in an externally driven change programme, do not normally 
bear the consequences of their decisions (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), which may 
affect their judgement, especially in the planning stage. External drivers of change 
are usually unaware of the "local conditions" (Nafziger, 1993) which need to be 
considered in any change programme, as conditions in the West (where most of the 
changes in The Gambia were driven from) and the change site are not the same. The 
political decisions made by external change agents are usually applied across the 
board of entire different classes of organisations in different countries, thus making 
such decisions less adaptive and less flexible (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). Rutland 
(1997) has identified two distinct problems in the Western approach to privatisation. 
These he puts down to errors based on a misunderstanding of the situation in the 
region and errors stemming from the deliberate promotion of Western interests 
irrespective of the regions needs. This lack of understanding by the drivers of change, 
according to Newman (2000), leads to the inappropriate application of their skills in 
designing the change programme. A country like The Gambia has many customs and 
traditions, such as the role elders play in organisations, and the extended family 
system. How these customs and traditions affect the local people who would be 
affected by a change programme need to be considered before embarking on any 
change programme. External models of change do not normally cater for such "local 
conditions" and run into trouble from the very onset. This leads to apprehension from 
the locals and they do not give it (change) their unequivocal support. 
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When institutional change is initiated externally, the people involved in its 
implementation, usually the locals, do not embrace it as theirs partly due to the fact 
that it originated outside their sphere of influence, and partly because of a lack of 
understanding especially if it does not fit within the prevailing institutional 
environment. When managers do not understand the concepts underpinning the 
institutional changes, they are unlikely to be able to use the changes effectively to 
improve efficiency and performance (Newman, 2000). Greenwood and Hinings 
(1996) argue that "change cannot occur without the organisations having sufficient 
understanding of the new conceptual destination, its having the skills and 
competencies required to function in that new destination and its having the ability to 
manage how to get to that destination" (pp. 1039-1040). Because of the lack of 
understanding and the lack of input, apprehension to the changes builds up and this 
lessens the likelihood of attaining the desired change objectives. 
Programme formulation for the changes in The Gambia was usually carried out in 
Washington, and very little contact was made with the people whom the reform 
programme was supposed to serve (Nafziger, 1993). A high ranking government 
official told me that in most of the decisions about reforming the Gambian economy, 
they were being pushed hard and fast by Washington (WB/IMF) and enough time was 
not devoted to analysing the reforms, the impacts and their consequences. Adams 
(1992) believes that the experts in Washington are ill-acquainted with the daily lives 
of their constituencies, and Bank projects were rarely adequately analysed. This, she 
argues, leads to serious miscalculations on the part of the Bretton Woods institutions. 
Nafziger (1993) believes that adjustments, such as those that took place in The 
Gambia, should have a high local policy planning and analysis component to them as 
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this allows for local capital development. Local input also allows policy planners and 
analysts to capture technological learning gains as was demonstrated in New Zealand. 
Organisational learning occurs through organisational routines that are repeated and 
modified (Levitt and March, 1988). Routines include an organisation's ideologies, 
strategies, systems, technologies, cultures, and conventions that define the way in 
which it undertakes activities (Newman, 2000). Most of the Treasury officials who 
were instrumental in instituting reforms in the New Zealand economy are now 
working as consultants in New Zealand and overseas, helping to share the experiences 
gained through learning by actively participating in the reform process in New 
Zealand. 
Externally controlled reform is expensive as it involves the use of foreign consultants 
in the preparatory and, sometimes, in the implementation phase. This foreign 
domination of policy does not foster the required commitment and active participation 
from the locals. Large sums of money are usually paid to foreign consultants who are 
found to be, in most cases, less competent than the people they are supposed to be 
advising (Stiglitz, 2000). Locals who feel that they could do the job will sometimes 
sabotage the directives of these external consultants, which will ultimately lead to the 
under-achievement of the reforms. This has been a factor that has contributed to the 
poor results of WB/IMF projects. 
Most externally driven reforms do not achieve the desired objectives because they are 
usually rushed through. The time between conception, design and implementation of 
reforms is usually short, as was experienced in The Gambia where respondents felt 
that they were being pushed hard and fast by the WB/IMF. The deadlines that were 
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given in most stages of the reform process in The Gambia proved unrealistic. A 
reason some respondents assigned to the rushed programmes of the WB/IMF was 
because WB/IMF officials had performance targets to meet and would do anything to 
achieve these targets. The remuneration of WB/IMF officials were usually 
performance based, and these officials would be tempted to do everything possible to 
ensure that they received the highest remuneration possible. Some respondents also 
believed that some WB/IMF officials had hidden agendas with respect to 
privatisation, and were therefore anxious that privatisation projects were concluded 
swiftly. Rutland (1997) notes that sometimes the rubric of privatisation serves as a 
cover for the international expansion of Western organisations. This perception of 
hidden age~das on the part of the WB/IMF introduced an element of mistrust in the 
WB/IMF induced reforms. Trust, as would be explained later, was found out to be an 
important concept in organisational change and its presence or absence was influential 
in determining the outcomes of a change programme. Nafziger (1993) believes that 
rushed projects, which are the characteristic mode of operation of the Bretton Woods 
institutions, is due to the fact that they have a short planning horizon. Reform, similar 
to those undertaken in The Gambia, must have a longer planning horizon if the 
desired outcomes are to be realised. 
WB/IMF aid programmes, especially in LDCs, are usually contingent on economic 
reform which· normally includes economic liberalisation. However, only a small 
proportion of the aid received from WB/IMF reforms actually goes into the reform 
programme itself. This adversely affects ~he outcome of the reform programme. 
There is a vicious cycle associated with aid from Western economies and most aid 
received ends up in the countries of origin. The aid is usually contingent on a number 
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of conditions, some of which include the repayment of external debt (back to Western 
economies) and the use of and payment to external (Western) consultants, unfamiliar 
with the "local conditions", to design the reform programmes. An UNCTAD report 
in 1991 found that the GDP growth in Africa during the eighties was only 0.4%. This 
was largely due to the poor performance of countries that were implementing, or had 
implemented, a programme of structural adjustment dictated by the Bretton Woods 
institutions. Nafziger (1993) notes that an Economic Commission of Africa analysis 
of WB data indicated that Africa's GDP growth, investment rates, budget deficits and 
debt service ratios fell after structural adjustment programmes were initiated through 
the WB/IMF contingency programmes of assistance. 
The evidence from The Gambia supports the view of Babai (1988) and Nafziger 
(1993). Babai (1988) notes that the track record for the implementation of reform and 
privatisation programmes shepherded by the WB have been poor. Nafziger (1993) 
concluded that empirical studies have failed to show the success of BankIFund 
adjustment programmes in Africa. The Gambian reforms were externally driven and 
controlled by the British initially and much later by the WB/IMF. Nkrumah (1965) 
described the control of third world economies, especially those of Africa, by Western 
nations as neo-colonialism. The essence of neo-colonialism, he argued, was that even 
though a State is independent, "and has all the outward trappings of international 
sovereignty", in reality "its economic system and thus its political policy is directed 
from outside" (pix). Callaghy and Wilson III (1988) believe that for certain donors, 
such as the British government and the USAID, the exercise has been an ideological 
one in which they have had an impetus to "denigrate non-market, non-Western 
economic models, patterns and linkages and to praise and foster Western capitalism" 
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(p.186). Rutland (1997) believes that the commitment to privatisation from aid 
agencies and governments has more to do with policy debates in Western countries 
than on the ground where privatisation is actually taking place. 
The level of influence from external sources, in particular the Bretton Woods' 
institutions and Western donors, according to Babai (1988) depends on the borrowers' 
level of desperation. The Gambia was desperate for aid to expand the electricity 
sector and increase its productive capacity and output as well as to develop and 
strengthen its economy. Electricity was an engine of economic growth and the 
government felt that there was no alternative other than to seek assistance from and 
accept the conditions of the WB/IMF. 
The Nawec corporate plan for 1999 stipulated that the success of the company would 
be measured on two fronts - customer perception that Nawec offered a quality 
service, and company self sufficiency to meet its capital expenditures. There have 
been power outages since 1977 in The Gambia, and I did not meet any customer, 
domestic or commercial, who was satisfied with the service provided by N awec. 
Nawec also suffered, and still suffers, from an acute shortage of capacity - both 
generating and transmission. Using the criteria given in the Nawec corporate plan, I 
am led to conclude that the reforms, especially the externally driven reforms, had not 
achieved their desired objective. 
During the period of military rule (URe an<;l Nawec eras), all aid from the WB/IMF 
and other donor countries was suspended, as these institutions believed that aid should 
also be made contingent on a democratic regime being in government. There was no 
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external input into any change programme and all of Nawec's plans and strategies 
were internally generated. During this period the outcomes of the changes undertaken 
in the electricity sector were more positive than any other era in the industry's history, 
as outlined in chapter five. The sector recorded its first profit and there was a fifty-
percent increase in the generating capacity. There was also a limited increase in 
transmission capacity. Nawec also upgraded some of the transmission and 
distribution lines that were constructed by the British before independence and some 
areas that had suffered from low voltage had reasonable levels of voltage stability and 
fewer electrical appliances were destroyed as a result of erratic voltages. People were 
more satisfied as there were less power cuts than before, although there was still room 
for more improvement. Some people who were in areas that had been on the waiting 
list for many years had electricity for the first time, increasing overall consumer 
satisfaction. 
The people implementing the change during the Nawec era understood the 
institutional context within which Nawec operated. The new team understood that 
they had to insulate the organisation from the existing dysfunctional norms in the 
society and they worked towards this by discarding old routines. They adopted 
concepts based around what they perceived as the best way to achieve improved 
performance. They thus developed a normative framework based around privatisation 
concepts and these concepts were more effective in bringing about change. The 
concepts were not imposed but rather evolved in the organisation over the years 
through the gradual introduction of new knowledge brought about by more qualified 
people joining the company. The management team had new value commitments and 
new capabilities (Newman, 2000) and they were able to scan the available 
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organisation templates and choose an alternative that was more appropriate. They 
were thus able to change the organisation to make it more effective and increases in 
performance were achieved. 
While the New Zealand industry was made up of multiple organisations III the 
generation, transmission distribution and retailing sectors, a single organisation 
constituted the Gambian industry. Although change at the organisational level could 
be regarded as a consequence of change at the institutional level, according to 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) changes in the institutional context lead to changes in 
value commitments inside organisations, which when coupled with sufficient 
managerial capability results in transformational change. Meyer, Scott and Deal 
(1983) note that organisational behaviour is the product of values and beliefs that 
originate in the institutional context and derived from a normative order. This is a 
view supported by Meyer and Rowan (1977), DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Meyer 
and Scott (1983) and Zucker (1987). The interpretive schemes contain beliefs and 
values about domain, organisational forms and criteria for performance evaluation 
(Greenwood and Hinings, 1987). The configuration of organisational structures and 
organisational systems are strongly underpinned by provinces of meaning and the 
interpretive schemes which bind them together in an institutionally derived normative 
order (Ranson, Hinings and Greenwood, 1980; Bartunek, 1984; Hinings and 
Greenwood, 1987). 
The reverse of change at the institutionallev.el leading to change at the organisational 
level is also true in that the changes in value commitments or the development of a 
normative framework at the organisational level leads to changes in the institutional 
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context. This was experienced in the New Zealand electricity industry where changes 
in belief systems in organisations created the impetus for the legislative changes in the 
institutional environment. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) note that change of a 
radical nature will only occur if all interests become associated with a reformative 
pattern of value commitment. Collins and Porras (1991) argue that it is impossible to 
prescribe radical change but rather it is better accomplished by appeals to the 
normative vision. Such a normative vision was absent in The Gambia for most of the 
changes undertaken in the electricity industry. What was being done by Western 
partners was change prescription in the absence of a normative vision, as change 
cannot occur without organisations having sufficient understanding of the new 
conceptual destination, it having the skills and competencies and it having the ability 
to manage how it gets to that destination. 
The empirical evidence from this study supports the thesis that reform initiated, 
controlled, and implemented endogenously at both the institutional and organisational 
levels has a more likelihood of achieving the desired outcomes than reform that is 
exogenously driven. This is because a normative framework that is made up of ideas, 
beliefs, and values that shape prevailing conceptions will most likely support 
endogenously driven reforms. Reforms that are exogenously driven are usually not 
supported by such a normative framework. 
7.3 The Importance of Trust in the Organisational Change Process 
Another conclusion reached in this thesis is that trust is an important component in the 
organisational change process. The presence or absence of trust at the organisational 
and industry levels could affect the outcome of the change process. The conclusions 
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from the findings of this research show that the outcome of change is dependent on 
the presence or absence of trust among the management team charged with 
implementing the change process. Change often involves the participation of a few 
key people in an organisational setting, and these people usually depend on one 
another to accomplish the organisational goals. I found out that the presence or 
absence of trust among the members of this team, which is usually the senior 
management team, accounted for the achievement or non-achievement of 
organisational goals. 
Mayer et. al (1995) note that the study oftrust in organisations have been difficult due 
to problems associated with defining the concept of trust, and the lack of clarity in the 
relationship between trust and risk. Gambetta (1988), believes that "scholars tend to 
mention (trust) in passing to allude to it as a fundamental ingredient or lubricant, an 
unavoidable dimension of social interaction, only to move on to deal with less 
intractable matters" (unnumbered foreword). The lack of a clear differentiation of the 
factors that contribute to trust, trust itself and its outcomes have affected research of 
trust in organisations (Kee and Knox, 1970; Cook and Wall, 1980). In the past 
decade, however, the importance of trust in social, economic, political, legal and 
organisational relations has been increasingly recognised by scholars (see Gambetta, 
1988; Blumberg, 1989; Sitkin and Roth, 1993; Bianco, 1994; Brown, 1994; Mayer et. 
aI, 1995; Mishra, 1996). During data collection, trust was only mentioned once by 
one respondent however, during data analysis, I realised that most of what I was being 
told by respondents referred to issues of trust. The change processes I was 
investigating in both countries were based on the concept of privatisation which, as 
has been outlined in preceding chapters, is an economic as well as a political activity. 
251 
Good (1988) believes that "the analysis of trust is related to the economic and 
political fabric of society and the individuals who constitute that society" (p.31). I 
found out that trust was a central component in the organisational change process as 
most change processes involve both economic and political dimensions. 
7.3.1 The Role of Competence in Building Trust 
Mayer et. al (1995) in their review of the trust literature identified three characteristics 
that appear repeatedly, namely, ability, benevolence, and integrity. The concept of 
ability (or competence as preferred by Kee and Knox, 1970; Rosen and Jerdee, 1977; 
Lieberman, 1981; Butler and Cantrell, 1984; Butler, 1991; and Mishra, 1996) was 
identified in chapters four, five and six of this study as being one of the factors that 
led to a desirable outcome of change. Mayer et. al (1995) defined ability as "that 
group of skills, competencies and characteristics that enable a party to have influence 
within some specific domain" (p.717). Competence allowed the change leaders to 
influence the direction of change, as well as the content of the change programmes. I 
found out, in both sites, that when the leader(s) of change were perceived as 
competent by the senior and middle management teams, the entire change teams were 
able to work together to bring about positive change in the organisations. Old 
management routines were done away with and new methods of operation were 
employed. 
Most of the change leaders in New Zealand had obtained valuable experience and had 
built up their managerial competence in the private sector. Some of these change 
leaders had carried out major restructuring programmes in the private sector, and were 
thus able to bring these experiences to the various reform programmes they were 
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associated with in the electricity sector. Newman (2000) notes that new individual 
knowledge is brought to bear by new experienced leaders and old routines are no 
longer sacrosanct when new leaders are hired. Weick (1993) notes that top managers 
understand, interpret and mobilise a firm's resources consistent with their own 
background and experience. The competence of the managers who were appointed to 
lead change in the electricity industry in New Zealand was never in question, even 
though there was an initial resistance to change especially from the engineers who had 
the most to lose from the change programme. The new executives were quickly able 
to build up the necessary trust within the organisation, despite the initial resistance, as 
their peers and subordinates saw them as competent. After the initial resistance most 
of those who had survived the changes were able to see that what the people who had 
come from outside were saying, did actually make sense. The competence of the 
change leaders and the acceptance of that competence by the old guard was important 
to enable the leaders to get on with the job of bringing about the necessary changes to 
make the industry more efficient. The staff believed in them and trusted them to get 
on with the job ahead of them. 
Since independence in 1965, The Gambia had always faced a scarcity of appropriate 
human capital in many sectors of the economy. This lack of human capability was 
evident in the electricity sector, especially in the GUC era where, for the first time, 
commercialisation practices were being introduced. An IMF report in 1999 put the 
level of human capital in The Gambia as low. This was reflected by the high 
illiteracy figures in the report. The report notes illiteracy rates of 94% in 1962, 
79.75% in 1985 (during the GUC era) and 67% in 1997 (these figures represent the 
percent of people over 15 years of age). There is therefore a gradual increase in the 
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literacy levels in the country. There is also a corresponding increase in the 
performance of the electricity sector implying that with increased literacy levels in the 
country, there was an increase in competence and therefore an increase in 
organisational performance. 
During data collection, respondents reiterated time and time again that the 
management of the GUC was incompetent, and that the poor performance of the 
sector was the result of management incompetence. The incompetence of the change 
leaders led to several members of the team not believing in their leader's actions. 
There was no direction from the top and there was clearly an absence of any 
normative framework to guide the reform programme. Incompetent managers 
gathered people around them who would be loyal to them under all circumstances. 
These people owed their employment to the manager. In most cases these people who 
surrounded the incompetent leaders where themselves incompetent. This 
incompetence led to the establishment of the "camp culture", which was very 
prevalent during the GUC era. It was fuelled by nepotism that gave rise to an 
unhealthy environment, which did not engender trust. The outcomes of the GUC era 
were poor because the working environment (the institutional context) was one that 
was characterised by mistrust, fuelled by incompetence and nepotism. The 
institutional context embodies "rules of the game" and thereby constraints, controls 
and enables adivity to go on (North, 1990; Jepperson, 1991). GUC was embedded in 
an institutional context which made transformational change difficult. 
The important role competence plays in establishing trust in the organisational change 
process was highlighted by the changes which took place in the UHC and Nawec eras. 
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These changes had a change leader at the helm of a team of people who were all well 
educated, and had also gained considerable experience in the sector building up there 
competence. Almost half of the team had acquired business skills to complement 
their engineering qualifications. They regarded one another as competent and trusted 
each other's judgement. A trusting relationship blossomed in the senior management 
team and they were able to work together to bring about positive change during these 
two eras of change. Team members had also been able to extricate themselves from 
the institutional context that was characterised by the "camp culture". This built up 
bust in the working environment and they were able to work together to bring about 
meaningful change during these two eras. 
7.3.2 Integrity 
Like Lieberman (1981), Butler and Cantrell (1984), and Mayer et. al (1995), I found 
that the concept of integrity was an important issue in the establishment of trust in the 
changes that took place in The Gambia. Various people I spoke to during the course 
of data collection pointed out that some of the officials in the industry lacked 
integrity. They claimed that this lack of integrity was sometimes due to no fault of 
managers but was rather caused by the 'system' in The Gambia, which in the past had 
rewarded several people for wrongdoing. It was easy to see how they arrived at this 
conclusion, because several prominent members of society who had been accused and 
found guilty of corruption were later promoted to more important positions of 
responsibility and authority. A government minister who was found guilty of 
engaging in improper acts bordering on cOfl'1,lption was not sacked but rather after the 
general elections was promoted by the President and became Vice-President of the 
country. This clearly indicated a lack of integrity going right to the top echelons of 
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Gambian society. Pettigrew (1987), Van de Ven and Poole (1988) and Wilson (1994) 
have lodged pleas for theoretical understanding of how contextual pressures are 
interpreted and acted upon by organisational actors. The institutional environment 
present in The Gambia was thus governing the behaviour of change leaders in The 
Gambia and the beliefs, values and actions of change leaders originated in the 
institutional context (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1983). 
Most respondents regarded one of the leaders of change in the electricity sector as 
someone who lacked integrity. There was a lack of trust in his ability to bring about 
positive change in the sector due to the fact that he also owned a company that had 
signed a contract with Nawec to serve as an IPP. He was also reported to have 
tampered with the tendering procedure for the purchase of fuel in order to satisfy one 
of the requirements of his private company. He awarded Nawec's fuel contract to Elf, 
an oil company that was providing financial guarantees to his personal company 
BEECL to participate as an IPP in The Gambia. Elf was providing the same quality 
of oil at a much higher price than other reputable and bigger oil companies such as 
Shell. He had therefore let his personal interest override that of Nawec. The board 
had to step in at the last minute to stop the fuel contract from being executed. The 
MD's actions were therefore lacking in integrity. 
Dasgupta (1988) points out that the decision about whether or not one should trust 
another person depends on that person's reputation. A favourable reputation, he 
opined, is acquired through behaviour over time. The Nawec MD's integrity was 
questioned, and the contract signed between Nawec and his private company not only 
dented his reputation, but also eroded the amount of trust people had in him and in the 
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organisation he was leading. Organisational members could no longer decide whether 
his actions were in the best interest of the organisation or his private interests. The 
MD had also served in the company twice before and was sacked on both occasions 
for wrongdoing. Managing Directors who are found to be unreliable and not 
following through on promises destroys the level of trust in the MD and in the 
organisation and it could also indicate a lack of integrity on the part of the MD. 
Such a lack of trust in an individual, according to Luhmann (1988), may prevent 
much needed capital investment because potential business partners, especially 
foreign, may deem it as a period of uncertainty and risk due to the normative views of 
untrustworthiness they hold about the management. The lack of integrity of change 
leaders in The Gambia thus has the ability of affecting the level of trust at the industry 
level. The reforms planned in The Gambia hinge on both Nawec and the government 
being able to attract foreign investment, as the government has made it clear that it is 
unable to provide the needed capital necessary for investment in the industry. A 
perceived lack of integrity of change leaders by foreign partners could adversely 
affect the change programme. Hence the need to ensure that in the organisational 
change process, leaders of change must have integrity and come into the organisations 
with good reputations. They also need to be seen as reliable and to be able to deliver 
on promises and agreements. 
Both the primary data collected and the secondary data I reviewed of the changes in 
New Zealand failed to reveal any issues related to the lack of integrity of change 
leaders. This led me to conclude that integrity was not a major issue of concern in the 
New Zealand changes. Most of the leaders of change had good reputations and were 
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deemed to be reliable as they had carried out similar restructuring exercises in the 
private sector. From the evidence in the New Zealand and Gambian change 
processes, I concluded that the integrity of change managers with regard to the 
development of trust or mistrust in the organisation and the organisational change 
process would be of more concern in countries where the institutional environment 
was characterised by and supported practises such as corruption and unreliability. 
7.3.3 Communication 
One of the dimensions identified by Mishra (1996) in his review of the trust literature 
was openness. During data analysis, I discovered that communication was an 
indication of openness and was an important construct for building trust in the 
organisational change process. Being able to communicate openly not only made 
people aware of what was happening, but it also served as a catalyst in creating an 
enabling environment for teamwork to flourish. 
There were two levels on which communication impacted on trust in the 
organisational change process. These were at the organisational level and the industry 
level. At the industry level in New Zealand, due to the fact that the industry had been 
historically set up with the supply side separate from the demand side, trust was 
required between the various sectors/participants in the industry to guarantee security 
of supply. Effective communication between the various sectors was therefore 
necessary and important to guarantee security of supply and to avoid black outs. The 
communication that was present between thy various sectors in the industry built up 
the level of trust in the whole industry. The level of trust was so evident that when 
one sector was in difficulty, another sector would rush to its aid so that the whole 
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system was not affected. Trust at the industry level in New Zealand has reduced with 
increasing competition. This is because the information that was readily available 
before and shared among organisations has now become commercially sensitive. 
Communication between the various sectors has decreased due to this commercial 
sensitivity of information. Companies are less likely to co-operate now, as they are 
all going after market share and competing for the same customers. Companies now 
charge other companies high prices to cover for them during cases of emergencies and 
some cases have now been taken to the Commerce Commission to investigate abuse 
of power by competitors. Due to the lack of communication the participants in the 
sector were unable to agree on a framework for further reform and there was an 
element of mistrust between companies and this affected the reforms of 1998/99. 
Companies on both sides of the industry were blaming each other and reporting to the 
government that the other side was responsible for the inefficiencies in the industry. 
The outcomes of this phase of the reforms in New Zealand, especially for the end 
user, have been higher prices in electricity, which is contrary to what the reforms were 
expected to achieve. The lack of communication and the decreased levels of trust in 
the New Zealand electricity industry were partly responsible for the catastrophic 
power failure in Auckland in 1998, when power was lost to the central business 
district for a few days. Many businesses lost millions of dollars as a result of the 
power failure. 
In The Gambia, communication between the government and the management of the 
electricity sector has been poor and this eroded the level of trust in the entire industry. 
Management most of the time was unaware of government intentions for the industry 
due to the lack of information flow from the government. Agreements were signed 
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between the government and external agencies without the management of the 
corporation being aware of the content or the existence of such agreements. Most of 
the agreements were signed after the MSG era despite the experiences gained from 
both the MSG contract and the contract with ESBIIBiWater. Some of the agreements 
signed were later rescinded for reasons only known to the government. Newman 
(2000) asserts that with no logic to government action, uncertainty and ambiguity are 
heightened and it is unlikely that change outcomes would be achieved. 
Corruption has always been an issue and part of the institutional context in The 
Gambia and dealings made behind closed doors always raises eyebrows as to the 
actual motives behind the decisions. Speculations and rumours of corruption in the 
privatisation of the electricity sector are rife in Gambian society. Ramanadham 
(1993) notes that the absence of transparency in privatisation transactions arouses 
suspicion and create popular disbelief in the fairness of the transactions. These 
rumours only serve to weaken the level of mutual trust between management and 
government and this could potentially hamper the outcome of the change process, 
which in The Gambia, has been an inadequate supply of electricity. Most of these 
rumours could have been dispelled if the government communicated with the 
management as well as with the general populace. 
At the organisational level, communication was widely recognised as an important 
factor in facilitating change in New Zealand. Throughout the change process, change 
managers communicated effectively with other members of their teams, as well as 
their subordinates. Communication was used as a means to foster trust within the 
organisation, especially the superior/subordinate relationship which was used to boost 
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the confidence of the employees. Managers ensured that everyone involved in the 
change effort knew what was gomg on. Technology played an important role in 
enhancing communication in the New Zealand industry as most organisations 
developed Intranet systems to communicate with employees within the organisation. 
Luhmann (1988) believes that there is a relationship between trust and confidence and 
he went on to say that "if there is a lack of confidence, there will also be a diffuse 
sentiment of dissatisfaction and alienation or even anomie" (p.103). The open 
communication system, which was the modus operandi for most New Zealand 
electricity companies, made it possible for lower level employees to have confidence 
in their superiors and in the senior management team. Improved communication 
strengthens employee commitment to the organisation, encourages employees to be 
more productive and innovative and it also encourages them to take responsibility for 
their actions. This engendered teamwork throughout the organisation and led to very 
positive outcomes. 
Communication at the organisational level in The Gambia was very poor during the 
GUC era, as power was concentrated in the hands of the MD. MDs during this era 
did not communicate effectively with their subordinates, and there was a high degree 
of mistrust in the organisation at the senior management level. Senior managers did 
not know what the MDs were doing and were sometimes kept in the dark with regard 
to organisational policy. The presence of the "camp culture" was also partly 
responsible for the high levels of mistrust in GUC, The dictatorial nature of the MDs 
and their lack of communication introduced .an asymmetry which disposed of mutual 
trust, and promoted power and resentment instead (Gambetta, 1988). 
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In the UHC and Nawec eras, the communication between members of the senior 
management team improved greatly and the senior management team were not only 
told about what was happening, but they also actively participated in the decision 
making process. The publication of a newsletter was introduced to inform middle and 
lower level staff of decisions taken by management, the outlook for the future and 
how these would affect the company and its employees. The increased level of 
communication increased the level of mutual trust (Duck, 1993) throughout the whole 
organisation. The increased level of communication played a great part in the 
improved outcomes during these two eras. 
7.3.4 Teamwork, Autonomy and Delegation 
The important role teamwork plays in the achievement or non-achievement of change 
objectives has already been discussed in chapter six. However, the presence or 
absence of teamwork in an organisation was also found to be an important component 
in establishing trust or mistrust in that organisation. Sincere teamwork between 
employees in any work environment is an indication of mutual trust in an organisation 
(Mayer et. aI, 1995). Thomas (1979) argues that "collaboration requires trust in the 
other party - trust in the other's information and trust that the other will not exploit 
oneself' (p.217). Granovetter (1985) argues that social relations rather than 
institutional arrangements are mainly responsible for the production of trust in 
economic life. In today's competitive environment, Bateson (1988) argues that it is 
only through concerted efforts that individuals in a group can generate an outcome 
that would put their group at an advantage over other groups. 
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Through co-operation and teamwork, trust can be generated in an organisation and, 
through trust, co-operation and teamwork can be developed in an organisation. The 
relationship between trust, co-operation and teamwork is therefore cyclical. The 
embeddedness argument of Granovetter (1985) stresses the role of concrete personal 
relations and structures (or teams) in generating trust and discouraging malfeasance. 
Teamwork and trust will increasingly lead towards autonomy and delegation, as direct 
supervision becomes impractical and unnecessary in a collaborative environment. It 
is therefore of the utmost importance that a trusting relationship is established among 
the senior management team during a change programme. Hume (1969) explains 
that, "when each individual perceives the same sense of interest in all his fellows, he 
immediately performs his part of any contract, as being assured that they will not be 
found wanting in theirs. All of them by concert enter into a scheme of actions, 
calculated for common benefit and agree to be true to their words" (p.574). The 
academic and practical management literature is replete with articles on the 
importance of delegation, and allowing individuals to be responsible for their actions. 
This has resulted in most organisations decentralising their decision making process. 
Decentralisation of decision-making involves trusting others as Mishra (1996) 
explained "delegating decision making to others involves both increasing dependence 
on others and entailing greater risks" (p.271). 
During the vanous changes undergone in The Gambia teamwork;, autonomy and 
delegation only became part of the interpretive scheme (Greenwood and Hinings, 
1993, 1996) and the management style dl.).ring the UHC and Nawec eras. This 
normative framework played a significant role in building up trust within the senior 
management ranks, and restoring the damage done by the "camp culture" as it was a 
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widely held belief that teamwork rather than dictatorship would lead to better 
outcomes. The dictatorial actions of the MDs in the GUC era had completely eroded 
trust at this level of the organisation. The new management style ushered in an era of 
collective decision-making and members of the management team felt valued 
because, for the first time in the company, their opinions were being sought. As a 
result of this, a lot of trust was built up, which was partly responsible for the positive 
improvements made during the UHC and Nawec eras. 
Effective teamwork also limits the need for extensive monitoring mechanisms to 
control opportunistic behaviour (Williamson, 1975, 1985). This can result in savings 
for the organisation, as agency costs, in particular moral hazard, would be reduced. 
Granovetter (1985) argued that economic exchanges are embedded in social 
relationships. Bromily and Cummings (1992), argue that trust could reduce the 
transaction costs, as higher levels of trust in an organisation reduces the costs 
associated with control and monitoring, which could have the undesirable side effects 
of reducing innovation and co-operation. Kuczi and Mako (1997) point to trust-based 
relations where patterns of economic exchange are interwoven with ties of kinship 
and friendship. 
7.4 Selection Process 
Another conclusion drawn from the research is the role the selection process of 
individuals plays on building or eroding trust within an organisation. The literature 
on trust in organisations has been silent on the issue of the selection of individuals to 
organisations. The literature on the selection process is also silent on the role trust 
plays in the selection process. I found out that the construct of trust with regard to the 
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selection process was more prominent in The Gambia, and is also likely to occur in 
other LDCs where the selection process is not rigourous, and where there exists a 
potential for the selection process to be unduly influenced by the institutional context 
in which the organisation is embedded. 
The literature on the management of organisational change (Nadler and Tushman, 
1990; Jick, 1993; Kotter, 1995; Nadler et. aI, 1995) emphasises the importance of 
getting in the right team to lead and manage change. The organisational change team 
in a change programme is normally assembled through a selection process. Such a 
process must not only be based on merit and ability but must also be seen to be fair if 
the desired objectives of change are to be achieved. A selection process that is based 
on merit and ability as well as fairness goes a long way in enhancing trust within an 
organisation, particularly within senior management ranks. Lorsh and Khurana 
(1999) note that the selection process influences the way employees, investors, and 
other constituencies view the company and its leadership and this could change their 
ideas, values or beliefs of, or towards, the organisation. 
The data I collected and analysed from New Zealand led me to conclude that the 
selection process adopted in the recruitment of the change managers and leaders was 
fair and transparent, especially in the initial changes. No preferences were given to 
existing employees, and every employee was considered on his/her merit. The boards 
were made up of people with commercial experience and good reputations, which 
helped to build up trust within the organi~ation, as people within the commercial 
environment respected these businessmen who were now responsible for developing 
policy in the electricity industry. However, more recently, respondents have 
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expressed doubts about the commitment of government to selecting the best people to 
serve on the boards of SOEs in the past few years, due to its slim majority in 
parliament. People with political affiliations were now being appointed to the boards. 
This has eroded the level of trust, especially at the industry level where the boards 
have had to deal with financial institutions to raise the necessary capital for various 
projects. 
The selection of individuals to lead the change process in The Gambia in most cases 
lacked transparency. In the GUC era, appointments to positions of authority were 
characterised by nepotism and political interference, leading to the erosion of trust in 
the selection process as well as in the organisation. The consequence of the process 
of selection was the "camp culture". In such situations, due to the lack of trust in the 
selection process itself and the individuals selected, it becomes increasingly difficult 
to obtain positive outcomes from the change process. The selection of MDs has 
always been the prerogative of the President and is thus a political appointment. The 
political nature of the appointment added to the mistrust of both the system of 
selection and the individual selected. In 1999 alone, there were three changes in the 
position of MD and six months into 2000 there has already been two changes in the 
MD position. The frequent changes in MD and the manner in which they were 
selected adversely affected morale in the organisation. These changes have most 
certainly affected the levels of trust in the senior management team, the performance 
of the company and the outcome of the change programme. 
The role that competence plays in establishing trust and its importance in the 
organisational change process has already been discussed earlier in this chapter. 
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However, a competent person may not gain the trust required for positive change if he 
is perceived to have been unfairly selected. This perceived unfairness could hamper 
the outcomes of the change programme. This was evident in The Gambia where the 
appointment of the President's son, who was a competent engineer in his own right, as 
MD of the GUC was a matter of concern to members of the senior management team. 
Although the new MD received the support of his colleagues, this was rather out of 
fear of his political connections, than out of merit. His selection thus eroded trust 
among the members of his team. Senior members of the team were well aware that 
the same fate that befell the former MD, who was removed to make way for the 
President's son, could befall them if they got out of line or out of favour with the new 
MD. There was thus an absence of genuine trust in the senior managementIMD 
relationship. Mayer et. al (1995) argue that although trust can frequently lead to co-
operative behaviour, it is not a necessary condition for co-operation to occur. This 
was what occurred in The Gambia, co-operation with the MD was not the result of 
trust but rather out of fear. The members of the management team wanted to keep 
their jobs and the only way they felt they could do so was to co-operate with the MD. 
Trust in organisations has become a major issue in The Gambia as a result of the 
present political landscape (institutional environment). A lot of people in many state 
owned enterprises similar to N awec do not trust other members of their team or 
organisation due to the recent experiences of many senior managers in the public 
sector. There have since 1994 been frequent hiring and firings in almost all industries 
and this has affected the level of trust in organisations. Team members in some 
organisations, in order to advance up the organisational ladder, have been known to 
fabricate stories about other members of the team and reported these members to the 
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intelligence agency and to people who are politically connected. The result of such 
actions in most cases is that the reported people were removed from their jobs and the 
'dobbers' were selected to replace them. Some of the respondents during the study 
mentioned that the electricity industry had suffered from such experiences in 1999 
and this had adversely affected its performance. A selection process that is based on 
the principle of "whom you know rather than what you know" will not build up the 
required trust levels in an organisation to bring about positive change. 
During the UHC and Nawec eras the board employed more structured selection 
processes in appointing most members of the senior management team. The senior 
management team likewise used better selection processes to appoint middle and 
junior management positions in the company. Some of the selection processes 
employed mirrored the re-engineering concept of Hammer and Champy (1993). This 
change in selection process was a result of a change in belief systems and values of 
organisational and board members. The selection process of the senior management 
team coupled with the integrity and competence of the management team played a 
great part in the building up of a relationship among the senior management team that 
was based on trust. 
Trusting relationships in an organisation is therefore partly dependent on the selection 
process adopted in that organisation. The selection process is also important in that it 
assists in identifying competence and integrity to avoid adverse selection 
(Williamson, 1985). Through the selection process, it is also possible to identify 
whether potential employees communicate effectively and whether they are team 
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players. All of these characteristics have been found to be important in establishing 
trust at the organisational level in the organisational change process. 
The selection process not only affects trust at the organisational level but can also 
affect trust at the industry level. The experiences in The Gambia with regards to the 
selection of partners for privatisation have not been good due to the lack of 
transparency associated with the process. This has affected trust at the industry level. 
Ramanadham (1993) asserts that privatisation transactions must be carried out 
transparently. A UNCTAD report in 1991 suggested that when privatisation is being 
contemplated, especially in developing countries, competitive bidding is usually the 
best option. Competitive bidding was used in the leasing process in the MSG era in 
The Gambia. However, there was a lot of scepticism about whether the contract was 
fairly won by Sogea, as the company had no previous experience in the operation of 
utility companies. This lessened the trust in the government's ability for conducting 
such programmes. The outcomes of the leasing arrangement vindicated some of the 
sceptics. 
The WB/IMF did not oppose the selection of Sogea as a partner in the leasing 
agreement, even though they knew that Sogea did not have the required expertise. 
This lessened the trust in WB/IMF projects and what the real motives of the WB/IMF 
were if they could allow such a lease to go through without any objections. Rutland 
(1997) believes that privatisation is sometimes based on the need to expand Western 
dominance. Callaghy and Wilson III (1988) have referred to shoddy work by 
privatisation "sharks" or "carpetbaggers" as having an adverse effect on reform. It 
appears from the outcomes of the leasing programme in The Gambia as if the 
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WB/IMF advanced this notion of Western expansion by its involvement in the leasing 
process. This lessened the trust in the WB/IMF being able to identify and select 
possible partners for The Gambia's privatisation programme. 
More recently, the government has entered into contracts with both BEECL and 
Bassam in the electricity sector to become Independent Power Producers. The 
government has also signed contracts with a South African Company ESKOM as well 
as ESBI and Biwater, who were past participants in the industry, to also participate in 
some capacity in the electricity industry. There seem to be no logic in the 
government's actions and this according to Newman (2000) heightens uncertainty and 
ambiguity in the institutional environment. Most of the respondents in the study did 
not trust the government and were sceptical yet again about the manner in which these 
companies were selected. No institutional framework has been put in place for the 
introduction of private sector investment in the electricity industry and the selection of 
partners. Ramanadham (1993) strongly advises that an institutional framework 
should guide every privatisation programme. Most of the contracts have been hastily 
arranged without any competitive bidding. The experiences of the past and the 
present selection processes of partners at the industry level have lessened the trust 
within the electricity industry. It is very likely that the outcomes of change would not 
be achieved if irresponsible and non-transparent selection of privatisation partners is 
continued. 
According to Mishra (1996), scholars are increasingly becoming aware of the central 
role trust plays in the survival and long term success of organisations. Peters (1987) 
argues that "the uncertainty of the environment can be swiftly dealt with only if the 
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firm can fall back upon the certainty of relationships among people and among groups 
- in other words, upon trust and integrity" (p.627). On the basis of a study in the New 
Zealand meat freezing industry, Addison (1997) stressed the importance of trust in 
organisational change and noted that in organisations characterised by mistrust, 
change was more difficult and had lesser chances of success. Webber (1993) believes 
that trust is the ultimate in any organisation, and that trust in the 
supervisory/subordinate relationship opens up new avenues of contribution and 
responsibility on both sides. 
The two cases that have formed this study has reinforced the importance of trust in the 
organisational change process and has shown both across and within the cases 
instances of trust and mistrust and their consequences. 
7.5 Summary 
This study has looked at the organisational change process by comparing two 
industries in two different settings in order to simultaneously examine the institutional 
and organisational contexts within which change occurs (Fox -Wolfgramm et. aI, 
1998). The results of the study have been the development of a better understanding 
of the organisational change process, the development of a model of the 
organisational change process, a contribution to the literature on organisational 
change, as well as the confirmation of some of the extant literature on the 
management of the organisational change process. 
The study suggests that government interference should be minimised in the 
commercial sectors of the economy. Government objectives are usually multi-
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focused in nature, and in most cases governments tend to have commercial goals 
conflicting with political goals. This study has shown that programmes that have a 
single focus of change result in better outcomes than multi-focused change 
programmes. 
The changes III both countries have seen an increasing move towards 
commercialisation and privatisation. This movement away from government run 
organisations has largely been ideological and based on the normative framework, 
which is well developed in Western economies, that private companies out-perform 
public companies. To achieve the desired commercial outcomes, economic theories 
of organisation (Williamson, 1975, 1985; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983a, 1983b) have played a prominent role in the formulation of policies. 
This has also been accompanied by mimetic, coercive and normative adaptation 
(DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) with New Zealand learning from and sometimes 
copying the experiences of other OEeD countries, and The Gambia forced into 
institutional adaptation by the WB/IMF. By adopting the concept of privatisation the 
reforms in The Gambia were accorded legitimacy by the WB/IMF and other donor 
agencIes. Privatisation also served to insulate the organisation from existing norms in 
society. However, as the cases have shown and the findings of this study have 
indicated, the acquiring of legitimacy in The Gambia does not necessarily translate 
into better performance. Legitimacy alone is insufficient to bring about improved 
performance. 
The political environment in any given country is important because it affects the 
institutional environment and the change process, as the study discovered. In Western 
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economies, where there is a well established democratic tradition, changes of a 
discontinuous nature such as those undertaken in The Gambia and New Zealand, are 
more likely to be met with stiff opposition from the various interest groups that would 
be affected by the change process. These interest groups will try to stymie the 
change. A major source of resistance to change according to Greenwood and Hinings 
(1996) derives from the normative embeddedness of an organisation within its 
institutional context. Political stability was also found to be important, even in 
democratic countries, to allow legislation to be passed in parliament to bring about 
change. In New Zealand, the government had only a slim majority and was, 
sometimes, unable to obtain the necessary support to pass legislation for reform. 
In less democratic countries like The Gambia, it is easier to bring about discontinuous 
change because the levels of freedom of expression and freedom of speech are 
limited. This limits vocal and organised resistance to the change. Although people 
may be unhappy, they have to accept change because of political repression, the 
scarcity of jobs and the fact that most of the available jobs are government controlled. 
Opponents of change are likely to lose their jobs if they offend the government and 
getting another job in a predominantly government controlled economy would prove 
very difficult. In such democratic countries it is effectively a dictatorship, with 
government usually having a big majority in parliament. The parliament, in effect, 
only serves as a "rubber-stamping" authority for government policies. 
The study found out that changes that are internally generated and supported by an 
appropriate institutional environment are more likely to achieve the change objectives 
set than changes that are externally generated. Changes that are externally generated 
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are usually supported by an inappropriate institutional environment, hence the under-
achievement of such change programmes. Critical to a change programme is the need 
for a normative framework to be embedded within the institutional environment. 
Such a normative framework would guide the change programme. The normative 
framework, as the study has shown, was composed of rationalising myths in New 
Zealand and existed prior to the commencement of the change programme. This 
framework which was supported by the appropriate institutional environment was 
largely responsible for the outcomes of the change programme in New Zealand. In 
The Gambia, there was notably an absence of any framework to guide the reform 
programme. The institutional environment was also unable to support some of the 
changes that were carried out. 
The conclusions drawn from the findings of this study, which have been discussed in 
this chapter, have been developed into a model of organisational change and shown in 
Figure 6 overleaf. 
The model shows that the outcome of the change process is dependent on whether the 
change process is implemented from within or from outside. The manner in which 
the change process is initiated, controlled and irnplemented will affect the level of 
trust within the organisation. The change policies and how they are developed (where 
and by whom) would also affect the outcome of the change process. The study found 
out that changes implemented endogenously were more likely to attain the desired 
outcomes than changes that were initiated exogenously. Externally induced changes 
are usually forced upon the change recipients and this limits their likelihood of 
achieving the change objectives. 
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Figure 6 Model of the Organisational Change Process 
The outcomes of the change process, as shown by Fig 6, is also affected by the 
competence, integrity and communication abilities of the change leaders and their 
ability to work together in a team environment. This serves to build up the level of 
trust within the organisation; the absence or presence of which will affect the outcome 
of the change process. The selection process of individuals was also found to be 
important in building up trust in an organisation. If the selection process is badly 
handled, even though the other variables that enhance trust are present, it affects the 
outcomes of the change programme. 
At the industry level, the integrity of change'leaders, their reputation, and their ability 
to communicate effectively between various players in the industry affects the level of 
trust in the industry. It is necessary that trust be developed at the institutional level 
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because an organisation depends on the environment for its survival. If players in the 
organisation's environment perceive untrustworthiness, the outcomes of the 
organisational change process will be unfavourable. 
Most of the changes in LDCs have been geared towards privatising government 
enterprises. The privatisation process could involve a range of different options such 
as the leasing of assets, the sale of the assets, or joint venture partnership 
arrangements. The manner of selecting potential lessees, buyers or partners has the 
potential and ability to affect the outcome of the change process. A poorly handled 
selection process affects the trust people and other industries have in the new owners 
or partners, the vendors, and the system that allowed the transaction to take place. 
This has the potential of adversely affecting the outcome of the change process. 
7.6 Implications of the Study 
This study which was undertaken to develop a better understanding of the 
organisational change process has implications for both policy and managerial 
practice more so for LDCs. The study also has implications for further research. 
7.6.1 Implications for Policy 
In any organisational change process there must be a policy or a framework guiding 
the change process (Ramanadham, 1993). In most LDCs state trading activities make 
up a significant proportion of GDP (UNCTAD, 1991). The trend in LDCs is to move 
away from government control towards the. privatisation of services that were once 
provided by government. These movements away from government control in most 
LDCs come from the dictates of the World Bank and the IMF and are not internally 
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generated. This study has found that the results obtained in privatisation programmes 
in Western economies could not be easily translated to LDCs because the models 
utilised by the WB/IMF are mostly Western models derived from a normative 
framework based on Western beliefs and values. These models prove to be unsuitable 
to the unique conditions found in LDCs. Governments and international lending 
agencies should therefore note that each country is unique and that any model 
developed should be developed specifically for that country. The models developed 
for LDCs could be enhanced from the experiences gained from privatisation processes 
in the West but should not be based solely on these. 
The non-transferability of Western models is mainly due to the fact that the 
framework and infrastructure in place in Western economies supports privatisation, 
whilst the framework and infrastructure present in most LDCs do not support 
privatisation (Ferguson, 1992). The private sector in the West makes a significant 
contribution towards the GDP of Western economies, and the presence of capital 
markets facilitates the trading of shares. Most LDC economies are government-
controlled, with the private sector accounting for only a small fraction of GDP. Most 
LDCs also do not have capital markets for the trading of shares which would facilitate 
privatisation. Hanke (1987) argues that "privatisation cannot take place unless there 
is enough capital in private hands to provide potential buyers for state divestiture" 
(p.11). In the absence of a vibrant private sector the likelihood of getting the desired 
levels of participation from the private sector both in terms of financial and human 
capital will be limited. This will affect the change programme, as has been 
demonstrated by the case study of change in The Gambia. The institutional 
framework and what that framework could support should therefore be taken into 
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consideration in any country before embarking on reform. Hanke (1987) and Dinavo 
(1995) have outlined some cases where privatisation has occurred in LDCs only to 
fail because the institutional structure was found to be inadequate to support 
privatisation. 
Policy makers must therefore understand and appreciate the capabilities of the 
institutional framework present before embarking on designing and implementing 
privatisation programmes. A privatisation programme that is supported by the 
appropriate institutional environment and framework would most likely result in the 
achievement of change objectives than one supported by an inappropriate institutional 
environment. Privatisation programmes that require local input and minimal capital 
investment that could be locally obtained should first be carried out in order to build 
up experience and the necessary infrastructure. Smaller firms can be privatised more 
easily than larger firms. Local investors are also more likely to be able to afford 
smaller firms than larger firms (Ramamurti, 2000). This will give recipients of 
privatisation time to understand the process and to learn in order to cope with future 
privatisation programmes on a bigger and wider scale through a feedback process 
from the previous and smaller privatisation programmes. 
In most LDCs it is acknowledged that there is a need for change in the manner in' 
which SOEs are managed. However, research has shown that most of the changes 
carried out in LDCs, especially those carried out under the auspices of the WB/IMF, 
have not achieved the desired results. This study has shown that the initiation and 
control of reform from outside affects the outcomes of the change programme. It is 
therefore imperative for funding agencies to concentrate their efforts on providing 
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assistance to LDCs to enable them to be in a position to design, control and 
implement their own changes rather than taking control Qf this aspect of reform 
themselves. Funding agencies should therefore focus on helping to upgrade the level 
of human capital in LDCs. An upgrade of human capital will, eventually, allow 
LDCs to build up the required capacity to initiate, implement and control their own 
change programmes. This study has shown that the level of trust that results when 
change programmes are internally designed is greater than when change programmes 
are externally designed. The building and enhancement of human capital will allow 
the "locals" to analyse Western models of change and appropriately adapt them to suit 
LDC needs. It will also allow them to understand the unique needs of LDCs and what 
the institutional framework could support. New concepts and programmes could be 
specifically designed to meet these unique needs and the institutional environment. 
Changes to the institutional environment could also be carried out to match the 
developing normative framework that would result due to the enhancement of human 
capital. 
The study has also shown that the outcomes of change were better when the focus of 
change was narrow. Too wide a focus of change results in the underachievement of 
the change targets and objectives (Newman, 2000). Change leaders therefore must 
ensure that change programmes are not too widely or multi focused. A well-defined 
and narrow focus will ensure that all energies are directed towards achieving that 
focus and the objectives contained therein. Policy makers in The Gambia should 
consider a split of the present utility industry into separate entities. There should be 
an industry dedicated to the production and distribution of water and the treatment of 
sewerage and another industry responsible for the generation, transmission, 
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distribution and retailing of electricity. A separation will narrow the focus of change 
and will also allow each industry to focus on its core business and work towards 
improving the efficiency and effectiveness of the split industries. Vuylsteke (1988) 
has suggested that fragmentation of SOEs need to be considered if an SOE 
incorporates too many activities that in the aggregate would not only make change 
difficult but would also not be attractive to potential investors. 
This study has shown that there needs to be a normative framework guiding the 
reform process. Those responsible for policy must believe and subscribe to the 
framework in order for the reforms to achieve their desired objective. Research and 
planning must be carried out before any major policy decisions are taken. The 
reforms in New Zealand had a clear framework guiding them and those implementing 
the change subscribed to and believed in the theories around which the framework 
was based on. The corporatisation programme was an example of a reform 
programme that achieved most of the objectives that were set because of the belief 
and conviction of those who designed the programme. The reform programme in The 
Gambia although it was based along the same lines as the reforms in New Zealand, 
the people implementing change did not seem to have an understanding of the 
framework they were ~mplementing and, as a result, some of the objectives of change 
were not met. Greenwood and Hinings (1996) note that radical change cannot occur 
without a sufficient understanding of the new conceptual destination. If people are 
designing and implementing a policy because they have to rather than the fact that 
they believe in what they are doing, the objectives of the programme are unlikely to 
be achieved. It is also essential that adequate planning precede any major policy 
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initiatives. There was a notable absence of any coherent planning in The Gambia and 
this adversely affected the reform programme. 
The study has implications for the role of government in state owned enterprises. The 
study has shown that the best practice for government would be to limit their role to 
overall policy and to leave execution and implementation of policy to management. 
In New Zealand where the government's role was largely restricted to policy, a lot of 
the policy objectives were achieved. In The Gambia there was repeated government 
interference in operational and management matters and many policy objectives were 
not achieved. Government interference could adversely affect reform programmes 
that are meant to operate under free-market market conditions. Therefore 
government's role in a commercial reform programme should be limited to policy 
and, if needs be, regulation. 
7.6.2 Implications for Managerial Practice 
In both developed and developing countries, the use of consultants by organisations to 
help them develop and implement reform programmes has increased. This study has 
shown that reform which involves the use of consultants could result in animosity 
developing between the consultants and their clients, which could lead to an 
environment that is characterised by mistrust. An environment that is characterised 
by mistrust will invariably lead to the non-achievement of objectives. Consultants, 
therefore, should always try to help and encourage their clients to develop their own 
normative frameworks based on their ideas, beliefs and values. Consultants should 
assist clients take ownership of their ideas and should endeavour to work with the 
clients to identify their problems and work together to develop solutions to these 
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problems. If consultants take ownership of reform at the organisational level and 
impose their normative frameworks on clients, the outcomes of change are unlikely to 
be achieved. 
The study has shown that trust develops through teamwork, autonomy and delegation. 
In organisations where managers work in teams and where there is cohesive bonding 
within the team, most organisational members identify with the changes that the 
organisation may be undergoing because it forms part of their normative framework. 
Teamwork builds up trust, which is essential, as the study has shown during a change 
process. Trust between team members leads to synergies in the team and this leads to 
the achievement of objectives. Managers of change must therefore work towards 
creating a working environment that is not characterised by dictatorship. Delegation 
and participation must be encouraged at all levels of the organisation. Managers must 
be made to take responsibility for the changes within their various departments, as 
when they take responsibility they would believe in the changes and would do 
everything within their powers to see that the change objectives in their departments 
are achieved. 
The study has also outlined the importance of communication. Managers should 
make use of all channels of communication with staff at different levels to inform 
them of ongoing and impending changes. When there is an open communication 
policy it builds up trust in the organisation. Managers should also use communication 
as a tool to prevent opposition to change. Opposition to change normally builds up 
when employees are not informed of pending changes and they do not know the 
possible outcomes of change. Employees thus have a fear of the unknown and this 
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leads to rumours and speculations, which only serve to derange the change process. 
Managers should therefore use communication as a tool to avoid rumours in the 
organisation as well as to break down fear of the unknown by employees as fear leads 
to resistance. In order to achieve the objectives of change, resistance to change must 
be eliminated or minimised by breaking the normative barriers embedded in the 
organisation and this could be achieved through communication. 
7.6.3 Implications for Further Research 
The research study looked at two industries that have undergone significant amounts 
of change over the past fifteen years and were still undergoing change. This made the 
exercise complex, as studying change whilst it is still an ongoing process is difficult. 
The ongoing process made it impossible to acquire empirical evidence for the last 
stage of the reforms in New Zealand. In The Gambia the introduction of Independent 
Power Producers (IPP) is still being contemplated and in the process there have been a 
few agreements signed some of which have failed to be executed and other 
agreements have been terminated, making the research of the process of change more 
difficult. Further research into the organisational change process, especially a 
comparison between a developed and a developing country, might be best approached 
from a perspective where change has been completed and the results are known or are 
being assessed. This would provide empirical evidence for all stages and the 
conclusions drawn from the research process would be more conclusive. 
The study has looked at organisational change in the electricity industry, which 
possesses natural monopoly characteristics in certain sectors, making it unique. The 
electricity industry is also very capital intensive and this discourages investors and 
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inhibits competition. Further research on the organisational change process could be 
carried out on industries that do not possess natural monopolistic characteristics. 
Research should also be carried out in industries that do not have high entry barriers 
that may limit the number of participants in the industry and thus inhibit true 
competition in the industry. 
The literature on privatisation (Millward, 1988; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Deane, 
1989) has indicated that the evidence on whether private companies outperform 
public companies is inconclusive. There exists an opportunity to study this closely in 
New Zealand where the electricity industry now consists of private companies and 
public companies operating under the same conditions (preferential treatment is not 
given to any) both in the supply and demand sides of the industry. Such a study will 
be able to contribute substantially to the literature on the public/private sector 
performance dichotomy. 
Future research into organisational change between a developed and a developing 
country could benefit by having at least four different cases to study - two from a 
developing economy and two from a developed economy. This would enable the 
findings of this study to be verified. The findings of such a study would be richer as it 
would involve multi-cross case analyses across developing countries, across 
developed countries and between developed and developing countries. A multi-case 
study involving four cases would make generalisations to a theory richer than a multi-
case study involving only two cases. 
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I entered into the research field without any indication that trust and the selection 
process would be identified as important concepts in the organisational change 
process. I was surprised by the outcomes of this research, and believe that this should 
be a suitable area of departure for future research into the organisational change 
process. Kee and Knox (1970), Cook and Wall (1980) and Gambetta (1988) all note 
that trust is an area that hasn't received proper attention in the academic literature. 
This study and that of Addison (1997) has confirmed the important role trust plays in 
the organisational change process. Future studies should take this further by 
specifically designing research studies to investigate issues of trust and how it affects 
the organisational change process. This will lead to a better understanding of the 
concept of trust as well as a better understanding of the organisational change process. 
The role the selection process plays in determining competence, integrity, 
communication skills and ability to work in a team environment has been well 
documented in the academic literature. However very little has been researched on 
the role the selection process plays in instituting trust in organisations. Future 
research should investigate the relationship between the selection process and trust, 
and further develop the findings of this study. 
This research has investigated change at two levels, the institutional level and the 
organisational level. The New Zealand industry is distinctively different from The 
Gambia, as it comprises of several separate and independent sectors whereas in The 
Gambia, the industry is the same as the organisation. A two-level study was 
undertaken because the changes in botb countries involved the concept of 
privatisation which is better understood by studying it at more than one level 
(Ramamurti, 2000). Fox-Wolgramm et. al (1998) also note that any study of change 
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should adopt a multi-level perspective. However, the qualitative research literature 
(Bogdan and Biklen, 1982; Taylor and Bogdan, 1984) notes that better results are 
obtained from a qualitative study if analysis is confined to a single level. However, 
the unique nature of these two industries made it difficult to confine the analysis and 
findings to one level. Future research on the organisational change process that 
utilises qualitative techniques could be designed and case selection carried out such 
that this uniqueness is eliminated and the research is confined to one level of analysis. 
The WB/IMF role in LDCs will continue for the foreseeable future. Future 
comparative research could be designed to study the outcomes of reforms that are 
externally induced and those that are internally generated to confirm or refute the 
findings of this study. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix One 
Introduction 
The reform programmes in New Zealand and The Gambia have had a high legislative 
input into them. The legislation served to define the institutional framework 
necessary for reform and were largely responsible for the organisational forms that 
were adopted (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). References have been made in the body 
of the thesis to the various pieces of legislation that have guided the reform 
programmes, especially in the case studies detailing change in the two electricity 
industries. Appendix One outlines some of the main legislation and how they have 
guided the reform programme in the electricity industries in New Zealand and The 
Gambia. Some pieces of legislation were economy wide (the SOE Act 1986 and the 
Public Enterprises Act 1990), and others were industry specific (the GUC Act 1972, 
the Energy Companies Act 1992, and the Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998). 
State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Act 1986 
Prior to the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Act 1986 state-trading enterprises played a 
major role in the provision of services in the New Zealand economy. State trading 
activities were carried out through government departments subject to tight central 
control of funds, capital works investment, and staffing. There were no incentive 
structures in place for attracting and hiring employees, and government employees 
received much less than their counterparts in the private sector. The absence of 
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incentives resulted in lower performance and efficiency levels within the enterprises 
(McKinlay, 1987). 
In 1985 the fourth Labour government published five general principles for the re-
organisation of state trading activities to make them more efficient (Duncan and 
Bollard, 1992). The five principles were: 
i. Non commercial functions to be separated from major state 
trading activities. 
ll. Managers would be required to run state trading activities as 
successful businesses. 
lll. Managers would be responsible for the pricing and marketing 
of products within performance objectives agreed upon with the 
government. 
tv. Enterprises would be expected to operate in a neutral 
environment i.e. there would be no competitive advantage or 
disadvantage within their speciftc industry. 
v. Enterprises would be set up under the guidance of a Board of 
Directors modelled along private sector lines. 
These five principles led directly to the formulation of the SOE Act 1986. The 
objectives of the Act were to change, in a fundamental way, the manner in which 
commercial activities of government enterprises were managed and controlled (Spicer 
et. aI, 1996). The overall aim of the Act was to enhance the effectiveness and 
improve the efficiency of these enterprises. The Act allowed for state trading 
departments to be transformed into limited liability companies through the process of 
corporatisation. The newly formed companies were to be bound by the same laws as 
companies in the private sector (the Companies Act 1955 and the Commerce Act 
1986). 
288 
The SOB model was designed to develop a more efficient governance structure short 
of full privatisation and the full reallocation of property rights (Spicer et. aI., 1996). 
The Act indicated that a clear commercial focus was expected, and companies were to 
operate as successful businesses and "be as profitable and efficient as comparable 
businesses that are not owned by the Crown" (section 4(1)). The corporatisation 
process was undertaken in New Zealand to remove or replace mixed, inconsistent, 
discretionary and non-monitorable objectives with clear, consistent and commercially 
measurable objectives (Duncan and Bollard 1992). The Act provided for the 
separation of policy and regulatory objectives from operations. It also required the 
distancing of politicians, in particular ministers, from the day to day operation of the 
new corporations. Success of the new corporations was to be measured in terms of 
rates of return on assets and capital (McKinlay, 1987) as well as using appropriate 
performance measures such as profitability (Spicer et. aI., 1996). 
One of the fundamental requirements of the SOB Act 1986 was for the government 
and the corporations to agree on a Statement of Corporate Intent (SCI). The SCI was 
to be the instrument that would be used for SOB monitoring. Included in the SCI was 
to be an agreement between the parties on the corporate objectives, the scope of 
activities, accounting policies, performance targets, estimated returns and commercial 
valuations. The SOB Act 1986 also provided for a board of directors to be the link 
between government and the management teams, in other words a separation of 
management from control (Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). The Act made 
provisions for non-commercial activities to be undertaken by SOBs. However, if such 
an activity was required of an SOB by the Crown, payment was to be received from 
the Crown for the non-commercial services provided (section 7). 
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The SOE Act 1986 had a wide impact and after its introduction there was a marked 
increase in efficiency of most government trading departments. Duncan and Bollard 
(1992) document some of the efficiency gains made by the newly formed corporations 
that were a consequence of the Act. 
Previous to the SOE Act 1986, the public sector (both local and central government) 
was unable to recruit and retain the skilled personnel required for commercial 
operations because of the lack of pay flexibility in the sector (Boston et. aI, 1996). 
The new commercial environment, brought about by the SOE Act 1986, necessitated 
a reform of labour laws to enable public sector companies to enhance their 
efficiencies. New skills were needed in running the commercial operations required 
of the corporations, and it was necessary to source these skills from the private sector. 
The Labour Relations Act 1987 and the State Sector Act 1988 brought labour 
legislation in the public sector and state-owned enterprises into line with those in the 
private sector. Responsibility for remuneration was transferred from a central body, 
the State Services Commission (Ssq, to the boards of the newly formed companies. 
The Employment Contracts Act 1991 was designed to give employees the option of 
either entering into individual contracts with their employers, or entering into 
collective agreements. The Employment Contracts Act 1991 was based, like the SOE 
Act 1986 and the State Sector Act 1988, on neo-liberal ideas. Under the Employment 
Contracts Act 1991, compulsory unionism was abandoned, and unions had less 
power. Unions were relegated to the status of incorporated societies and were 
allowed to represent employees as agents (Castles et. al., 1996; Dannin, 1997). 
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Energy Companies Act 1992 
The electricity industry in New Zealand is made up of the generation, transmission, 
distribution and retailing sectors. Generation and transmission were run as 
departments under the national government, while local body authorities undertook 
the distribution and retailing of electricity. The SOE Act 1986 applied only to the 
generation and transmission sectors of the industry. It was felt, however, that the 
efficiency gains that resulted from corporatisation were captured by the demand side 
(distribution and retailing) of the industry and not passed on to the consumers. The 
Energy Companies Act 1992 was designed to bring changes to the demand side of the 
industry that would correspond to the changes made earlier on the supply side 
(generation and transmission). It was felt that these changes were necessary to make 
the industry more efficient. 
Prior to 1992, the demand side of the industry was made up of Electric Power Boards 
(EPBs) with locally elected board members and Municipal Electricity Departments 
(MEDs), which were owned by local councils. Each of these local authorities 
operated within defined geographical areas known as franchise areas. The Energy 
Companies Act 1992 required the transformation of all EPBs and MEDs to Electric 
Power Companies (EPC) with limited liability, under the Companies Act 1955. The 
Act catered for the removal of the franchise areas, and allowed customers to freely 
choose retailers across the once historical boundaries, if they so desired. The Act was 
also designed to encourage the formation of new energy companies through mergers 
and acquisitions of existing local authorities in order to bring down the high number 
of electricity distributors and retailers. The inefficiencies on the demand side of the 
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industry were partly attributed to the high number of companies in the industry. A 
study carried out by Putnam Hayes and Barlett (1989) showed that economies of 
scale, on the demand side of the industry, could only be achieved if companies had a 
minimum of 20,000 customers. Most power companies, except the ones that served 
the big cities, had less than 20,000 customers. Small rural townships and 
communities had power companies that had less than 10,000 customers. These small 
number of consumers and the many distribution companies were partly responsible 
for the inefficiencies on this side of the industry. 
The principle objective of the Energy Companies Act 1992 was that energy 
companies should operate as successful businesses (section 36(1)) with each company 
being governed by a board of commercial directors. The Act also provided for a 
statement of corporate intent (SCI) to be agreed upon between the shareholders and 
management of the companies through the board. In this respect the Energy 
Companies Act 1992 was similar to the SOE Act 1986. 
As a direct consequence of the Act some local authorities merged with neighbouring 
authorities, which reduced the number of companies from fifty-nine in 1992 to thirty-
seven by 1997. Most of the EPBs, which previously had no owners, were 
transformed into companies with trust ownership with the local consumers being the 
shareholders. Some larger EPBs, however, opted for majority public shareholding on 
the New Zealand Stock Exchange. 
Reform on the demand side of the industry progressed slowly compared to that on the 
supply side. Read (1997) attributes the slow pace of reform to the complexities of 
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having to deal with a much greater number and variety of organisations. The slow 
process of obtaining government and Commerce Commission approval for mergers 
and acquisitions also stagnated the reforms on the demand side. 
Electricity Industry Reform (EIR) Act 1998 
The reforms in the electricity sector brought about a lot of improvements (Duncan and 
Bollard, 1992; Spicer et. aI., 1996; Read, 1997); however, the anticipated levels of 
efficiency in the industry were not realised. This prompted the government to initiate 
further reforms in the industry in 1998. The demand side of the industry had 
historically developed as vertically integrated companies, with EPCs being 
responsible for both the distribution and retailing of electricity. The supply side of the 
industry had only two major players with disproportionate market shares. 
Government officials felt that this institutional framework inhibited competition in the 
industry and as a result, the government decided to introduce the Electricity Industry 
Reform (EIR) Act 1998 to enhance more competition in the electricity industry. It 
was hoped that the changes that were required by the EIR Act 1998 would lead to 
lower power prices for all consumers. 
The EIR Act 1998 affected both the supply and demand sides of the industry. On the 
supply side, in order to enhance competition, the Act required that the dominant 
generator ECNZ be split into three competing generators. This split would increase 
the number of generators and make the market shares of each generator in the industry 
more proportional, thereby increasing competition on the supply side. On the demand 
side, the Act required EPCs to separate their lines businesses from retailing. This was 
to eliminate risks of cross-subsidisation of retail businesses by the natural monopoly 
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lines businesses. The separation was also required to eliminate restrictive access 
conditions that incumbent line owners put in place to inhibit competition in what was 
once their exclusive franchise area. The separation was also instituted to remove any 
cross subsidisation of uneconomic generation investments by the lines businesses, as 
some demand side companies had invested in generation as well. Separation in the 
demand side of the industry was expected to increase competition in the retailing of 
energy. The expectations of the EIR Act 1998 were that further rationalisations 
would take place in the lines businesses bringing the number of companies down from 
thirty-seven. 
The government has, however, threatened to introduce further legislation in the 
industry in the event that prices, which have risen since the introduction of the EIR 
Act 1998, become uncontrollable. The reforms in New Zealand up to this stage have 
been largely based on light-handed regulation based on the Commerce Act 1986 and 
the threat of regulation. The Commerce Act 1986 is a general piece of legislation 
meant to curb anti-competitive behaviour in the New Zealand economy. Attempts 
were made in late 1999 to introduce special regulatory legislation to arrest the price 
increases, which resulted after separation in April 1999. However, this attempt by 
the National led government did not receive the required support from all parties in 
parliament and as a result the government was unable to get the legislation through. 
A ministerial inquiry was set up by the new Labour led coalition government to 
review the reforms in the electricity industry that resulted from the EIR Act 1998. 
The report from this inquiry indicated that. regulation was indeed necessary in the 
electricity industry to curb rent seeking behaviour by both lines and energy 
businesses. 
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The Gambia Utilities Corporation (GUC) Act 1972 
The GUC Act 1972 was responsible for the amalgamation of the Water Works and the 
Electricity Departments of the Ministry of Works into a commercially oriented 
corporation. The corporation was expected to operate on sound commercial lines 
(section 14(1)) and to ensure that its revenues were sufficient to produce a reasonable 
rate of return to its shareholder (the government). Section 14(2) of the Act required 
the rates of return for each financial year to be determined a priori by the minister in 
charge of the corporation together with the Minister of Finance (shareholding 
ministers). This was similar to the requirement in New Zealand to have a Statement 
of Corporate Intent (SCI) between the government and the SOEs. 
The GUC Act required the governing body of the corporation to be a board of 
directors that was to be appointed by the minister responsible for the corporation 
(section 5(1)). The responsibilities of the board included the formulation of policy to 
achieve the objectives set by government and making sure that management took 
steps to implement these policies (section 5(6)). The MD was to be appointed by the 
minister in consultation with the board. However this was never adhered to and the 
President made all the appointments to the position of MD. Tariffs were to be 
determined by the board; however, approval was needed from the shareholding 
ministers and parliament before any revision of tariffs could become effective. The 
GUC Act 1972 catered for non-commercial activities to be undertaken by the 
corporation however, compensation was to be received from the government for any 
non-commercial activity or service undertaken by GUC (section 15). 
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The Public Enterprises Act 1990 
State-Owned Enterprises or parastatals, as they are better known, in The Gambia 
suffered from government and political interference in the late seventies and 
throughout the eighties. The government introduced the Public Enterprise Act 1990 
to promote improved performance in state trading activities as most of the parastatals 
in the country were underperforming in economic terms as well as to curb ministerial 
interference in the activities of the parastatals. 
The principal objective of every public enterprise, as stipulated by the Act, was to 
operate as a successful business and to be as profitable and efficient as possible 
(section 3). The Act allowed for the reformulation of existing boards to give them a 
commercial orientation. The new directors were required to assist the enterprises to 
achieve their principal objectives (section 4(1)). The Act, however, vested a lot of 
power and authority in the President. The President was responsible for appointing 
the directors (section 23(1)) as well as the managing director (section 25(1)). It was 
believed that this authority would curb ministerial and political interference in the 
operations of the public enterprises (PE). It was felt that ministers and politicians 
were less likely to interfere when they knew that they would be accountable to the 
President for their actions. 
Under the Act it was expected that a formal statement of intent would be agreed upon 
between the PEs and the government detailing the expectation from the PEs and the 
obligations of the government. This was meant to encourage maximum performance 
and to clarify objectives (section 9). Any contract agreed upon would specify the 
scope of commercial services and non-commercial activities of the PEs, as well as the 
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performance targets. An incentive scheme for management performance, including 
penalties for lack of performance, was also to be included in the agreement between 
the government and the PE (section 10). Any non-commercial objectives sanctioned 
by the government and undertaken by the PEs which were not in line with the 
financial objectives of the PEs, were to be paid for by the government in whole or in 
part (section 6). 
Section 14 of the Public Enterprise Act 1990 allowed the government to form 
corporations for taking over the activities of any PE, or forming new PEs to carry out 
any activity on behalf of the government. UHC and subsequently Nawec were 
formed utilising the provisions of this clause. UHC was formed as a holding 
company and all the assets of GUC were vested in the holding company. Nawec was 
formed as a limited liability company to undertake the supply of water and electricity 
in The Gambia, and took over the operations of the UHC, which had been responsible 
for operations after the MSG contract was terminated. Section 17 of the Act allowed 
a PE to hire or lease any movable or immovable property of the PE. This clause 
allowed UHC to lease its assets under a management lease contract to Sogea. Sogea 
in turn established MSG to run the operations of the assets leased from UHC. 
Conclusion 
The above description of the various pieces of ·legislation guiding the reform 
programmes in the electricity industries in New Zealand and The Gambia point out a 
number of similarities in the legislative framework. The institutional frameworks 
guiding the reforms had a heavy commercial focus and were all meant to bring about 
one form of privatisation or the other in the electricity industries. Both were 
297 
influenced by agency theory, even though when the GUC Act 1972 was introduced, 
agency theory was still in its infancy. The monitoring mechanisms contained in the 
SOE Act 1986 and the Public Enterprise Act 1990 both adopted governance and 
control mechanisms based on agency theory. The monitoring mechanisms were also 
similar and made provision for rates of return and profitability to help in determining 
performance. The various Acts made provisions for non-commercial activities to be 
carried out, but required payment for any such activities to be made to the enterprises 
concerned. There was clearly a noticeable trend towards the homogenisation of the 
institutional frameworks in the two countries (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). 
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Appendix Two 
Appendix Two outlines the interview schedule that served as an "aide-memoire" 
(Bryman, 1989) and reminded me of the topics I wanted to cover during my 
interviews in The Gambia and in New Zealand. The "aide-memoire" was divided into 
four sections as I felt that asking questions under these sections would enable me to 
find out what actually happened in the two change programmes. The answers 
obtained from the questions in the four sections would also enable me, during 
analysis, to gain a better understanding of the process of organisational change. From 
the "aide-memoire" I was able to make up the specific questions I wanted to ask for 
each section. Each interview had its own aide-memoire, because the aide-memoire 
guided me along and I ticked the areas under each section as I covered them in each 
interview. The aide-memoire varied according to the person being interviewed. If the 
interviewee was predominantly a human resources expert, I ensured that more focus 
was placed on the human resources questions that I had developed. I did not go from 
section to section in the manner written down below but jumped from one to the other 
depending on what the respondent was talking about. This was to ensure that the 
interview flowed smoothly and not too structured, as this would have led to disjointed 
answers. The ticks beside each area enabled me to know which areas I still hadn't 
covered and I was able to come back to these before the end of the interview. The 
notes written on the "aide-memoire" and the answers received from the previous 
interview assisted me in drawing up the "aide-memoire" for the next interview. 
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Why Change? 
Why was there the need for change? 
Ideology? 
How Change? 
How were the changes implemented? 
Who/what is driving the change? 
Speed of change? 
Structural change? 
Selection and rewards? 
Leadership of change? 
Problems? 
Resistance to change? 
Politics/governmental problems? 
People problems/Staffing problems? 
Outcomes? 
Price? Profitability? Investment? 
Costs? Cultural change? 
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Appendix Three 
This Appendix contains the list of codes which were developed through the process of 
coding and data analysis. As an example of the coding process, all of the data which 
were coded to the category selection are also provided to illustrate how data were 
conceptualised through the use of codes which were astringent as they pulled together 
a lot of material thus permitting analysis (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The category 
selection was not determined a priori but it was allowed to emerge as emergent 
categories usually prove to be the most relevant and best suited to the data. 
I think the introduction of the present MD is quite sad as he has been 
known for what he did in the past. He is someone who vehemently 
believes in the principle of establishing camps and during his first stint 
as MD the environment was very unhealthy as there were a lot of 
camps especially in the senior management team. He is also known to 
have been spreading stories about the removed MD even before he was 
removed and went to all quarters to see that his deal goes through and 
that resulted in the changing of guard and it saw him return as MD. 
It is also the president's prerogative to employ the MD, but it is also 
important to employ a MD that is conversant with the requirements of 
the sectors. 
They took people with the expectation that people were able to do the 
job so if you are not able to do the job that is why they weeded a lot of 
people at the onset when the took over. 
Before they took over, they came here enquiring about the qualification 
of each and every individual that was employed with GUC and it was in 
consultation with us who were here. 
The structure was there but they needed these number of people and 
instead of needing four for a job they said we· need two and we decided 
on that and the others would go and of course based on the capability 
and the capacity of the workers was taken into consideration. 
When UHC came in they felt that there were areas that needed 
additional manpower and therefore they recruited people that were 
ousted by MSG at the time. 
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The right people have not been appointed both at the management level 
and at the board level. 
The choice of MD should be made more prudently, qualifications aside, 
than has been done in the past. It is necessary for you to look into the 
character of the individual before an appointment is made. 
The present MD has served in the corporation before as an engineer 
and he was sacked. He later came in as MD and was again sacked and 
he has now been brought in again. I wish him luck. 
There is a gross conflict of interest as he is the owner of Banjul Electric 
Company which has just signed a D280 million contract to build a 
power house and he is also MD of NA WEe. I feel that this is unethical 
and should not have been allowed at all. Such appointments are what 
lead to reckless behaviour on the part of management. 
The selection of people into management positions is very important 
and also into board positions is of utmost importance. 
I believe the boards should have people with private sector experience 
who are handling companies with turnover in the millions because then 
the tendency that they would be tempted to do something inappropriate 
for small sums of money is unlikely. 
This problem is also in the management of NA WEC, we are talking of a 
D200 million company and we need to pay people well and also 
honesty should be the yardstickfor appointment into senior positions. 
I do agree that this is difficult, but this is a small country and everyone 
knows everyone and we do know of people's past history and these 
should be taking into consideration when appointments are made. 
There has been too much overstaffing in the sector and the sector needs 
efficient people who are employed not for the sake of employing but 
rather for their competence and they are promoted on merit and ability. 
We really need more competent people in the sector. 
Another area in which major gains have been made is that the previous 
board was very involved in getting the right type of people in the 
organisation within the normal constraints of government. Senior 
people were vetted before being promoted or appointed to any position 
within the company. However there were occasions when this was 
beyond the control of the board. 
As I have stressed throughout this. interview we are dealing with a 
D200 million company and it was necessary that we have people who 
have good characters to run the company as the likelihood of 
corruption is great especially if we have unscrupulous people 
appointed. 
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Well in Africa we have some come in by the back door but generally we 
have a set criteria to select people especially in the engineering sector. 
We however take people from GITI who have either 0 level or A level. 
The key is to have the right people in the right place and have less 
interference from government and that is the problem. 
It is good to have people who are knowledgeable in the regulatory body 
so that they would be able to argue issues and also that they are not 
baffled by too much technical details. 
Well for selection I guess the best criterion is to have square pegs in 
square holes, get the right person for the job. As far as I was 
concerned I tried to do that as far as possible although sometimes 
mistakes could be made. 
The whole chain of activity was broken down into task and then the 
tasks were grouped together into jobs and it was after all these things 
had been done and then started assigning individuals to job, but we 
forgot about everything else names individuals and everything and 
identified what needed to be done and after we felt that we had it right 
and tasks had been identified and lumped together into jobs and then 
we started putting people into jobs and we found out that we needed 
some more people. We got some new people and some of the old 
people who had very good track records were reinstated. Some of the 
people in GUC had very bad track records, some of them were involved 
in dubious activities. We also realised that MSG had their bad 
elements and we made sure that some of these bad elements were never 
brought back to NA WEe. 
Well initially people were given questionnaires to ask whether they 
wanted to be employed by MSG or UHC, but it was made clear that the 
holding company would only take 18 people and so naturally most 
people chose MSG. It was also stated that if MSG did not find a 
suitable position for you they would pay you six months salary and it 
was left from MSG to choose. 
They naturally had help from the Gambians who were around. There 
was a lot of infighting in this process and if a Gambian manager did 
not like a subordinate, he would give a bad or false report about that 
subordinate and this happened a lot. 
We recruited competent people and we recruited an HR manager 
responsible for HR and admin for the first time, we also recruited a 
corporate planning manager and. we recruited two mechanical 
engineers 
We also had problems getting professional staff especially engineers 
and it has been difficult. For the last three years we advertised for 
these positions but we have only been able to get one or two and there 
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are still a lot of vacancies in the sector for skilled professionals. On the 
IT side we have also been unable to recruit an IT manager and 
computer engineers are difficult to get mainly because of the salary 
structure as most of them prefer to work in the private sector. 
We decided to make it transparent and advertised all positions and the 
board interviewed all the candidates. 
You only have to develop the ability to recognise that capacity and 
utilise it and when I say recognise and utilise it I mean round pegs in 
round holes. We are trying to get people who know the industry and 
can strategise and move the industry forward and that is what we are 
trying to do. 
The SOS normally recommends to the President for appointment to the 
board we feel that it is people who are capable and not just go to sit on 
board meetings but have to contribute meaningfully to the development 
of that institution and ask pertinent issue when you are discussing 
papers. 
People were hired and put into the system without any prior knowledge 
of what electricity was. 
In terms of both administrative and technical management of the 
system, the people responsible that is the managers responsible for 
hiring people in the system in my opinion were not competent and 
employment was based on things such as political affiliation and that 
sort of thing. 
We have however stopped hiring illiterates, I have personally stopped 
and we only take illiterates now as labourers and for any other jobs you 
must have some qualifications and this was started in 1995. 
The days are gone when we were employing illiterates and now we are 
employing technical people from places like GITI. 
We also have a board sub-committee for recruitment on senior 
positions and a management sub-committee for recruitment in junior 
positions. 
The manner in which the management team is selected leaves much to 
be desired. 
The managers to serve under the holding company were all handpicked 
and most of them did not have the necessary qualifications nor 
expertise to monitor the leasing arrangement. 
Well that was done by the board. Government appointed the MD and 
the board selected the remaining staff and the positions were all 
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advertised. At the lower levels, the management advertised the posts 
and selected the applicants. 
They then decided that for this unit we will need so many people to do 
this such as erecting a pole and then they employed the GUC people to 
guide them as to who the best people were to stay in the unit. 
I think parliament thought that it was best for the president to appoint 
the MDs of public corporations and these were the rules as laid down 
and approved by parliament. 
The data for the New Zealand and Gambian cases were coded separately. The New 
Zealand case yielded 176 nodes as two levels were utilised in coding - the industry 
and the organisational level. The Gambian case had a total of 103 nodes as only one 
level was used, as the industry and the organisation were one and the same. The 
categories used for coding in the study are listed below. 
New Zealand 
1= /New Zealand 
2= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective 
3= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry 
4= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Ideological 
change 
5= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/W ork Practice 
change 
6= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industrylBasics 
7= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Changes 
8= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/isomorphism 
9= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industrylDomination 
10= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Outside 
influence 
11= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Cooperation and 
Communication 
12= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Technological 
change 
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13= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Cultural Change 
14= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Causes of the 
changes 
15= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Causes of the 
changes/Economic deterioration 
16= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Causes of the 
changes/Ideology 
17= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Causes of the 
changes/Efficiency 
18= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Causes of the 
changes/Goverment Political reasons 
19= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Speed of Change 
20= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Change due to 
legislation 
21= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industrylRationalisation 
22= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Separation 
23= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the 
industry /Separation/Transpower-ECNZ 
24= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the 
industry/Separation/ECNZ split 
25= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Separation/line 
Energy split 
26= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Vision and 
planning 
27= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Changes within the industry/Customer 
pressure 
28= /New Zealand/Industry PerspectivelBackground 
29= /New Zealand/Industry PerspectivelBackground/Occupation 
30= /New Zealand/Industry PerspectivelBackground/Qualification 
31= /New Zealand/Industry PerspectivelBackgroundlResponsibility 
32= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/BackgroundlLength of Involvement 
33= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Competition 
34= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/CompetitionlBenefits 
35= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/CompetitionlBenefits/Price reduction 
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36= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Competition/Benefits/Choice 
37= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Competition/Collusion 
38= /New Zealand/Industry PerspectivelProblems 
39= /New Zealand/Industry PerspectivelProblemslInterest group 
40= /New Zealand/Industry PerspectivelProblems/Change Time 
41= /New Zealand/Industry PerspectivelProblems/problems of the split 
42= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Coordination 
43= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Privatisation Problems 
44= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Ideological 
45= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Lack of Understanding 
46= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Regulation Problems 
47= /New Zealand/Industry PerspectivelProblems/Problems due to competition 
48= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Political 
49= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/ProblemslEnvironment 
50= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Imperfection 
51 = /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Community problems 
52= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Capture of gains 
53= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Market Problems 
54= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Government Problems 
55= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Lack of competition 
56= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Complexity 
57= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Cultural problems 
58= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/People problems 
59= /New Zealand/Industry PerspectivelProblems/Price 
60= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Inefficient 
61= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/disruptive 
62= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Problems/Cost 
63= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Change Drivers 
64= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Outcomes 
65= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Outcomes/Productivity and reduction in 
numbers 
66= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Outcomes/Profitability 
67= /New ZealandlIndustry Perspective/Outcomes/Success 
68= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Outcomes/Cost reduction 
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69= !New Zealand/Industry Perspecti ve/OutcomeslPrice 
70= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/OutcomeslEfficiency 
71= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Outcomes/new jobs 
72= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Outcomes/Customer benefit and reaction 
73= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Outcomes/Unfavourable outcomes 
74= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Outcomes/Learning 
75= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Outcomes/competition 
76= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Outcomes/Transparency 
77= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/OutcomeslFluidity-flexibility 
78= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Outcomes/Commercialisation 
79= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Regulation 
80= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Regulation/adequacy? 
81= !New Zealand/Industry PerspectivelRegulation/Information disclosure 
82= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Ownership Options 
83= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Ownership Options/Government ownership 
84= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Ownership Options/Private ownership 
85= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Ownership Options/Private 
ownershiplForeign Ownership 
86= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Benefits (Pri. & SOB) 
87= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Training 
88= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Risk 
89= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Investments 
90= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Industry Security 
91= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Industry response 
92= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Industry Background 
93= !New Zealand/Industry PerspectivelElectricity market 
94= /New Zealand/Industry PerspectivelElectricity marketlBenefits 
95= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Cross subsidisation 
96= /New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Government 
97= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Government/Role in industry 
98= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Government/Interference 
99= !New Zealand/Industry Perspective/Corporatised 
100= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective 
101= !New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the Organisation 
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102= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Ideological change 
103= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the Organisation/Work 
Practice change 
104= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Changes 
105= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Separation 
106= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the Organisation/New 
CEO 
107= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Causes 
108= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Outside influence 
109= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Communication 
110= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
OrganisationlEmpowerment and autonomy 
111= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Internally driven Change 
112= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Internally driven ChangelManagement driven 
113= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Internally driven Change/Participatory 
114= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Internally driven Change/CEO Driven 
115= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Cultural Change 
116= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Downsizing 
117= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Selection 
118= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Change time 
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119= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the Organisation/Use 
of consultants in implementing change 
120= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the Organisation/Old 
Management Style 
121= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Rationalisation 
122= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the Organisation/New 
management style 
123= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the Organisation/New 
management style/Focus and vision 
124= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the Organisation/New 
management style/team 
125= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Structural change 
126= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the OrganisationlExit 
strategy 
127= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
OrganisationlEmployment contracts 
128= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Isomorphism 
129= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
OrganisationlPlanning 
130= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/training and qualifications 
131 = /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Change within the 
Organisation/Strategy 
132= /New Zealand/Organisational PerspectivelBackground 
133= /New Zealand/Organisational PerspectivelBackground/Occupation 
134= /New Zealand/Organisational PerspectivelBackground/Qualification 
13 5= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspecti velB ackground/Responsibility 
136= /New Zealand/Organisational PerspectivelBackground/Length of Involvement 
137= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/ Problems 
138= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/ Problems/Interest group 
139= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/ ProblemslTime taken to change 
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140= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/ Problems/government 
141= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/ Problems/internal problems 
142= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/ Problems/Old people 
143= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/ Problems/Problems of outsourcing 
144= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/ Problems/Lack of understanding 
145= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/ Problems/Complacency 
146= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/ Problems/Costs 
147= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/ Problems/Staffing problems and 
redundancies 
148= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Privatised Ownership 
149= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Outcomes 
150= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Outcomes/Productivity 
151 = /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Outcomes/Profitability 
152= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Outcomes/Cost Savings 
153= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/OutcomeslDiversification 
154= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Outcomes/Success 
155= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Outcomes/Staff reduction 
156= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/OutcomeslEfficiency 
157= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Outcomes/Culture change 
158= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Outcomes/W ork environment 
159= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Company History 
160= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Company History/Power net 
161= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Company History/Mainpower 
162= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Company HistorylDelta 
163= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Reward Systems 
164= /New Zealand/Organisational PerspectivelReward Systems/Performance related 
pay 
165= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Reward Systems/Satisfaction and 
recognition 
166= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Reward Systems/Performance 
management 
167= /New Zealand/Organisational PerspectivelEmployee Response to change 
168= /New Zealand/Organisational PerspectivelEmployee Response to 
changelEmployee support 
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169= !New Zealand/Organisational PerspectivelEmployee Response to 
changelEmployee understanding 
170= !New Zealand/Organisational PerspectivelEmployee Response to 
changelEmployee dissatisfaction 
171= !New Zealand/Organisational PerspectivelEmployee Response to 
changelEmployee enthusiasm 
172= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/outsourcing 
173= !New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/outsourcing !Benefits 
174= /New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/outsourcing /Monitoring 
175= !New Zealand/Organisational Perspective!Next time round 
176= !New Zealand/Organisational Perspective/Retention of key People 
The Gambia 
1 = /The Gambia 
2= /The Gambia/Background (prior to 1972) 
3= /The Gambia/Culture 
4= /The Gambia/Culture/GUC Culture 
5= /The Gambia/Culture/MSG Culture 
6= /The Gambia/CulturelUHC NA WEC Culture 
7= /The Gambia/Management Style 
8= /The Gambia/Management Style/Autocratic 
9= /The Gambia/Management Style/leadership 
10= /The Gambia/Management Style/Team effort 
11= IThe GambialManagement Style/Autonomy & Delegation 
12= /The GambialManagement Style/Consultative & Participative 
13= /The Gambia/Management Style/Problems with management style 
14= /The Gambia/Management Style/Management competence 
15= /The Gambia/Rewards & Incentives 
16= /The Gambia/Rewards & Incentives/Performance related reward 
17= /The Gambia/Rewards & IncentiveslLow remuneration 
18= /The Gambia/Change 
19= /The Gambia/Change/Structural or institutional Change 
20= /The Gambia/ChangelEconomic wide reform 
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21= /The Gambia/Change/Change drivers 
22= /The Gambia/Change/Change problems 
23= /The Gambia/Change Cause 
24= /The Gambia/Corruption 
25= /The Gambia/CorruptionlNepotism 
26= /The Gambia/Corruption/Conflict of interest 
27= /The Gambia/Investment 
28= /The Gambia/Problems 
29= /The Gambia/Problems/Staff problems 
30= /The Gambia/Problems/Staff problems/Camps 
31= /The Gambia/Problems/Staff problems/Infighting 
32= /The Gambia/Problems/Technical problems 
33= /The Gambia/Problems/Capacity 
34= /The Gambia/ProblemslLack of autonomy 
35= /The Gambia/Problems/Disorganisation 
36= /The Gambia/ProblemslLack of understanding 
37= /The Gambia/Problems/Human resource inadequacy 
38= /The Gambia/Problems/unclear definitions 
39= /The Gambia/Problems/Lack of resources (financial) 
40= /The Gambia/Problems/resistance to change 
41= /The Gambia/Problems/Lack of experience 
42= /The Gambia/ProblemslManagement problems 
43= /The Gambia/Consultants 
44= /The Gambia/Outcomes 
45= /The Gambia/Outcomes/Profitability 
46= /The Gambia/Outcomes/W orking as a team 
47= /The Gambia/Outcomes/capacity and network expansion 
48= /The Gambia/Outcomes/Costs 
49= /The Gambia/Privatisation 
50= /The Gambia/Privatisation/Management lease contract 
51= /The Gambia/Privatisation/Management lease contractlBenefits 
52= /The Gambia/Privatisation/Management lease contract/problems 
53= /The Gambia/Privatisation/Privatisation problems 
54= /The Gambia/Privatisation/Joint Venture 
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55= IThe GambialPrivatisation/benefits of privatisation 
56= IThe Gambia/Privatisation/Management Support contract 
57= IThe GambialPrivatisation/Management Support contract/Benefits 
58= IThe GambialPrivatisationlManagement Support contract/problems 
59= IThe Gambia/Privatisation/Caution about privatisation 
60= IThe Gambia/downsizing 
61= IThe Gambia/downsizing/Exit strategy 
62= IThe Gambia/downsizing/Downsizing problems 
63= IThe Gambia/downsizing/Overstaffing 
64= IThe Gambia/Regulation 
65= IThe Gambia/Mimetic Isomorphism 
66= IThe Gambia/Commercialisation 
67= IThe Gambia/Commercialisation/Lack of commercialisation 
68= IThe Gambia/Accountability 
69= IThe Gambia/Selection 
70= IThe Gambia/Lack of focus 
71 = IThe GambiaIW ater & Electricity Separation or integration? 
72= IThe GambialEnginerring Dominance 
73= IThe Gambia/Splitting electricity 
74= IThe Gambia/Participation 
75= IThe Gambia/Pricing 
76= IThe GambialExternal Pressures 
77= IThe Gambia/Rate of change 
78= IThe Gambia/Government 
79= IThe Gambia/Government IGovernment ownership 
80= IThe GambiaiGovernment IGovernment role 
81= IThe Gambia/Government IGovernment Policy 
82= IThe Gambia/Government IProblems to do with Government 
83= IThe Gambia/Government IPolicy framework 
84= IThe Gambia/Government IInterference 
85= IThe Gambia/Government Ipolitical problems 
86= IThe Gambia/Competition 
87= IThe GambialMD Turnover 
88= IThe GambialMD Turnover/lack of continuity 
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89= IThe Gambia/Planning 
90= IThe Gambia/Planning/Lack of planning 
91 = IThe Gambia/Control & monitoring 
92= IThe Gambia/Introduction of outsiders 
93= IThe Gambia/Communication 
94= IThe Gambia/Performance Contract MOD 
95= IThe Gambia/Training 
96= IThe GambialTraining/Lack of training 
97= IThe Gambia/Implementation of change 
98= IThe Gambia/Outsourcing 
99= IThe Gambia/Consumer relations & reactions 
100= IThe GambiaIBoard of Directors 
101= IThe Gambia/Organisational structure 
102= IThe Gambia/Costs 
103= IThe Gambia/Costs/Cost cutting 
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